
















The Dissertation Committee for Megan Grace Oprea Certifies that this is the 
approved version of the following dissertation: 
 
 
The language attitudes of second-generation North Africans in France: 








Barbara E. Bullock, Supervisor 
Carl Blyth 
Alexandra Wettlaufer 
Almeida Jacqueline Toribio 
Benjamin Brower 
The language attitudes of second-generation North Africans in France: 









Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 





This dissertation is dedicated to John, without whom, I would not have made it this far.  
 
“I send this token, but how little can it express my gratitude to you for making my life & 
any work I have done possible, and for giving me so much happiness in a world of 






I begin with an expression of gratitude to the Department of French & Italian for 
their generous financial support over the last six years while I pursued my degree. I am 
very appreciative of the members of my committee for their guidance on this project and 
for the unique insight that each was able to provide from their areas of expertise. I would 
particularly like to thank my supervisor, Barbara E. Bullock, for her belief in this 
research, her excellent feedback and edits, and her tutelage.  
A special thanks to my brother, Ryan Oprea, whose help with the statistical 
analysis was invaluable, and whose advice about how to get through graduate school 
helped me to keep perspective. I am also grateful to my sister, Karen, who has given me 
endless support along this journey (as well as some last minute edits), and to Hugo, 
whose emotional intelligence I could always rely on.   
I most especially am appreciative of my husband, John, for his support and 
encouragement through the most difficult moments in this process.  
 
 vi 
The language attitudes of second-generation North Africans in France: 
The effects of religiosity and national identity  
 
Megan Grace Oprea, PhD 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
 
Supervisor:  Barbara E. Bullock 
 
This dissertation explores the language attitudes (LAs) of second-generation 
North African immigrants in France toward Arabic and French, focusing primarily on 
women. I explore how these attitudes are correlated with religiosity, national identity and 
proficiency. Although numerous LA studies have been done in the Maghreb, none have 
examined the attitudes of the highly marginalized North African community in France. 
Previous research in LAs and in sociolinguistics has also neglected religion as a variable, 
a gap in the literature that this dissertation addresses. 
French and Arabic have powerful language ideologies making them an ideal 
language pairing to study. Muslims believe Arabic is the only language through which 
the true message of the Qur’an can be transmitted (Suleiman, 2003). Previous LA studies 
in the Maghreb indicate that people there strongly associate Islam with Arabic (Benrabah 
2007; Chakrani, 2010). It is also the national language of most Muslim majority countries 
and is linked with both national and pan-Arab identity (Dawisha, 2003). The French 
language is seen as the vehicle of French culture and is an important symbol of national 
identity that is used as a tool for the assimilation of immigrants (Weil, 2010). 
There is evidence to suggest that LAs are stronger in a diaspora context (Garrett, 
Bishop & Coupland, 2009). Language attitudes may be especially potent for the North 
 vii 
African diaspora because of the colonial history between France and the Maghreb, and 
the strained relationship between France and its immigrant population. Given that 
language can act as a symbol of culture (Choi, 2003), participants who more closely 
identify with their North African cultural and religious heritage will express more 
positive attitudes toward Arabic.  
In order to explore these topics, I constructed an anonymous language attitudes 
survey that was distributed online to second-generation North Africans in France, ages 18 
to 30. The survey included questions concerning attitudes toward religious and national 
identity. The results indicate positive attitudes toward Arabic, Islam and North Africa, 
while expressing relatively neutral attitudes toward French, and negative attitudes toward 
France. Correlations did emerge that suggest a relationship between religiosity, national 
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1. Introduction  
 
Today, France is home to the largest Muslim population in Europe, with official 
estimates putting the number at approximately 4.7 million (Pew Research Center, 2010).1 
The majority of this Muslim diaspora comes from France’s former colonies in North 
Africa: Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria (Kaya, 2009). The North African immigrant 
community, including the second and third generations, has lived on the fringes of French 
society for several decades and has been the focus of much scrutiny because of their 
religious practices, particularly when those practices intersect with public places like 
schools. This demographic change over the past half-century has come with much 
societal debate surrounding cultural and linguistic assimilation and whether, and in what 
ways, this community is able/willing to assimilate. In order to understand this major 
diaspora community in France, it is necessary to understand how they perceive 
themselves in relationship to their country of residence as well as the country of their 
heritage.  
One way to do this is by exploring how their attitudes toward language interact 
with their sense of belonging in France, their attachment to North Africa, and their 
religiosity. This is an especially valuable way to study this community because of the 
linguistic context in which this population finds itself. France is a country with a uniquely 
strong relationship with language. French is at the heart of the concept of French 
                                                
1 The number of Muslims in France is approximated to be a little below 5 million; however, when 
considering undocumented Muslims, this number is probably higher, putting it somewhere between 5 and 6 
million (Kaya, 2009, p. 64).  
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citizenship going back to the French Revolution (Weil, 2010), and of French culture and 
patrimony going back even further (Lodge, 1993). Arabic, which is spoken by the 
majority of North African immigrants in France, has been strongly tied to Islam since its 
advent (Suleiman, 2003), and in the past century has been a potent symbol of Arab 
identity, both politically and ethnically (Dawisha, 2003). Studying the language attitudes 
of this population is an ideal approach because both Arabic and French have strong ties to 
culture and identity, perhaps more so than other languages, and yet, no studies to date 
have focused on studying how the North African diaspora in France views these two 
languages. 
I propose to study the language attitudes of this community, and the role that 
these attitudes play as a proxy for attitudes toward religion, national identity and cultural 
identity. Understanding language attitudes is a way of understanding language ideologies 
(Garrett, 2010), which for many countries, especially France, have come to define much 
of what it is to be a member of that country. If we want to know how this marginalized 
community sees itself vis-à-vis France, their attitudes toward language should be 
considered a powerful indicator. In order to study these attitudes, I have conducted an 
online language attitudes survey targeting second generation North Africans in France. 2   
                                                
2 The terms “survey” and “questionnaire” will be used interchangeable throughout this dissertation. 
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1.1 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
In this section I briefly review the background and context for this study, 
specifically focusing on the North African immigrant community in France, language 
attitudes, and the language ideologies of French and Arabic. 
1.1.1 North African Immigrant Community 
Immigration to France from North Africa became prominent in the years after the 
Second World War when France was in need of a renewed workforce to aid in the effort 
of reconstruction (Kaya, 2009). After the end of the colonial era in the 1950s and 1960s, 
France maintained close ties with the Maghreb politically, economically and 
linguistically. This continued relationship with the Maghreb, and its geographic 
proximity to France, has made immigration to France relatively easy, with the proportion 
of immigrants from the Maghreb going from 2% in 1946 to 39% in 1982 (Hargreaves, 
2007).  
Today, the North African immigrant community lives predominantly in the 
banlieues on the outskirts of major metropolises such as Paris, Lyon, Grenoble and 
Marseille in public housing. These neighborhoods and buildings are isolated from the 
wealthier communities and city centers and are known for being run-down and 
dangerous. The majority of first generation North Africans work in manual labor jobs, 
with only a minority working in the professional sphere (INSEE, 2010). The second 
generation, although doing a little better than their parents’ generation, experiences high 
levels of unemployment (Tribalat, 1995). Whereas the second generation in the 1980s 
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was interested in assimilation to French society, their counterparts today are embracing 
their North African cultural and religious heritage (Begag, 2007). There is a “renewed 
Islamization” in the North African diaspora youth community (Gray, 2005), who are 
overall more religious than their parents (Begag, 2007).  
The majority French culture has not been very welcoming to the North African 
diaspora. While immigration can be a source of tension in all countries because of a 
perception that a population influx will endanger the economy and make jobs harder to 
come by, in France the debate has largely surrounded concerns and fears about Islamic 
fundamentalism (Tribalat, 1995). Seventy-four percent of those polled in 2013 thought 
that Islam is not compatible with French society’s values (Le Bars, 2013). The French 
policy of laïcité, or secularism, and the firm separation of public and private life have 
come into conflict with the North African diaspora who, as predominantly Muslim, 
express their religious adherence in the form of prayer and clothing, both outward signs 
of religious affiliation. The most long lasting conflict has been that of the affaire des 
foulards, a battle that has spanned decades over whether or not school girls should be 
allowed to wear headscarves, a symbol of religion, in the secular schools.3 This, mixed 
with the bitter history between France and the Maghreb during the fight for 
independence, has led to a volatile situation in France. In 2005, there were mass riots in 
the banlieues across France after the deaths of two North African youths at the hands of 
                                                
3 It is important to note here that while the headscarf is a symbol of religion, it can also be worn for cultural 
reasons.  
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the police. Kaya (2009) argues that the riots were caused by colonialism, racism, poverty 
and exclusion from French society. 
This tension has extended into the linguistic realm, where the speech practices of 
the North African community are stigmatized because they deviate from the highly 
praised standard variety (Melliani, 1997; Stewart, 2012). Despite the fact that many 
North African immigrants knew some French before coming to France, their speech is 
accented and often contains Arabic words. Their children, the second generation, are 
sometimes viewed as being ‘between’ languages because they do not speak standard 
French, nor are they always highly proficient in Arabic. Language is therefore yet another 
way in which this community is identified as different and therefore stigmatized. 
1.1.2 Language Attitudes, Culture and Religion 
There are two basic types of language attitudes: instrumental and integrative 
(Baker, 1992). Instrumental attitudes are those that indicate that a language is useful to 
the speaker, for example, to advance their career or make them more knowledgeable. 
Integrative attitudes tend to involve attachment to speakers of a language and 
identification with the cultural activities associated with that language (Baker, 1992, p. 
32). The attitudes that one holds toward a given language can be an expression of 
attitudes toward the culture attached to that language. Studying language attitudes is, 
therefore, a way to tap into how language is viewed as a proxy for attitudes toward 
religion and culture (Choi, 2003).  
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Language attitudes have traditionally been studied for language planning 
purposes, especially in post-colonial contexts in Africa, in order to decide on a new 
national language after the departure of the former colonial power, as well as to assess the 
effects of the language policies pre and post-independence (e.g. Bentahila, 1983). 
Language attitude studies are also used to examine situations where language contact is 
causing language shift to occur, for example in Wales (Baker, 1992), the theory being 
that by understanding language attitudes, these attitudes can be improved and language 
shift avoided. Language attitude studies are also useful for understanding a population 
and how they view a culture and society that is related to a language. This is especially 
relevant in migration contexts where immigrants are adjusting to a new language and 
culture.  
A subset of language attitude studies explores attitudes in the diaspora. This has 
been done mostly by a research group who compared language attitudes in the Welsh 
diaspora to those in Wales (Coupland, Bishop, Evans & Garrett, 2006; Garrett, Bishop & 
Coupland, 2009). They found that the diaspora groups had more positive attitudes toward 
the Welsh language and culture than those living in Wales, indicating what they call a 
“diasporic lens” through which they view their culture, language and heritage, with a 
religious thread also emerging. These studies indicate that diaspora groups tend to 
identify with their country of origin both linguistically and culturally, such that positive 
attitudes toward their heritage language may become a defining aspect of the community, 
with strong links to national identity, religion and cultural norms from the country of 
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origin. These findings suggest that diaspora language attitudes may be unique and should 
be studied across various cultural and linguistic contexts. 
Language attitudes are particularly important in a country like France where the 
concept of being ‘French’, both legally and culturally, is tightly intertwined with the 
French language and its proper usage (Judge, 2007; Weil, 2010). French language 
ideology goes back at least to the 16th century when it was praised for its ‘inherent’ 
beauty, and continued into the French Revolution (1789) when it was used as a tool for 
unifying the nation. In the last forty years it has been used as a substitute for economic 
success and continues to be a symbol of cultural ‘purity’ (Gordon, 1978; Oakes, 2001).  
There is a similarly strong relationship between Arabic and Islam. Suleiman 
(2003) argues that Arabic is especially prestigious because it is the language of the 
Qur’an and the Hadith, both of which refer to it as the language of heaven, the language 
chosen by God and the language of the Arabs. Like French, it has been praised as a 
superior language for centuries as well as viewed as tantamount to being a Muslim and an 
Arab. This ideology has manifested itself in language attitudes in the Maghreb, where 
people strongly associate Arabic with Islam (Benrabah, 2007; Chakrani, 2010). Arabic 
was also the foundation for the now-defunct Arab Nationalist project of the 20th century, 
which encouraged its use as the national language in post-colonial Arab countries.  
The North African diaspora in France is caught between the two formidable 
language ideologies surrounding French and Arabic. Studying their language attitudes is 
therefore a powerful tool for improving our knowledge and understanding of this 
marginalized group in France who is stigmatized linguistically, culturally and religiously. 
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It can further our knowledge of how they view their own position in France and how 
language acts as a stand-in for their sense of cultural and national identity.  
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Prior sociolinguistic research on the North African diaspora in France and their 
language attitudes has been deficient in a few important ways. This dissertation seeks to 
reddress some of those deficiencies. First, there have been several studies that examine 
the language attitudes of North Africans toward Arabic and French in order to understand 
the effects of France’s colonial-era language policies and of the post-independence 
Arabization movement (Benrabah, 2007; Chakrani, 2010); however, there are currently 
no language attitude studies of the North African Muslim diaspora in France.4 There is a 
need to examine this population in order to understand the post-colonial language 
attitudes not only of those who have immigrated to the country of their former colonizer, 
but of the succeeding generations who have gone through the French educational system 
and speak French at high degrees of proficiency, but who also still have roots in North 
African culture and language. Examining their attitudes toward language, and how these 
relate to religious and cultural attitudes, will shed light on how this population identifies 
itself in relation to the majority French society. 
                                                
4 There are some studies that discuss language attitudes incidentally to other research questions, although 
none that are systematic, thorough or that are working in the language attitude tradition. These studies will 
be discussed in Chapter 2. 
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Second, previous scholarship on language attitudes in the Maghreb has paid little 
attention to the strong ties between Arabic and Islam. It is my contention that this is an 
oversight of a powerful factor in the formation of language attitudes, which has been 
noted, but not explored in the field. Given that the North African immigrant community 
in France is predominantly Muslim, religion should be considered a component of their 
identity and should be studied accordingly. This trend of avoiding discussing religion is 
also wide spread in studies on sociolinguistic variation.5 Yaeger-Dror (2014) points out 
this gap in the literature and exhorts the sociolinguistic community to consider religion as 
a central component to identity. By highlighting and exploring religion and religiosity in 
this study, I hope to encourage researchers in language attitudes and sociolinguistics to 
take religion into consideration. 
Third, despite a rich body of sociolinguistic variation research on second and 
third-generation Maghrebi immigrants in France (Goudaillier, 1997; Fagyal, 2004; Jamin, 
Trimaille and Gasquet-Cyrus, 2006), little has been done to study women in this 
community and the ways in which they use language as an expression of identity 
(Trimaille & Billiez, 2007). There is evidence that suggests that women living in the 
Maghreb do not experience the same freedoms as women in France (Gill, 1999; Sadiqi, 
2003; Killian, 2006) and that this may affect their linguistic choices (Billiez, 1985). I 
propose that some women may express more positive attitudes toward French because of 
its relationship with French society. Unfortunately, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, the 
                                                
5 I make a distinction throughout this dissertation between the fields of language attitudes and 
sociolinguistics in order to separate language attitude studies from sociolinguistic studies on language 
variation, despite the fact that language attitudes are at times classified as belonging under the umbrella of 
sociolinguistics and, according to Garrett (2001), are a component of sociolinguistics.  
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majority of participants who responded to the survey for this dissertation were women 
(only five men responded). This eliminated any chance comparing responses based on 
gender. However, it does allow for a closer examination of how women view language, 
France, the Maghreb and Islam in the North African diaspora in France.  
1.3 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The objective of this dissertation is to examine the language attitudes of the North 
African diaspora in France, specifically the so-called second generation, toward French, 
Standard Arabic and dialectal Arabic,6 as well as their attitudes toward religion, France 
and the Maghreb. I explore the relationship between attitudes toward Arabic and attitudes 
toward Islam, given the uniquely close relationship between the two (Suleiman, 2003), in 
order to assess whether the language ideology of Standard Arabic is still present in the 
second generation of this diaspora community, and whether level of religiosity is a factor 
in the formation of language attitudes. I investigate how the dialectal Arabic spoken by 
this community is related to their attitudes toward the Maghreb and North African 
culture, and whether attitudes toward French are similarly correlated with attitudes 
toward France and French society. In addition, I also consider the extent to which 
proficiency (based on self-assessment) is related to language attitudes in this linguistic 
                                                
6 I do not investigate attitudes toward Berber in this dissertation, while acknowledging fully the large 
Berber community in France, and the role that the Berber language plays in identity for this portion of the 
North African diaspora. I investigate attitudes toward the standard variety of Arabic instead of Berber a) 
because of the close relationship between this variety and the Muslim religion, given that religion and 
language is one of the primary interactions that this dissertation focuses on, and b) because I am interested 
in attitudes toward the classic diglossic languages of dialectal and standard Arabic in the diaspora context.  
 11 
context in order to contribute to general knowledge of the interaction between proficiency 
and attitudes. 
The purpose of this inquiry into these attitudes is to understand better this large 
immigrant community, which has a long and troubled history with France, both during 
the colonial era and in the migration context, in order to provide insight into how they are 
integrating into life in France and whether they view themselves as insiders or outsiders 
in a country that has a strict definition of what it means to be French. It is also to improve 
our knowledge of language attitudes, their formation and components. This involves 
exploring the relationship between religious and national identity and language attitudes.  
 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY  
This dissertation makes significant and original contributions to the field of 
language attitudes and sociolinguistics, contributions that may have an effect on related 
fields such as sociology, diaspora studies, European studies and psychology. These 
contributions are methodological, theoretical and substantive in nature. 
Methodologically, I innovate where the language attitude survey tool is concerned. 
Whereas previous surveys have been pen and paper tasks that were done in the presence 
of the researcher, or were mailed out to schools and universities, I distributed my survey 
on the Internet. This allows for absolute anonymity, which helps to avoid effects of the 
researcher on the responses of participants, and also reaches out beyond the university 
educated to recruit participants from varying socioeconomic levels and backgrounds. 
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Theoretically, this research contributes to the understanding of the factors 
involved in language attitudes, especially concerning the effects of religion and 
religiosity. Language attitude studies, like sociolinguistic variation studies, ought to take 
religion into more careful consideration. For many communities religion is an important 
component of their identity, which affects linguistic attitudes and linguistic variation. 
Researchers in the field of sociology of religion and language have been highlighting the 
importance of the relationship between the two for years, but until recently there has been 
limited interest in the topic among sociolinguists (see Yaeger-Dror, 2014 for a recent 
discussion). By exploring the relationship between religion and language attitudes, this 
study aims to impact which variables are considered in sociolinguistic variation research. 
If sociolinguistics is the study of how we use language in a social setting, and attitudes 
are our “map of the social world” (Garrett, Coupland & Williams, 2003, p. 3), then 
understanding language attitudes should be fundamental to the field of sociolinguistics. 
Garrett (2001) argues that the two should be more integrated because language attitudes 
affect language variation. By furthering our understanding of what contributes to 
language attitudes, this study expands on the variables that should be considered in 
sociolinguistic research. 
This dissertation also contributes theoretically to the study of language attitudes in 
the diaspora, an area that has only been studied to a limited extent and for limited 
populations. Language attitude surveys have primarily been used for the Welsh diaspora 
in the U.S. and South America (Garrett et al., 2009), and for the Basque diaspora in the 
U.S. (Lasagabaster, 2008), both Western diasporas in Western contexts. This research 
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provides insight into how language attitudes function in a migration context from a non-
Western country to a Western one, especially where there is a colonial history.  
Substantively, this research is innovative in its exploration of the attitudes of 
second-generation North Africans in France, a population that has been neglected in the 
language attitudes field, despite much focus on the attitudes of their counterparts in the 
Maghreb. The shifting demographics in Europe necessitate research on diasporic 
communities from Muslim-majority countries, particularly diaspora from former colonies 
living in the country of their former colonizers. This dissertation explores how they view 
language as a proxy for religious and national identity, particularly in a ‘secular’ nation 
like France, and how they view themselves vis-à-vis the majority French culture. This 
dissertation, therefore, provides new insight into our understanding of this community 
and the inner machinations of assimilation. 
 
1.5 OVERVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGY  
In order to fulfill the goals of the study outlined above, I launched an anonymous 
language attitude survey online that targeted 18 to 30 year old French men and women 
who were born in France but whose parents are Arabic speakers born in the Maghreb. I 
constructed an original survey that draws from a large body of literature on attitude 
questionnaires in order to avoid the pitfalls of their construction (Bentahila, 1983; Baker, 
1992; Oppenheim, 1992; Garrett et al., 2003). It contains several question formats, both 
scalar and non-scalar, in order to vary the design and thereby tap into participants’ 
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attitudes in a more covert manner. The majority of the questions are quantitative and 
close-ended, which lends itself to easier analysis; however, some open-ended questions 
were used in order to allow participants to share their attitudes in a less restricted manner. 
The survey was launched on Qualtrics, and was circulated on the Internet via an online 
flyer that was sent to various list-serves, organizations, Mosques and Facebook groups 
(both religious and secular), the latter generating the majority of responses. All survey 
materials were in French. The data was analyzed quantitatively, looking at percentages in 
order to understand the overall attitudes of the group, and running correlations to look for 
relationships between attitudes toward language, religion and culture. The open-ended 
qualitative questions and comment sections were used to help shed light on the 
quantitative results.  
1.6 TERMINOLOGY 
1.6.1 Classical Arabic, Modern Standard Arabic, and Darija 
Before moving on to the research questions, it is necessary to give a brief history 
of the Arabic language and explain the differences between Classical Arabic, Modern 
Standard Arabic and dialectal Arabic, in order to help explain the distinctions made in 
these questions between different varieties of Arabic. It is further required to clarify the 
terminology that will be adopted throughout this dissertation and motivate these decisions 
before beginning the review of the relevant literature. 
The first attestations of what is often referred to as Classical Arabic appeared in 
the 4th century AD (Owens, 2006). Classical Arabic (CA) refers to the dialect of Arabic 
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spoken in the Arabian Peninsula by the Prophet Mohammed and his tribe in the 7th 
century and is the language in which the Qur’an was written and recorded a century later 
(Sayahi, 2014). The first fixed version of the Qur’an appeared in the second half of the 8th 
century along with a codification of the grammar (Owens, 2006). The Hadith, or sayings 
of the prophet, and the Sunnah, the teachings and practices of Mohammed, were also 
recorded in this language. Because of its intimate ties to the advent of Islam and Islam’s 
primary sacred texts, CA is taught in Qur’anic schools and is considered the only 
language that is capable of transmitting the message of the Qur’an.  
While CA was preserved throughout the centuries, the spoken language changed, 
especially as it came into contact with other languages and was spread beyond the 
Arabian Peninsula. According to Versteegh (2001, p. 145), today there are five groups of 
regional dialects in the Arab world: 1) Arabic spoken in the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf area), 2) Mesopotamian Arabic (Iraq), 3) Syro-Lebanese Arabic 
(Syria and Lebanon), 4) Egyptian Arabic, and 5) the Maghrebi dialects. These Arabic 
dialects are, for the most part, not written or codified and are acquired at home as the 
mother tongue. These dialectal varieties are different enough from one another as to make 
communication between them difficult, if not impossible. The dialectal Arabic spoken in 
the Maghreb is often referred to as Darija, a term that I have adopted. 
In 19th century Europe, the educational system and the military apparatus began to 
modernize. With this came pressure on the Arab states to modernize as well. If the Arab 
states needed to modernize, so too did the language. “The vernacular dialects were 
considered too ‘corrupt’ to serve such a function and Classical Arabic had the high 
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standing needed to initiate a renaissance” (Sayahi, 2014, p. 23). This led to the creation in 
the 19th century of what is now known as Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) (Saadi-
Mokrane, 2002). It is based on Classical Arabic, and is very similar to it. The main 
differences between the two are that MSA has a simpler syntax (Sayahi, 2014) and has 
made innovations based on Arabic roots to make up for gaps in the lexicon in order to 
make it capable of being a language used in science and technology.7 Today MSA, also 
sometimes called Literary Arabic, is the academic written standard for the Arab world 
and is used in Arab diplomacy. It is the official language in 27 countries with nearly 300 
million speakers worldwide.  
Although there are differences between CA and MSA, many researchers opt to 
refer to them together as Standard Arabic (SA). They do so not in an effort to deny the 
differences between the varieties but because they acknowledge that these are more alike 
than dissimilar and are rarely distinguished in the mind of the Arabic speaker, “for them 
there is only one SA” (Bassiouney, 2009, p. 26). For this reason, Bassiouney refers to 
Standard Arabic throughout her work, encompassing both MSA and CA. Sayahi (2014) 
also adopts the use of Standard Arabic. While recognizing that differences do exist, he 
notes that the written Arabic of today has changed very little since codification in the 
early Islamic period. Sayahi further argues that both are included in the diglossic 
conception of the H language in Arab societies. It would be confusing to distinguish 
between them or to pretend that they represent two separate H varieties. Sadiqi (2003), 
too, does not distinguish between CA and MSA, opting to refer to them as Standard 
                                                
7 Aguadé (2012) notes that CA historically did borrow foreign words, especially throughout the Middle 
Ages. The resistance to borrowing foreign words is a relatively new phenomenon in Arabic and is due to a 
fear of linguistic colonization that set in after independence from colonial rule in the post WWII era. 
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Arabic as well. In fact, she argues that Classical Arabic “developed” into Standard 
Arabic. Bentahila (1983) makes a similar case, arguing that there are different labels used 
to refer to Arabic writing from different historical periods: pre-Islamic Arabic, Early 
Islamic Arabic, Middle Arabic, and today Modern Standard Arabic. He argues that MSA 
has in fact “undergone little change since the days of the prophet” (p. 133). He uses 
Classical Arabic to refer to all of these varieties, much as more recent authors use 
Standard Arabic to encompass them all. I follow Sadiqi (2003), Sayahi (2014) and 
Bassiouney (2009) and use the term Standard Arabic to refer to Classical and Modern 
Standard Arabic, unless needing specifically to distinguish the two. 
1.6.2 Immigration Terminology 
The term ‘second generation immigrant’ is often used to refer to someone who 
was born in a given country, but whose parents immigrated there. Similarly, the children 
of the second generation are referred to as ‘third generation immigrants.’ This is often 
done in referring to immigrants in France. This terminology has been contested as 
prejudiced because it labels these French citizens by their immigrant background 
(Freedman, 2004). It treats their origin as their defining quality, something that is not 
done for immigrants in France from central and eastern European countries. Mindful of 
this objection, I use these terms because they are helpful in distinguishing between 
immigrants, their children, and their grandchildren. It also follows the tradition in the 
linguistics literature, where it is common to talk about generations of ‘immigrants’ as a 
way of understanding language shift in a diaspora or immigration context. 
It is further important to distinguish between types of second-generation 
immigrants in France. The classic second generation in this context are those whose 
parents immigrated to France at the end of the colonial era, and who grew up in France in 
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the 1980s. Their parents came to France prior to the cessation of foreign worker 
recruitment immigration, which was shut down in 1974. However, people from the 
Maghreb have continued to immigrate to France since that time, and are, by definition, 
first generation immigrants, despite the fact that they are not members of the classic first 
generation who emigrated in the 1960s. Their children, who grew up in the 1990s and 
2000s, are, therefore, second-generation immigrants, which should be differentiated from 
the classic second generation who grew up in the 1980s. 
 
1.7 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
I have organized the goals and purpose of this study into a list of seven research 
questions for the sake of clarity and procedural ease. I will refer back to these research 
questions throughout the methodology, results and discussion chapters. 
RQ1. What traits or values do young second-generation North Africans associate 
with French, Standard Arabic, and Darija? 
 
RQ2. What are the religious and cultural attitudes of this population? 
 
RQ3. Are positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic and Darija associated with 
positive attitudes toward Islam? 
 
RQ4. How are attitudes toward Darija and French associated with attitudes 
toward the Maghreb? 
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RQ5. Are positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic and Darija associated with 
positive attitudes toward individuals from other Arab countries? 
 
RQ6. How are attitudes toward French and Darija associated with attitudes 
toward France? 
 
RQ7. Are high levels of proficiency in a language predictive of positive attitudes 
toward that language and the culture associated with it? 
 
1.8 ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. The introduction chapter has 
acted as a guide to the dissertation by briefly providing a context for the study, the gaps 
in the literature that motivated it, the goals of the dissertation, the scholarly contributions 
that it makes, the methodology and terminology used, and the research questions it poses. 
Chapter two contains the literature review, in which I discuss language attitude theory in 
depth, the relationship between language and religion (specifically focusing on Arabic 
and Islam), the relationship between language and national identity (specifically Arabic, 
nationalism, and pan-Arab identity), and the use of language as an expression of identity. 
In Chapter Three, I discuss the history of French language ideology in order to 
contextualize French language attitudes and the connection between French, French 
culture and the French state. I go on to review the history of the relationship between 
France and the Maghreb, including language policies during and after the colonial era, 
the successive waves of immigration, and the current situation for the North African 
diaspora in France. Chapter Four offers a review of various methodologies for studying 
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language attitudes before discussing the specific methodology that I utilized in this study 
and how the data was analyzed. In Chapter Five, I present the results from my study, 
including the raw data from all of the quantitative questions and the correlations that were 
run. Qualitative data is presented when appropriate for clarifying responses to 
quantitative questions. Chapter Six contains a discussion of the results and goes into more 
depth in order to understand how they pertain to each of the seven research questions 
presented above, as well as the general aim of understanding how the community views 
itself in relation to French and North African culture and national identity. In Chapter 
Seven, I make my concluding remarks including a discussion of the limitations of my 
study, the contributions it makes, and the possibilities for future research.  
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2. Literature Review 
In order to understand fully the nature of language attitudes, and all of their 
contributing factors, it is necessary to understand the components of language attitudes 
and the relationship of attitudes to beliefs and ideologies, language use and choice, 
proficiency, and attitude stability. In this chapter, I review the two main types of 
language attitudes and their relationship to covert and overt prestige, particularly in a 
diglossic or a minority language situation. I address language maintenance in the Arab 
diaspora in order to understand how Arabic is used in immigration contexts. It was 
further necessary to discuss how language can symbolize the culture with which it is 
associated, and the ways that women in particular use language choice as an expression 
of identity and to access the more liberating lifestyle that may come with a particular 
culture. I additionally discuss the language attitude literature in the Maghreb, in order to 
contextualize the attitudes of Maghrebi immigrant communities in France, and present 
the research that has been done on language attitudes in the diaspora. 
One of the goals of this dissertation is to explore the relationship between 
language attitudes and religion, cultural identity, and national identity, particularly 
concerning Arabic and Islam, Arabic and Maghrebi national identity, and pan-Arab 
identity, all within a diasporic context. In order to do this properly, the relationship 
between Arabic and Islam must be established, as well as the relationship between Arabic 
and Arab nationalism.8  
 
 
                                                
8 The relationship between Arabic and nationalism is focused on more than French in the discussion of 
nationalism in this chapter. French will be explored separately and in more depth in Chapter 3. 
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2.1 LANGUAGE ATTITUDES, LANGUAGE MAINTENANCE, AND LANGUAGE AS A 
TRANSMITTER OF CULTURE 
Language attitudes research is concerned primarily with the factors that underlie 
and affect attitudes, and how these attitudes influence or are predictive of behavior. This 
is particularly relevant to the study of language maintenance and language shift. If the 
contributing factors of language attitudes can be determined, and if attitudes are found to 
be related to language use, then there is thought to be a way to prevent language shift. 
However, not all language attitudes research is done for the sake of understanding 
language maintenance or supporting revitalization efforts. Many language attitudes 
studies in North Africa have had as their goal understanding the post-colonial effects of 
Arabization and the changing status of French in the country (Bentahila, 1983; Benrabah, 
2007; Chakrani, 2010). Other studies look to attitudes as a predictor in language change 
(Benrabah, 1994). Regardless of the intent, a proper investigation into language attitudes 
must include an understanding of the determinants of language attitudes, their link to 
behavior, proficiency, stability, and diglossia, the relationship between language attitudes 
and language shift, and the role language plays as a transmitter of values and culture. 
2.1.1 Defining Language Attitudes and What Influences Them 
Attitudes are our “map of the social world” (Garrett et al., 2003, p. 3), which 
permeates how a person experiences the world and society and how that experience is 
filtered and expressed in behavior. They affect how we view every person with whom we 
interact, and how we choose to express ourselves. Choi defines linguistic attitudes more 
specifically as “an individual or collective expression towards language and any issues 
related to language; it is the act of responding to certain aspects of language, linguistic 
ideologies and linguistic use” (Choi, 2003, p. 82), highlighting the importance of 
ideology and language use in the formation of language attitudes. Choi further points out 
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that attitudes toward language may be an expression of something commonly related to 
that particular language, or one aspect of it, such as religion, or national identity. 
It can be difficult to assign a clear definition to attitudes (Garrett, 2010), because 
they are often confused with opinions, beliefs and ideologies. Opinions, like beliefs, are 
cognitive components of attitudes. While opinions are easily expressed, attitudes are 
often dormant and less obvious, and the two may not match up (Baker, 1992). This can 
make attitudes more difficult to access than opinions, forcing the researcher to be more 
nuanced in his/her methodology in order not to confuse the two (Garrett, 2010). 
Language ideologies, on the other hand, precede and form language attitudes (Gafaranga, 
2010), as they “represent broad, socio-cultural schemas that shape the development of 
intrapersonal attitudes towards particular language varieties and their speakers” 
(Edwards, 2009, p. 11). People are socialized into language ideologies, and these 
ideologies reflect their beliefs (Dragojevic, Giles & Watson, 2013). Language 
socialization occurs not only on the micro level at home but also on the macro level in the 
form of institutional language policies (Giles, Hewstone & Ball, 1983) and 
ethnolinguistic vitality (i.e., the degree of presence of the language in question in public) 
(Bourhis, Giles & Rosenthal, 1981). Ethnolinguistic vitality can be examined objectively, 
as in societal treatment studies (Garrett, 2010), or subjectively, by asking people what 
their perception is of ethnolinguistic vitality. Attitudes are thus formed by individuals 
based on the language socialization and connected language ideologies with which they 
are raised. These ideologies can create a power relationship in bilingual communities 
where one language, and its speakers, is viewed as superior, as is the case in France 
(Riley, 2011). Additional factors that can affect how people view languages and dialects 
are political ideology, race, socioeconomic level of speakers, religion, cultural identity, 
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education, and institutional backing (Bentahila, 1983; Alfaraz, 2002; Yagmur & Akinci, 
2003; Benrabah, 2007; Chakrani, 2010).  
2.1.2 Language Attitudes and Language Shift 
For many researchers who are interested in language maintenance and language 
shift, understanding the link between attitudes and behavior is a key issue, as is the 
stability of these attitudes. Attitudes are made up of cognitive, affective and action-ready 
components (Baker, 1992; Garrett, Coupland and Williams, 2003; Edward, 2009), which 
may work in concert with one another. For example, an individual who is consciously 
aware of having positive attitudes toward a language (cognitive), and privately has 
subconscious positive emotional feelings about that language (affective) proceeds to 
behave linguistically in such a way as to reflect that (action ready) by speaking the 
language. However, it also may be that a person’s cognitive attitudes, or overt rational 
attitudes, conflict with their affective and emotional covert attitudes, so that they may 
proclaim to feel one way about a language but privately feel another. This frequently 
occurs with attitudes toward code switching, which, although stigmatized and often 
viewed as “deficient” in bilingual communities, is commonly used (Ziamari, 2009). This 
demonstrates that negative outward attitudes toward a practice may conceal conflicting 
inner attitudes.  
Garrett (2010) maintains that language attitudes affect language choice and that 
there is a strong relationship between attitudes and behavior in general, although he 
acknowledges that the relationship is not always clear. Oppenheim (1992) writes that “an 
attitude is a state of readiness, a tendency to respond in a certain manner when confronted 
with certain stimuli” (p. 174); however he too warns that there is not a one-to-one 
connection between the two. Other factors, such as topic, setting, or interlocutor may 
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change the calculus behind the decision to use one language over another.9 Attitudes may 
also change in differing context (Davies & Bentahila, 2013).  
Indeed, the relationship between language attitudes and language use is disputed 
within the language attitudes literature. Al-Khatib (2001), using a language attitudes and 
language use questionnaire, found that language shift depends in part on attitudes toward 
the dominant language. If this is the case, then language attitudes do have some kind of a 
relationship toward language use, even if it is not direct. Similarly, Mugaddam (2006) 
found that positive attitudes toward Arabic were a major contributor to its adoption by his 
Sudanese participants. Bentahila (1983) indicates that the function of the language in a 
society or a person’s life may in fact affect attitudes toward that language, rather than the 
other way around. He argues that language choice is not arbitrary but that languages have 
different domains and the choice is made based on an interaction of factors. Ultimately, 
the differing roles of each language are correlated to some extent with the attitudes 
toward those languages. For example, in Morocco, French is used more in formal 
situations and is also attributed qualities linked to formality, while the reverse is true for 
dialectal Arabic.  
Yağmur and Akinci (2003), however, found that language attitudes of first and 
second-generation Turkish immigrants to France did not parallel reported language use. 
Choi (2003) reports a similar finding for attitudes toward Guarani in Paraguay, although 
she maintains that “attitudes have a decisive influence on processes of linguistic variation 
and change, language planning, and the maintenance or loss of languages in a 
community” (Choi, 2003, p. 81). Ziamari (2009) used a questionnaire to ask Moroccans 
about their attitudes toward code-switching, as well as recorded conversations and 
                                                
9 This is not to imply that speakers are making rational, calculated decisions about language choice, or are 
even always conscious of the language that they choose to use (Al-Khatib, 2001). 
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debates between participants in a classroom, finding that there was a difference between 
how they felt about the linguistic practice and what they actually did, with most of them 
expressing negative attitudes toward code-switching but then engaging in it in 
conversation, showing a disconnect between attitudes and action. Similarly, Slavik 
(2001) found that there was a negative relationship between language use and positive 
attitudes over time for Maltese. Maltese was used less frequently over time but was held 
in higher regard. Edwards (2009), although acknowledging that an “attitude may be 
understood as a disposition to react favorably or unfavorably to a class of objects” (p. 
83), also warns that there can often be a difference between professed attitudes and 
actions. 
It is important to note that despite the debate over the causal relationship between 
attitudes and use, many language shift and language maintenance studies utilize a 
language attitudes and language use questionnaire, indicating that it is a useful indicator 
of whether language shift is occurring. What is more, even studies such as Choi (2003), 
which did not find a correlation between positive attitudes and high rates of use of a 
language, still claim that there is a relationship between the two. 
Slavik (2001, p. 150) suggests that “while positive attitudes may not lead to 
language-maintenance efforts, negative attitudes almost certainly lead to a lack of such 
efforts.” Perhaps there is a relationship between language attitudes and language use, but 
it is not the same everywhere. It is further possible that in some cultural contexts 
language attitudes will have more of an effect on language use than in others. Mugaddam 
(2006) found a positive correlation between positive attitudes toward Arabic and its use; 
however, positive attitudes toward ethnic languages did not have a similar effect, 
although they were seen as a symbol of ethnic group identity. In order to explore fully the 
link between language attitudes and language use it is necessary to understand the culture 
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of the people being studied, the history that they have with the languages in question, and 
the language ideologies associated with each language. 
One of the problems with many of the arguments for and against the existence of 
a relationship between language attitudes and use is that the questionnaires used are often 
rudimentary, sometimes including only one or two questions on language attitudes, and 
often only permitting yes/no answers, thus forcing participants to express their attitudes 
in a binary manner rather than on a continuum. Furthermore, many researchers discuss 
language use and its relationship to language attitudes, but almost none engage in an 
effort to compare the results of questionnaires regarding attitudes and behavior with any 
kind of ethnographic observations, instead relying on reported language use (although see 
Gal, 1978b). There is no consensus on the relationship between language attitudes and 
language use, which is why continuing research on the topic is needed, as is the further 
refinement of the tools used to capture both. 
While many language attitude studies have been concerned with the relationship 
between attitudes and language choice, few have discussed the connection between 
language attitudes and sociolinguistic variation and the role that investigating language 
attitudes can play in influencing what variables are considered factors in variation. One 
reason for this has been that the language attitudes field traditionally operated under the 
methodological umbrella of social psychology. This has changed in recent years and the 
field has innovated methodologically (Garrett, 2001). Garrett (2001) urges researchers in 
the two fields to work together more closely and argues that language attitudes are, in 
fact, “an essential component of sociolinguistics,” (p. 626). Despite this, the two have 
struggled to integrate. If one can determine the factors that contribute to attitudes about 
language for a group or population, then those factors may be useful variables to examine 
in a sociolinguistic study on language variation for that group.  
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2.1.2.1 Language Maintenance in the Arab diaspora 
Although attitudes do seem to be related to language shift, there are many other 
factors at play, with no primary factor being sufficient to explain the shift or maintenance 
(Fishman, 1964). Some of the main factors in determining language shift and language 
maintenance are group size of the minority language speakers and their demographic 
concentration (Al-Khatib, 2001; Mugaddam, 2006), proficiency  (Fishman, 1964), 
domain (Abu-Haidar, 1994), status of their social contacts (Gal, 1978b), urban versus 
rural dwelling (Fishman, 1964), the language that mothers speak or value (Cheng, 2003; 
Cavanaugh, 2006), inter-marriage with exogenous group members (Al-Khatib, 2001; 
Mugaddam, 2006), degree of solidarity (Mugaddam, 2006), education (Cheng, 2003), 
participation in community activities (Slavik, 2001), institutional support and economic 
factors (Gafaranga, 2010) and knowledge of the dominant language prior to immigration 
(Slavik, 2001). 
It is often stated that the language of a family who has immigrated is largely lost 
by the third generation (see Slavik, 2001, for an example). However, there is reason to 
suspect that this may not be the case for the Arab diaspora, and more specifically for the 
North African Muslim diaspora in France, based on the criteria above. Although Landau 
(1999) argues that religion is waning for some diaspora groups, this is less so for the 
Muslim Arab diaspora. Studies on Arabic-English bilinguals in America indicate that 
speakers are “not leaving Arabic behind” in part because of Arabic’s status as the 
language of Islam (Jake and Myers-Scotten, 2002, 328), and the recent “revival of 
Muslim identity” (Rouchdy, 2002, p. 142). Arabic is needed to fulfill one of the pillars of 
Islam, prayer, keeping it present in the day-to-day life of many in the Muslim Arab 
diaspora. There may, in fact, be a renewed interest among second and third-generation 
Maghrebi immigrants in France in the language of their parents and grandparents, given 
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that many of the circumstances that usually lead to language maintenance discussed 
above are fulfilled by the North African diaspora in France.  
Language loss often occurs when a community begins marrying exogenous group 
members at a high rate (Gal 1978a; Landau, 1999; Dzialtuvaite, 2006). The children of a 
mixed-language marriage are raised in a bilingual household and are part of two 
linguistic groups, thus weakening the strength of each of the languages in the child’s life 
and identity. This often happens within immigrant communities. The children will 
eventually speak predominately the language of the parent from the receiving country. 
However, there is evidence to suggest that second and third-generation North African 
immigrants, particularly men, are marrying spouses from the home country (Selby, 2009; 
Boumans and de Ruiter, 2002), which may create a cycle of ‘linguistic refreshing’ 
whereby there is a continual presence of a native and/or monolingual Arabic speaker in 
the household. This will strengthen the spouse’s Arabic, pushing him or her to speak 
Arabic more than he or she otherwise would. Thus, a second-generation man who speaks 
both French and Arabic, who marries a first generation woman, will have children who 
would be considered third-generation Arabic speakers via their father, and at the same 
time second-generation speakers via their mother. Mothers tend to have more linguistic 
influence on their children because of the tendency for women to stay at home and raise 
the children, especially in this community. Thus, their second-generation speaker status 
would ‘win’ over the father’s third generation status, potentially creating a perpetual 
cycle of second-generation Arabic speakers in the North African diaspora in France. 
Another factor in the maintenance of language in the diaspora is continual 
immigration. For the Arab diaspora, there has been steady immigration due to the 
instability in the Arab world (Rouchdy, 2002), whether economic or otherwise. A 
constant influx of immigrants ensures that there is always the presence of first-generation 
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speakers who have children who are second-generation speakers.  This can be seen in the 
Arabic speaking community in Detroit, Michigan, where the new arrivals largely 
maintain their first language, which Rouchdy (2002) compares to Spanish-speaking 
immigrants in the U.S. The proximity of the Maghreb to France, and the numerous flights 
between the two, facilitates this kind of continual immigration, with many maintaining 
ties to the homeland by owning homes there as well. Furthermore, many in the Maghreb 
have at least some knowledge of French, which makes the transition easier and more 
likely, although this knowledge may also increase the chances of language shift. 
Both language and religion aid in maintaining ethnic roots in the diaspora (Safran, 
2008), which may slow the process of language shift in a community. The unique 
relationship between Islam and Arabic strengthens language loyalty to Arabic for the 
predominately Muslim Arab diaspora, especially in France where increased 
stigmatization and marginalization has moved youths to turn more strongly toward 
religion and to outwardly express it (Begag, 2007). This relationship has kept the Arabic 
language alive throughout the centuries, even during the Ottoman Empire (Dawisha, 
2003), and remains the case today.  
There are, however, other factors that may encourage language shift among 
certain members of the community, including knowledge of French prior to immigration, 
low levels of institutional support in the form of dialectal Arabic language classes 
(Oakes, 2001), and the fact that, in the Maghreb, French is the language of economic 
success and power (Sayahi, 2014).  
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2.1.3 Language Attitudes: Integrative and Instrumental, Covert and Overt  
The study of language attitudes is often used to “establish the relationship 
between language choice and language status in a speech community” (Omoniyi, 2006, p. 
134). According to Baker (1992) language attitudes can be broken down into two basic 
categories: instrumental and integrative. Instrumental attitudes include agreement with 
statements such as ‘learning language X will advance my career,’ or, ‘make me a more 
knowledgeable person.’ They are often utilitarian, pragmatic and individualistic. In 
Morocco, French is seen as an instrumental language because it provides better access to 
education, jobs, government, wealth and power (Chakrani, 2010). An integrative attitude 
“may concern attachment to, or identification with a language group and their cultural 
activities” (Baker, 1992, p. 32), linking language attitudes to positive attitudes toward 
culture. These types of attitudes are usually social, interpersonal and are identified as 
related to a particular group. For Baker’s Welsh population, reminder of one’s culture 
increased positive language attitudes, and being involved in cultural activities had a much 
larger influence on positive language attitudes than mass media. This indicates that the 
degree of cultural attachment is correlated with attitudes toward the language associated 
with that culture.  
Positive attitudes toward a language indicate that people associate it with some 
sort of prestige, of which there are generally thought to be two types: overt and covert 
(Wolfram, 1997; Chakrani, 2010), with the former linked to instrumental attitudes, and 
the latter with integrative attitudes. Overt prestige is associated with the language which 
is standardized, state-sanctioned, used by people in positions of power, and generally 
considered the High (H) variety in a diglossic environment (Schiffman, 1997). It is the 
language that is associated with modernity and progress and status (Bentahila, 1983; 
Edwards, 2009). Non-standard dialects and languages usually have covert prestige and 
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their speakers are seen favorably in terms of solidarity by their in-group members 
(Dragojevic et al., 2013). A low overt prestige language can act as a powerful bonding 
agent for group identity, has social attractiveness, and evokes integrity, friendliness etc., 
all of which are traits of solidarity (Edwards, 2009). These language varieties, although 
stigmatized, “can also fulfill important social identity-enhancing, community-promoting, 
and bonding/solidarity functions for their speakers” (Dragojevic et al., 2013, p. 19). 
Zahn and Hopper (1985) found that the factors that emerge as determinants of 
positive language attitudes are superiority, attractiveness and dynamism. While a 
language with overt prestige may be seen as superior, a language with covert prestige is 
seen as more socially attractive and dynamic. Others have found that the language spoken 
at home was the most predictive factor of language attitudes, more so than participation 
in optional minority language classes (Huguet, 2006). This contradicts Baker’s (1992) 
study, which found that participation in Welsh cultural activities was the best predictor of 
Welsh language maintenance. It may be that in addition to universal causes for positive 
or negative language attitudes there are also culturally specific factors, so that for one 
culture, religious involvement may be a primary factor in language attitudes, but in 
another it may be education. The current study therefore tries to frame the participants 
and their cultural context in order to understand the specific factors that contribute to 
attitudes in this environment, and to highlight that some factors in language attitude 
studies may have been overlooked in previous research, such as religion.  
2.1.4 Stability and Proficiency 
Some researchers claim that attitudes are constantly shifting, even within a single 
conversation, and thus only discourse analysis is an informative methodology for 
understanding language attitudes (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Garrett et al. (2003) 
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acknowledge that there are varying levels of stability, and Baker (1992) argues that 
attitudes can “take ‘U’ turns parallel with sudden religious conversion” (p. 97), indicating 
how deeply attitudes run and how violently they can swing from one end of a continuum 
to the other. Baker (1992) also notes that they can change due to individual and social 
factors, highlighting that there are personal and community influences on language 
attitudes. Language attitudes can further become more complex over time (Edwards, 
2009); however, Garrett (2010) argues that while attitudes do shift, a person’s attitudes 
stay within certain bounds, are durable, and can be and should be studied in a 
generalizable way. Although there is disagreement on the stability of language attitudes, 
these authors all agree that they can be studied and explored, so long as one 
acknowledges that attitudes are not always constant.  
A further theme in language attitudes research is the link between positive 
attitudes and degree of proficiency in that language. In this there is, again, little 
consensus. One of the main findings from Coupland et al. (2006) was that the higher the 
level of competency in Welsh, the higher the affiliation with Wales, Welsh, and Welsh 
culture, regardless of other factors. Baker (1992) agrees that the better a person’s attitude 
toward a given language, the less likely they are to decrease in competency in that 
language. Proficiency also affects attitudes, although it is not one of the major 
determiners (Baker, 1992). There is a link between attitude and proficiency, but the 
direction of causality remains unclear, and indeed may prove to be bi-causal.  
There is also evidence that positive attitudes can co-exist with very low levels of 
proficiency. Davies and Bentahila (1989) asked Moroccans what they consider their 
‘own’ language to be and why. The results revealed that the language toward which one 
feels a strong sense of ownership and identity may not be the language in which one is 
most proficient. Indeed, one participant in Billiez’s (1985) study of third generation 
 34 
Algerian immigrants in France said “Ma langue c’est l’arabe, mais je ne la parle pas” 
(“My language is Arabic, but I do not speak it”) (Billiez, 1985, p. 52), indicating sense of 
ownership without proficiency. Lasagabaster (2008) similarly found that participants had 
very positive attitudes toward Basque even if their self-reported proficiency was low. 
Yağmur and Akinci (2003) also found that their second-generation immigrants in France 
had positive attitudes toward Turkish but reported low proficiency in the language. 
There is not a definitive answer to this question, and further research in the area is 
needed. Unfortunately, most language attitude studies are not able to assess language 
proficiency due to time and access and must therefore rely on self-reports, which further 
complicates the accuracy with which researchers can say whether and how attitudes and 
proficiency are connected.  
2.1.5 Language Attitudes and Diglossia 
The participants in this dissertation come from countries where diglossia existed. 
Although this diglossic situation did not carry over into the diaspora in France, it is 
nevertheless necessary to briefly review diglossia to contextualize the language attitudes 
studies in the Maghreb, as well as provide a full understanding of language attitudes and 
how they relate to prestige. Classic diglossia is defined as a linguistic situation wherein 
there is a High (H) and a Low (L) prestige language where each has distinct functions 
with limited overlap (Ferguson, 1959). Arabic is considered to be the archetypal example 
of classic diglossia (Sayahi, 2014). Ferguson originally stipulated that there were nine 
ways in which the H and L varieties differ: function, prestige, literary heritage, 
acquisition, standardization, stability, grammar, lexicon and phonology (Ferguson, 1959), 
the primary feature being the use of the H variety for administration, education and 
religion (Sayahi, 2014). The H variety typically functions as the language of government. 
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It is written and codified and has been standardized, usually with the help of a language 
academy. The grammar is more complex than the L variety, if the languages are related. 
There are also usually large differences in their lexicon and phonology. The H variety is 
not learned as a mother tongue but is learned in school. The L variety is used in daily life 
and interactions and is the language of the home and the street. It is not written or 
standardized and has undergone and continues to undergo change, including in the form 
of lexical borrowings. It has, compared to the H variety, a simpler grammar and 
phonological system (Ferguson, 1959). This describes the situation of Arabic in Arab 
countries where Standard Arabic is the H language, and the dialect, such as Darija, is the 
L language. 
In diglossic situations the H and L language are considered to have inherent 
qualities or faults based on language ideologies held by the speakers, although no 
language is actually inherently ‘good’ or ‘bad’, ‘beautiful’ or ‘ugly’ etc.  The H language 
is imbued with positive attributes and status while the L language is considered 
unsuitable for anything other than daily tasks and the mundane. This labeling “reflects, 
first, language attitudes among users and, second, the superposed nature of the H” 
(Bassiouney, 2009, p. 27). The attitudes that speakers hold about each language 
perpetuate their H and L status, while the status of the languages (where it is used, who 
speaks it etc.) perpetuates the positive or negative attitudes held about each. Sayahi 
(2014) describes what he calls the diglossia paradox, wherein native speakers of the L 
language, both the educated and the illiterate, have strong negative attitudes toward it, 
and yet they transmit it to their children, thus perpetuating the diglossic community. This 
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is relevant only for diglossic situations where the L and H languages are related and there 
are no native H language speakers.10  
2.1.6 Language as a Transmitter of Culture 
Studying language attitudes can inform us not only of how people view a 
language, but also how they view the culture associated with that language. While 
language attitudes often indicate things about the function of a language in the lives of a 
given community, they also suggest transference of attitudes toward the community of 
speakers of a language onto the language itself. These attitudes can then lead to people 
making linguistic choices based on these attitudes (Garrett, 2001), as a way to symbolize 
membership in and attitudes toward a culture or society. For example, El Aissati (1996) 
argued that, for the Arab diaspora in the Netherlands, using too much Dutch could 
indicate “too much of an involvement in Dutch society” (El Aissati, 1996, p. 39). Using 
the language of the receiving country was, in this case, a way of symbolizing attachment 
to the values of Dutch culture, which are perceived by the speakers, and their parents, in 
this study as very different from their, presumably Muslim, values. Fishman (2006) wrote 
that “Resistance to and advocacy of either fundamentalism or modernization cannot but 
be reflected in the corpus of everyday speech” (p. 24), because changes in language 
practices are “ideologically loaded” and have meaning for both the individual and on a 
societal level (Rajah-Carrim, 2010, p. 35). Thus, language choice, as an extension of 
language attitudes, may be a very potent symbol of religious attachment or detachment 
when one language is strongly associated with a religion and the other is not.  
Sefiani (2003) describes North African immigrants in France as using language to 
express their new identity that is born out of a conflict between two worlds: straddling the 
                                                
10 Joshua Fishman (1967) expanded the definition of diglossia to include linguistic situations where the L 
and H language are unrelated and there exist native speakers of both. 
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universalist society of France and the deeply traditional world of their parents and 
grandparents. Herder viewed the loss of one’s language as the loss of one’s identity 
(Edwards, 2009). If someone wants to lose the identity of their family, tradition, or 
religion, they may also abandon that language. The reverse is also true: if someone in an 
immigration context rejects the culture and values of the receiving country, they may also 
reject the language of that country, perhaps not in terms of language use, because that 
may prove impractical, but in terms of language attitudes.  
There is also evidence to suggest that the language in which a person is speaking 
may subconsciously affect how they express their identity. Although the Whorf-Sapir 
hypothesis has often been purported to say that language dictates thought, a neo-
Whorfian reading proposes that it only influences thought: 
 
An informal Whorfianism tells us that every language interprets and presents the 
world in a somewhat different way, that the unique wellsprings of group 
consciousness, traditions, beliefs and values are intimately entwined with a given 
variety. (Edwards, 2009, P. 254) 
  
This indicates that there is a subconscious awareness of the traditions and values 
associated with a language for the speaker.11 This proposition is supported by some work 
in language attitudes research. Bentahila (1983) gave his participants a series of sentence 
completion tasks at two separate times, once in Arabic, once in French. He found that his 
participants were much more likely to complete the sentences making reference to 
family, duty, patriotism and religion when using Arabic. When using French, the 
sentences were completed making reference to career success, liberation, and education. 
                                                
11 This is not to say that the language inherently carries any traditions and values. It only carries the 
traditions and values of the society that the speaker associates with that language. 
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Bentahila concludes that outlook and worldview change depending on the language mode 
in which one is speaking, arguing, “Moroccans are both bilingual and bicultural…[and] 
associate each [language] with different values and beliefs” (Bentahila, 1983, p. 49). 
Richard and Toffoli (2009) tested this theory further by giving a questionnaire in Greek 
and English to Greek-speaking Canadians. Their goal was to discover how language 
choice affects marketing, arguing that because “language is a carrier of values” (p. 997) 
participants will respond differently in each language, and thus language choice should 
be considered in advertising. They found that there is indeed a language effect and that 
this may pose a problem for researchers carrying out studies on ethnic identity if the 
subjects are bilingual. Garrett et al. (2003) also found a difference in responses between 
teachers who took a language attitudes questionnaire in Welsh versus English.  
These studies suggest that language is a transmitter of culture and values, and thus 
the language a bilingual speaker uses can represent a choice, either conscious or 
unconscious, to identify in that moment with a particular set of values and beliefs and to 
embrace a particular ethnic identity (Edwards, 2009). It further brings out different 
aspects of their personality (Koven, 2007; Edwards, 2009). “A speaker’s choice of code 
in a particular situation is part of that speaker’s linguistic presentation of self” (Gal, 
1978a, p. 4). This is not dissimilar to Keane’s definition of voicing as the “linguistic 
construction of social personae” (Keane, 1999, p. 271). Although this dissertation does 
not explicitly examine language use, it does focus on language attitudes, which, as 
discussed previously, are related to language use. Attitudes toward language, therefore, 
may reflect cultural attitudes and cultural identity.  
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2.1.6.1 Women, Language and Identity 
If language, as expressed via language attitudes, is a symbol and transmitter of 
culture, then women may use language as a tool to embrace a culture that offers them 
more liberties and reject one that is restrictive. Since Labov’s New York study (Labov, 
1966), women have been seen by linguists as quicker to adopt prestige forms, particularly 
in terms of pronunciation, especially women of lower middle class socioeconomic status. 
They have been thought to do this in order to put themselves at an advantage socially, 
due in part to the stigma associated with the speech of the lower classes. It is also an 
indirect way of gaining respect (Bassiouney, 2009), which can otherwise be difficult for 
women to access. Women tend to use more standard forms than men, regardless of other 
factors, and because they are more conscious of status, they also over-report how 
frequently they use them (Romaine, 2003). They use language as a way to “achieve status 
denied to them through other outlets” because traditionally women could not gain it via 
education or work (Romaine, 2003, p. 104). 
In addition to sociophonetic variation, women also use language choice as a way 
of claiming status. However, it is not just status that women strive for in choosing a 
prestige form or code. In some situations it is also a way of rejecting conservative 
tradition: 
 
When we look at cases where women have led in shifts to more prestigious 
languages, we can see how those aspiring to be ladies had to escape both literally 
and figuratively from their status as rural peasants by leaving the land and their 
language behind (Romaine, 2003, p. 110). 
 
This is precisely what Susan Gal found in her study on language shift from Hungarian to 
German in a Hungarian/Austrian rural community (Gal, 1978a). Her ethnographic and 
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questionnaire-based study reveals that language choice is used for stylistic and rhetorical 
reasons but also in order to signal social group membership. Gal found that women were 
shifting to German more often and more quickly than men, and that this choice correlated 
with other life decisions including marrying exogenously men who are workers rather 
than farmers. Peasant life is much less attractive to women than men because they have 
fewer opportunities in that life. The women in this study claimed not to want to marry a 
peasant man because the life of a peasant wife is seen as “particularly demeaning and 
difficult” (p. 11) compared to the choices they otherwise have. The peasant wife has 
strenuous farming chores, and often lives with the mother-in-law, whereas a worker’s 
wife has regular house upkeep that may or may not involve working. Thus their language 
choice is part of rejecting a harder more restrictive life. Gal writes that young women are 
more willing to engage in this newly available life because they are “less committed than 
the men to the traditionally male-dominated system of subsistence agriculture and 
because they have more to gain than men in embracing the newly available statuses of 
worker and worker’s wife” (Gal, 1978a, p. 2-3). Thus, not only are these women gaining 
status by choosing a more urban language, they are gaining a sort of freedom from a way 
of life that offered them fewer options and was dominated by men.  
A similar phenomenon can be seen in North African culture where women use 
language as a tool for liberating themselves from traditional roles. In the Maghreb, 
women’s roles are largely restricted to the private home sphere, while men freely access 
the public one (Sadiqi, 2003; Killian, 2006). The inequalities in the Maghreb extend to 
the linguistic realm. Women are “more easily interrupted and silenced in the family and 
in society” (Sadiqi, 2003, p. 63) and are not permitted to use certain taboo words, while 
boys are (Sadiqi, 2003, p. 84), another form of ‘silencing.’ In order to break from a place 
of ‘silencing’ women may choose to use French more than men as a way of having a 
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voice that is not so easily ignored. Women use language in order to gain respect, 
especially if they are denied it in other capacities (Bassiouney, 2009), which is what can 
occur in the Maghreb.  
Gill (1999) discusses language in the Maghreb and the different connotations of 
French and Arabic for women. She found that Maghrebi mothers encourage their 
daughters to be bilingual in French and to get an education so that they can “evade the 
harshness of their own or of their mothers’ life experience” (Gill, 1999, p. 130). French is 
the primary language of higher education in the Maghreb, and thus is seen as the 
gatekeeper of a better life. It is “the language of access to a ‘public’ life as opposed to a 
housebound existence in the service of the family” (Gill, 1999, p. 130). It is not 
uncommon for mothers to adopt prestige forms for the sake of giving their children more 
opportunities (Romaine, 2003). Beyond speaking French for oneself, marrying a French 
bilingual man in the Maghreb is perceived as meaning that he will be more open-minded 
and that women will not have to live the “old harsh, secluded lifestyle” (Gill, 1999, p. 
130). Similarly, the women in Gal’s (1978a) study advised their daughters not to marry 
Hungarian-speaking peasants, so that they could have a better life with a German-
speaking worker. While for both men and women French is a way to access education, 
for women it is also a way to access life outside of the home sphere, which is where 
women are largely relegated in North African society (Killian, 2006). Women can use 
code choice in order to attain power and assert their identity (Bassiouney, 2009). Eid 
(2002) studied the use of SA and colloquial Arabic in the writing of female Egyptian 
authors and found that some women used a fusion of SA and colloquial Arabic in order to 
“distance themselves from the predominant, accepted traditional (male) discourse” (p. 
204). However, one impediment to departing from these traditional roles may be 
stigmatization by other group members (Romaine, 2003). 
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The phenomenon of using language choice as a tool for gaining access to public 
life, and rejecting traditional roles is likely to be all the more potent for women who have 
immigrated to less a traditional society. Women who emigrate from the majority Muslim 
countries of North Africa to France are exposed to a culture where men and women have 
the same rights in the public sphere, and where the children of emigrants from the 
Maghreb have more freedom and independence (Ennaji, 2010). There is evidence that 
suggests that women in the Maghrebi diaspora in France may feel reluctant to acquiesce 
to the expectations of traditional North African Islamic society in the face of French 
society, which is secular and presents more material freedoms for women. Hargreaves 
(1995) describes it as a “deep reluctance” to accept traditional gender roles.  
Billiez (1985) examines the difference in language behavior between third-
generation immigrants in France from the Iberian Peninsula and from Algeria. She found 
that the Algerian girls used Arabic exclusively with their mothers, but at no other time, 
while the men used it much more broadly (supported by Ziamari, 2009). This may be 
because they do not want to use Arabic as a signifier in public, but would rather be seen 
as part of French society. One of the Algerian girls in the study reports that she 
intentionally uses French, not Arabic, when she visits Algeria with her family, as a way 
of rejecting the cultural tradition. This, combined with comments about not being able to 
go out in Algeria, but being anxious to do so immediately upon returning to France, 
indicates that these girls may be rejecting a tradition that is restrictive to women, by 
rejecting the language of that tradition. Similar attitudes were not found among the 
Portuguese or Spanish female participants. Mohamed El Manar Laalami’s (2000) survey 
of Moroccans residing in France on their feelings of integration, found that 82.9% of 
women felt quite integrated compared to 67.1% of men (cited in Ennaji, 2010, p. 14). 
Furthermore, according to the Institut National d’Etudes Démographiques (INED) 
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women emigrants from the Maghreb were abandoning their native language faster than 
men (among men and women who had been in France the same amount of time) (Gill, 
1999). 
Women choose to use one code over another not only to access status and respect, 
but also because of how speaking in that language “feels” and the access it gives women 
to experience other identities. Koven (2007) studied second-generation Portuguese 
women in France, and found that they reported feeling more free in France and described 
how they were expected to be more socially conservative in terms of clothing and 
relationships with men when they visit Portugal. The participants described how they felt 
like a “different person” depending on whether they were speaking French or Portuguese. 
Speaking French allowed them to tap into another part of themselves. Language choice 
can affect or bring out different aspects of personality, as seen in responses to 
questionnaires and interviews, including level of ethnic affirmation (Edwards, 2009). 
Given the inseparability of language and identity (Joseph, 2004, p. 11) it is not surprising 
that a bilingual should feel different in their different languages.  
 
It has been pointed out that a speaker’s choice of code in a particular situation is 
part of that speaker’s linguistic presentation of self. The speaker makes the choice 
as part of a verbal strategy to identify herself or himself with the social categories 
and activities the code symbolizes…. because codes (in this case languages) are 
associated with social statuses and activities, changes in language choice can be 
used by speakers to symbolize changes in their own social status or in their 
attitudes towards the activities the languages symbolize. (Gal, 1978a, p. 4) 
 
A young woman of North African descent living in France may feel more liberated when 
speaking French, and more constrained by traditional gender expectations when speaking 
in Arabic, which may affect language attitudes. Women’s language attitudes toward 
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French in the North African diaspora may be overall more positive than their male 
counterparts because of an association of the language with French society, which offers 
them more opportunities than North African society. Group membership does not equal 
high group regard (Lambert, Hodgson, Gardner and Fillenbaum, 1960), there, just 
because women belong to the North African diaspora does not necessitate them having 
positive attitudes towards that group and its language. Despite the fact that a gender 
comparison was eliminated in this study, it is still important to understand how women 
express their identity via language given that the majority of participants in this study 
turned out to be women. 
 
2.1.7 Language Attitudes Studies 
Language attitudes research developed as a field of inquiry within sociolinguistics 
in the 1960s, focusing primarily on the linguistic situations found in Québec and in 
Wales, and on language revitalization and language policy. In the ensuing decades, 
language attitudes have been studied under the umbrella of the sociology of language and 
social psychology. There have also been similar studies done within perceptual 
dialectology; however, this field is more concerned with how participants classify various 
accents in terms of ethnicity or correctness. Their methodology may limit their 
questionnaire to two questions, rating level of correctness and level of pleasantness for 
multiple dialects (Alfaraz, 2002), or involve drawing dialect maps (Evans, 2002); 
whereas, language attitudes studies done within sociolinguistics or sociology of language 
usually have extensive questionnaires exploring more than pleasantness and correctness 
of an accent/language (e.g. Baker, 1992; Chakrani, 2010). In this dissertation, I focus on 
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reviewing language attitude studies from the fields of sociolinguistics and the sociology 
of language. 
In the past few decades the language attitude research has expanded and now 
language attitudes are studied in many parts of the world, in particular countries once 
under colonial rule that have experienced the upheaval of independence and its linguistic 
consequences. Countries such as those in the Maghreb have seen language policy change 
in this transition, and thus linguists have explored how this change has affected language 
attitudes (Bentahila, 1983; Marley, 2004; Chakrani, 2010). Other countries in the post-
colonial era, particularly sub-Saharan African countries, have used language attitude 
surveys in order to help decide what the new national language should be (Ferguson, 
1975). Below, I review the language attitudes literature in the Maghreb, in France, and in 
two diaspora contexts. 
2.1.7.1 Attitudes in the Maghreb  
In order to understand the language attitudes of French individuals whose parents 
come from the Maghreb, it is first necessary to review the language attitudes held in those 
countries of origin. This will provide a context and background for the attitudes of 
participants in France, and for what the attitudes of their parents may have been before 
arriving in France. Because this dissertation does not explore attitudes toward Berber, this 
section will focus primarily on attitudes toward French and Arabic in the diaspora, 
although attitudes toward Berber will be noted when possible. Bentahila (1983) explores 
the language attitudes and reported language use in Morocco toward Classical Arabic (for 
our purposes Standard Arabic), Moroccan Arabic (or Darija) and French, in order to 
ascertain the linguistic situation roughly thirty years after independence.12 In particular, 
                                                
12 His investigation did not include attitudes toward Berber. 
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he is interested in the effects of Arabization, and the resulting attitudes toward both a 
bilingual French/SA educational and government system and a monolingual SA system. 
Bentahila’s widely cited study gives a thorough understanding of usage, attitudes, and the 
roles that each language plays in the home, school, work and public life of Moroccans.  
Bentahila’s (1983) participants view SA as the richest and most beautiful 
language, strongly associating it with Islam, Arab identity, and patriotism, and seeing it 
as the language that Moroccans ought to use above all others. SA is considered religious 
and pure while Darija is viewed as ignorant, not surprising given that it is largely an 
unwritten language and only recently has a Moroccan Arabic dictionary been written. 
French is deemed the language that is the most practical, modern, useful for studies, and 
able to keep up with the modern world. Again, this is to be expected given the role in 
government and education French played while Morocco was a French protectorate and 
its continuing role in higher education. Attitudes toward code switching were 
overwhelmingly negative, inciting feelings of pity and disgrace and evoking lack of 
identity, lack of confidence and lack of pride in nationality. Bentahila concludes that the 
overall feeling of Moroccans is that “each language has its own value and that each 
serves a useful purpose” (p. 35).  
For language choice based on topic, Bentahila’s participants chose French more 
for scientific and technical subjects, while they chose Darija for domestic and everyday 
ones. Interestingly, they also chose Darija slightly more for religious topics than SA, and 
chose both much more than French, indicating that the prestige that SA carries as the 
language of religion may be transferrable to the colloquial varieties. He also found that 
Darija is used almost exclusively in the home domain. This is to be expected because SA 
is a learned language that is not acquired naturally at home. The author ultimately 
concludes that Moroccans are both bilingual and bi-cultural. Gill (1999) supports this, 
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arguing that what has emerged is a sense of split loyalties. Bentahila (183) argues that for 
Moroccans, French and Arabic each represent a distinct culture with very little overlap. 
French is the language of France, modernity, education etc., while Arabic is the language 
of tradition, the home and everyday life. France represents status, while Arabic represents 
solidarity.  
Because of rapidly changing politics and ideologies, attitudinal studies are likely 
to become outdated after twenty or thirty years (Davies & Bentahila, 2013). Chakrani 
(2010; 2013) updated Bentahila’s work by doing a language attitudes study in Morocco 
more recently. He argues that today in Morocco there is no longer a clear status/solidarity 
divide between French and Arabic, as found in Bentahila (1983). Chakrani’s findings 
indicate that French has begun to index solidarity, as has SA, and that Darija has growing 
status. All three languages are essentially competing for both status and solidarity, with 
no significant difference between SA and Darija for status traits. This indicates that 
Darija, once viewed as very low for status items, is gaining prestige, implying that there 
may be a transfer of the language ideology associated with SA to Darija. Chakrani also 
found that Darija was rated significantly higher for modest and religious, traits usually 
associated with SA because of its history with Islam. However, he concludes that the 
overall negative attitudes toward Darija found in Bentahila (1983) remain unchanged. 
When it comes to Berber, he found that it is used more often by the lower class than the 
upper class, and the increasing use of French in the home is having a negative impact on 
Berber, as well as Darija. 
French was rated as more open-minded than SA or Darija. Chakrani (2010) 
explains that this is because, in Morocco, French is a gateway to modernity and other 
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cultures.13 However, he does not explore what this inversely implies about attitudes 
toward SA and Darija as languages that are not open-minded, and why this might be the 
case. He further gives very little attention to the trait religious, which may in fact be 
connected to attitudes of open and close-mindedness. He notes that French and Darija are 
ranked as being more religious than SA, a surprising result, but does not explore it 
further. He is more concerned with the correlation between attitudes, reported language 
use and socioeconomic status (SES) (for a deeper analysis of this see Chakrani, 2013), 
and the state of diglossia in the Maghreb. He does touch on the association between 
patriotism and local identity noting, “Moroccans see in the desire to use [SA] in the home 
domain, the ability to instill moral values, given that the home and family represent the 
nucleus of Moroccan society” (p. 148). He does not, however, explore why SA is 
associated with moral values. In his follow up analysis (Chakrani, 2013), he again 
reinforces the association of modernity and open-mindedness with French, but is focused 
on the ideology of modernity as a new form of linguistic imperialism.  
Benrabah (2007) examined language attitudes in Algeria for the purpose of 
understanding the effects of a staunch Arabization policy since Algeria’s independence. 
He argues that, as feared in the 1960s, Arabization has only entrenched the 
modern/traditional dichotomy between French and Arabic. He studied adolescents ages 
14 to 20, and found that SA was largely associated with sacredness, religion, values, 
richness, and closeness to God. French was associated with action, development, utility, 
liberation, and modernity, with 91.5% of participants choosing French as “the language 
which allows openness to the world” (Benrabah, 2007, p. 239). French was 
                                                
13 It is important to note that English has also gained prestige as a language associated with modernity and 
a cosmopolitan lifestyle. In Marley’s (2004) study in Morocco, 67.8% of participants completely agreed 
that English is more useful in the world than French. Chakrani (2011) writes that English has begun to 
“dominate in media, entertainment, and the business sectors” (p. 169) in Morocco, and, together with 
French, gives “exclusive” access to a modern lifestyle (p. 172). 
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predominately associated with science and technology, and interestingly, was the 
language used most for courting and saying, “I love you.” He argues that French is 
allowed to “transgress” language taboos, which cannot be spoken in Arabic, such as 
expressing emotions of love in a dating context.14 One particularly notable finding was 
that the girls chose French as the most beautiful language significantly more than boys 
did, with boys choosing SA. According to him, this is due to a difference between 
choosing overt versus covert prestige, the latter based on national and/or local group 
solidarity and an association of Arabic with masculinity. He also investigated attitudes 
toward Berber, and found that 2.2% selected it as the language that I like the most, 1.3% 
selected it as the richest language, 1.7% chose it as the most beautiful language and 1.4% 
selected it as the most useful language. This indicates overall negative attitudes toward 
Berber, not surprising given the fact that the Berber community has largely been 
discriminated against in Algeria. It also might indicate that the population Benrabah 
examined did not come from Berber families. 
We should expect the language attitudes in Tunisia to be somewhat different than 
in Morocco or Algeria because of the different history of colonialism and reaction to 
independence. Tunisia experienced far less conflict during the process of independence, 
and has been less tumultuous in the years since. For this reason, there has been less 
interest in terms of studying language attitudes, although may change in the wake of the 
Arab Spring. Walters (2003) suggests that Tunisia may be in a semi-postdiglossic 
situation because Tunisian Arabic varieties are taking on the H language role. 
Significantly fewer of the Maghrebi immigrants in France come from Tunisia than come 
from Algeria or Morocco (Tribalat, 1995). This makes those countries of higher interest 
                                                
14 It is not uncommon for speakers to use other languages or to code-switch in order to avoid cultural 
taboos.  
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in terms of establishing language attitudes for the purposes of this study, since the 
participants will mostly be of Moroccan and Algerian descent. For this reason, we will 
leave our discussion of language attitudes of the Maghreb and move on to a discussion of 
attitudes in France. 
2.1.7.2 Attitudes in France  
Numerous studies have examined the language use of second and third generation 
Maghrebi immigrants in France, mostly focusing on sociophonetic features. Several 
linguistic phenomena are associated with this population, including palatalization and 
affrication (Jamin et al., 2006), use of non-standard lexical items (Goudaillier, 1997), and 
shifting stress (Fagyal, 2004). Some of these traits are correlated with integration in 
‘street culture’ (although affrication may be occurring on a more wide spread scale). 
Research has also been done on code switching among Moroccan Arabic-French 
bilinguals in France and Morocco, focusing primarily on syntactic structure (Bentahila 
and Davies, 1983; Nortier 1995; Sefiani, 2003; Ziamari, 2009). 
Although a few studies have explored language attitudes, this has been done 
almost exclusively from the point of view of ethnic majority views in France, particularly 
in Paris (Paltridge and Giles, 1984; Oakes, 2001; Kuiper, 2005). This was done at first to 
assess the attitudes of those who speak the prestige variety, Parisian French, toward the 
low prestige regional varieties. As those regional varieties have largely leveled, the 
research has switched toward examining the attitudes of ethnic majority French speakers 
toward the French of ethnic minorities, by and large of Maghrebi origin (Stewart, 2012). 
The study of the language attitudes of North Africans in France toward French and 
Arabic has been largely left untouched. Those studies that do touch on this topic have 
done so incidentally while pursuing other aims, or have discussed attitudes qualitatively 
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without any data to back up their claims. They indicate that, in France, French 
symbolizes modernity while Arabic is associated with Islamic-Arab identity (Gill, 1999). 
This is, in part, because of language attitudes in the Maghreb where French, as the 
colonizing language, has been the language of higher education. French is also a symbol 
of membership to a higher socio-economic status in France and is more prestigious than 
Arabic, which is associated with tradition because of its historical relationship to Islam 
and to Arab nationalism, as well as its position as the language of the colonized and the 
language of immigrants. Although there is overtly a modern/traditional and high SES/low 
SES divide between French and Arabic, there is evidence suggesting that the covert 
prestige for Arabic in the diaspora may be quite strong. 
Billiez (1985) compared observational and interview data of third-generation 
Iberian and Algerian immigrants in France and found that the Iberian group did not use 
Spanish/Portuguese outside of their Iberian network, while the Algerians frequently used 
Arabic in the public sphere. The Algerians viewed it as a marker of identity and a kind of 
secret code. Similarly, Abu-Haidar (1994) found that Algerian immigrants in France have 
a strong language loyalty toward Arabic, not because of its use as a means of 
communication but because it “has come to symbolize both communal allegiance and 
ethnocultural pride” (p. 54). El Aissati (1996) also found Arabic to have symbolic value 
for the Arab diaspora in the Netherlands, juxtaposed with Dutch, which was seen as 
embodying the values of Dutch society. Gill (1999) argues that language choice for the 
young Maghrebi diaspora is based on economic need for jobs, necessitating speaking 
French, as well as on their rapport with the Maghrebi-Islamic culture of their parents. 
Wernitz (1993, cited in Boumans and de Ruiter, 2002), used a questionnaire on language 
use and in-person interviews with first-generation male Moroccan immigrants to France 
who were pursuing higher education. She found that they viewed SA as the most 
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beautiful language and that their language choice between Darija and French depended 
on whether they wanted to express ethnic solidarity or present themselves as 
academically minded. Boumans and de Ruiter (2002) conclude that second-generation 
Moroccans most often speak Arabic at home with their parents, as well as when returning 
to Morocco. The language is “restricted to private and intimate situations” (p. 269). This 
contradicts Billiez’s findings about use of Arabic as an identity marker outside of the 
Arabic community. It is possible that this disparity in results is due to the passing of time, 
but it also may be due to the use of different methods for reaching these conclusions. 
Regardless, further research is needed in order to understand how and where the 
Maghrebi diaspora youth are using Arabic.  
Mohamed (2003) studied language and identity among young Maghrebis under 
the age of 17 living in France focusing on the effects that taking an Arabic course has on 
their social and psychological well-being.15 He examined the attitudes of students, as well 
as Arabic teachers and social workers, in order to understand the children’s place in the 
system. He used questionnaires and interviews to determine if there is a difference in 
identity and attitude between students who are taking a Standard Arabic course and those 
who are not. He argues that a sort of biculturalism/bilingualism, and a reinforcement of 
their culture of origin, will have positive effects on this marginalized population. Many of 
the questions that he investigates have to do with the social and family life of the children 
and parents, although he does touch on some questions of attitudes toward Arabic, Islam 
and the Maghreb. 
Mohamed found that SA learners had more positive attitudes toward Arabic, their 
culture of origin and themselves and were more likely to make reference to their North 
                                                
15 Although published in 2003, the data from his book comes from research done from 1990 to 1993. 
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African identity. They see Arabic as an identity marker, which carries symbolic value, 
and as a carrier of the civilization and culture of the Maghreb and of Islam. Many chose 
to study it in order to read the Qur’an and know Islam. The boys in particular made 
comments about how Arabs should know it, such as, “un Arabe se doit absolument de la 
posséder” (“an Arab absolutely has a duty to posses it”) or “c’est honteux de ne pas parler 
l’arabe quand on est fils d’arabe” (“it is shameful not to speak Arabic when one is an 
Arab son”) (Mohamed, 2003, p. 97). He found that the young girls were the most distant 
and separated from their roots, and that attitudes toward Arabic depend on the family’s 
attitudes toward Arabic and Maghrebi culture, and how often they go back to North 
Africa.16 
Mohamed (2003) concludes that learning SA will help students with North 
African roots to do better in school, identify more strongly with their heritage, and have 
better social and psychological well-being; however, he does not take into account that 
the SA learners may be a self-selected group of individuals who began with positive 
attitudes toward Islam and SA and a strong Maghrebi identity, which then led them to 
pursue SA classes. His claim of causality is not well supported by the evidence he 
provides. There were further troubling, but not uncommon, problems with this study. For 
the most part, the author does not distinguish between SA and Darija, referring generally 
to “Arabic” in his study. At one point he acknowledges that they speak Darija but insists 
that SA is their “langue d’origine,” impossible considering that SA is not learned as a 
first language by anyone. He further claims that the parents, first generation immigrants, 
do not speak “perfect Arabic” (p. 98) presumably because he views the dialect as 
inherently imperfect. It does not seem that he can assess these individuals’ attitudes 
                                                
16 This contradicts an earlier statement he made that girls practice Islam more actively than boys. It is not 
clear to what this contradiction is due, possibly methodological problems. 
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toward Arabic and its connection to North African identity if he does not acknowledge 
dialectal Arabic as a language in its own right, and its place in their life and country of 
origin. Another major problem with his study is methodological. It is unclear what the 
materials were that he used to assess their attitudes. Sometimes he provides the question 
along with the participants’ responses, but often he does not. He conducted in-person 
interviews and had some pen and paper tasks to make social and psychological 
assessments. It is not evident whether the language attitude questions were in an 
interview format or in a written questionnaire, and in what language these were 
conducted. The research was done by Mohamed, himself a first-generation immigrant 
from the Maghreb, which may have had a significant effect on how the participants 
responded. It is likely that these students would answer in such a way as to acquiesce to 
what they thought were appropriate answers given their interlocutor. The questions were 
also not scalar, which prevented any nuance in their responses. 
Although Mohamed touches on many of the themes explored in this dissertation, 
he does not approach them systematically. He is also not working from a language 
attitudes framework. He is, in fact, approaching the topic from the vantage point of a 
social psychologist who is ultimately trying to determine whether bilingualism for young 
Maghrebis will have positive or negative effects in their education and social life due to 
psychosocial benefits, as opposed to cognitive ones. Furthermore, Mohamed’s 
participants are under 18 and he does not explore their attitudes toward French or 
dialectal Arabic, restricting his analysis to SA, two major differences between his study 
and this dissertation. The data from his study was also collected in the early 1990s, and is 
no longer representative of second-generation young adults of Maghrebi origin living in 
France. As Davies and Bentahila (2013) point out, attitudinal studies need to be redone 
every twenty to thirty years because of quickly changing political cultural contexts. 
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2.1.7.3 Attitudes in the Diaspora  
In order to understand attitudes in the Maghrebi diaspora, it is necessary first to 
explore how diaspora language attitudes work more broadly. Recent work in language 
attitudes has explored attitudes amongst diaspora groups and suggests that there may be a 
unique diasporic lens through which diaspora members view the language of their 
heritage. Here, I review a small sampling of this diasporic language attitude literature, 
focusing on the well-established language attitudes research groups in Wales, although 
there are other studies that look at the attitudes of immigrant communities (e.g. Slavik, 
2001; Yagmur & Akinci, 2003). Coupland et al. (2006) used a questionnaire to study the 
language attitudes of North Americans of Welsh descent as well as those living in Wales 
and England with different migratory backgrounds (i.e., those who left Wales but 
returned, or those who recently moved to Wales from England etc.). In total they 
examined six different demographic flow groups. Their goal was to explore Wales and 
Welsh ethnolinguistics on a fine-grained level, specifically concerning globalization, 
flow, and migration, in order to improve understanding of social tensions within and 
outside of Wales. Their main finding was that there seems to be a specific diasporic lens 
through which the Welsh diaspora17 in North America views their homeland and culture, 
and a “desire to affiliate more closely with Wales” (Coupland et al., 2006, p. 369) that is 
similar to the Welsh-born participants who had remained in Wales. Furthermore, those 
who left Wales and then returned later in life had the highest engagement with Welsh: 
“Movement out of Wales seems to have galvanised their ethnolinguistic feelings and 
stance” (Coupland et al., 2006, p. 370). Their research demonstrates that the group that is 
                                                
17 The authors use the term “diaspora” to describe the Welsh communities in North and South America. It 
is not clear why they choose to refer to them as a diaspora group rather than as immigrants. It may be 
because large numbers of Welsh settled in the communities that the authors studied as opposed to being 
scattered throughout the two countries. Regardless, in my discussion of their research, I repeat their 
terminology. 
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often studied and thought to have a monopoly on ethnolinguistic affiliation, those still 
living in the homeland, “[does] not always represent the highest values of Welsh 
ethnolinguistic identification” (Coupland et al., 2006, p. 371). Members of an 
ethnolinguistic group may have different attitudes, or degree of attitude, depending on 
where they live and the history of how they got there.  
Garrett et al. (2009) expanded their study to include the Welsh diaspora in 
Patagonia with a different history of migration than the North American diaspora in order 
to investigate the nuances and effects of different diasporic experiences and histories on 
ethnolinguistic vitality and language attitudes. The Welsh who went to Patagonia claim to 
have done so because those who had gone to North America had “lost” their language, 
and religious and cultural values. The Patagonian group did not want to have to integrate 
in this way. Using the same methodology, they again found that the diasporic groups, 
particularly those in Patagonia, had higher perceived vitalities than those in Wales and 
identified with Welshness more than with the country itself. The two diasporic groups 
were more committed to supporting the Welsh language than the Wales group. The 
authors write, “the fact that commitment to a minority language is stronger ‘abroad’ than 
‘at home’ indicates a particular lens through which language and cultural distinctiveness 
is viewed ‘from afar.’ The Welsh diasporic lens intensifies the image of Welsh and its 
attraction” (Garrett et al., 2009, p. 187). In both the 2006 and 2009 studies, the authors 
found that one of the factors of language attitudes was the ceremonial importance of 
Welsh. Interestingly for the Patagonia group, a religious thread emerged that did not 
emerge in the other two locales, indicating that not every diasporic group will have the 
same attitudes, or the same degree of attitudes, even for diaspora groups who speak the 
same language and come from the same culture. Attitudes vary depending on the 
motivation for migration and the history of their community.  
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Lasagabaster (2008) explored the language attitudes of adults of Basque origin 
(from Spain and France) living in the United States. He found, when comparing this data 
to his previous language attitudes study of people living in the Basque Country 
(Lasagabaster & Huguet, 2007), that the diasporic group had slightly more positive 
attitudes toward Basque. He argues that there seems to be a connection between positive 
language attitudes and being a diaspora minority language speaker and that this needs to 
be explored further. He notes that linguistic diversity has not gotten sufficient attention in 
the diaspora literature even though “ethnic groups have maintained their ethnicity and ties 
to their homeland, their own language(s) playing a key role in many cases” (p. 69). This 
supports the theory that there is a “diasporic lens” whereby these speakers have more 
positive attitudes toward the language of their country of origin than speakers in the 
homeland. Lasagabaster also found that low socio-economic status (SES) and links to the 
homeland play roles in the formation of positive attitudes in the diaspora. Most of the 
population of North African immigrants in France belongs to a lower SES (Hargreaves, 
1990; Begag, 2007), indicating that there will generally be positive language attitudes 
toward Arabic and North African culture. 
These studies demonstrate the tendency that diaspora groups have to identify 
strongly with their country of origin both linguistically and culturally, which may 
translate into a strong sense of national identity with the country of origin. Garrett et al. 
(2003) writes that “language is often…more than just a ‘characteristic of’ or ‘a quality of’ 
a community. It is able to enshrine what is distinctive in the community, or, we might 
even say, constitutes that community” (p. 12). Positive attitudes toward a language may 
become a defining aspect of a community with strong links to national identity, religion 
and cultural norms. It becomes necessary, therefore, to understand the specific 
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relationship between the language(s) in question, and the religion and national identity of 
the community, which is the task of the following two sections.  
 
2.2 LANGUAGE AND RELIGION 
There are relatively few studies in the field of sociolinguistics that explicitly 
explore the relationship between linguistic variation and religion. Yaeger-Dror (2014) 
points out that most studies that look at religion do so as a subset of ethnicity and do not 
single it out as worthy of attention as a sociolinguistic variable. It is often ignored with 
researchers focusing on SES or region instead. This can be seen in language attitudes 
studies such as Chakrani (2010) or Bentahila (1983), where the results reveal that religion 
is influencing language attitudes and choice, but there is no direct exploration of the 
matter. Although sociolinguistics has largely neglected religion, in the related field of the 
sociology of language, the last decade has seen an emerging interest in religion, led by 
the preeminent scholar on the subject, Joshua Fishman. Although many of the goals of 
the sociology of language differ from the goals of sociolinguists, namely looking at the 
role of language in society at large, rather than on the individual level of language 
variation, much can be gained by studying the former.  
The basis of the sociology of language and religion is the fact that most religions 
have a language with which they are associated (Omoniyi & Fishman, 2006), and which 
may be an important indicator of religious identity (Rajah-Carrim, 2010). Oftentimes the 
language associated with a religion can change from country to country, although 
different religions are more or less flexible on this count (Spolsky, 2010). The importance 
of both as markers of identity (Edwards, 2009) makes religion an ideal variable to study 
in sociolinguistics and in language attitudes research. This is even more so given that 
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degree of orthodoxy and level of commitment to religion is correlated with linguistic 
choices (Yaeger-Dror, 2014) and linguistic variation (Baker-Smemoe and Bowie, 2015). 
Discussing variables in sociolinguistics, Bassiouney argues that religion is important in 
language variation and change only because it creates a close-knit community and unites 
its members (Bassiouney, 2009). Although this is true, it leaves out the importance that 
religion holds for many people beyond the community, at the individual level, for which 
language can act as a symbol. 
The choice of the language used to express a particular religion is determined by 
the ideology of the religious community and the power of the language in that community 
(Pandharipande, 2006). Language ideologies refer to “the belief system that is prevalent 
in a specific community about language and language use” (Bassiouney, 2009, p. 201), 
and help to rationalize choosing the language to express that religion (Pandharipande, 
2006), however subconsciously. If the language ideology includes a belief that there is 
one language that can best express a religion, then that language will gain significant 
importance in the community and the attitudes toward that language will also improve 
(Gafaranga, 2010). Thus, language attitudes will often carry the values of a community, 
and are associated with religiosity (Dragojevic et al., 2013). Once a language has been 
established as the language best suited to represent and express a religion, that language 
may then continue to hold prestige and loyalty because of its relationship to the religion. 
Indeed, once a language comes to be associated with a religion, it is very difficult for it to 
become disassociated (Safran, 2008).  
Religious affiliation can be an important aspect of language maintenance in a 
minority language community (Baker, 1992). Dzialtuvaite (2006) found, for example, 
that for the Lithuanian diaspora in Scotland, religion played a strong role in maintaining 
Lithuanian identity and the Lithuanian language. The Amish community in America, 
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particularly in Pennsylvania, has managed to maintain German, even though it has gone 
far beyond the standard three generations in which language shift usually occurs for a 
diaspora group (Moelleken, 1983). This is also a community that is no longer receiving 
new immigrants from Germany and yet is producing new generations of native German 
speakers. Maintenance of German is strongly associated with the religious commitment 
of the community.  
2.2.1 Arabic and Islam 
The three major monotheistic religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam have all 
had, to differing degrees, a language that was at one point strongly associated with the 
religion; however, none has had such a strong ideology and one to one association 
between language and religion as has Islam. For centuries, the Catholic Church insisted 
on the primacy of Latin both in the delivery of sermons and in the language in which the 
Bible was written. There was a strong and persistent ideology that Latin was the only 
language suited to communicate the Catholic Christian faith.18 This was the case until the 
Council of Tours (813), which permitted priests to conduct their sermons in the local 
vernacular because there was a growing problem of parishioners no longer understanding 
Latin (Judge, 2007). During the Protestant Reformation (16th century), Bibles and 
religious pamphlets began to be printed in vernacular languages as well (Safran, 2008). 
Although Catholic masses were still performed in Latin until Vatican II (1962-65), the 
power of Latin as the primary language of the Catholic faith ended in the 16th century. 
Similarly, Judaism has long been associated with Hebrew, which was the sacred language 
of the religion and the religion in which the holy book, the Torah, was written. Despite 
the long historical association between the two, Judaism has had a long-established 
                                                
18 Latin was not, however, the primary language of liturgy for the Orthodox churches. 
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tolerance for multilingualism, with Yiddish taking on some sacred attributes in the 20th 
century (Spolsky, 2010).  
The only one of the three monotheistic religions that has not changed its stance on 
the language that may be used in religious services is Islam, still requiring Arabic for 
religious services and for prayer. Pandharipande (2006), in his study of religious 
languages in Mauritius, found that while religions such as Buddhism and Christianity 
recognized new south Asian languages as codes for their religions, Islam did not. This 
highlights the fact that Islam stands apart from other religions in its belief and 
commitment to Arabic as the only appropriate language for the expression of Islam and 
the Qur’an. Spolsky (2010) writes that some religions are indeed less flexible in terms of 
their religious code, citing Islam and Arabic as an example. There is a uniquely strong 
relationship between the Arabic language, in particular Standard Arabic, and Islam, 
because of a language ideology that goes back centuries. Arabic is especially important 
and prestigious because it is the language of the Qur’an, the Islamic holy book, and the 
Hadith, the words purportedly spoken by the Prophet Mohammed (Suleiman, 2003). Both 
of these texts refer to Arabic as the language of heaven, the language chosen by God and 
the language of the Arabs (Suleiman, 2003). The entry for the Qur’an in the Concise 
Encyclopedia of Islam says:  
 
The substance of the Koran is completely wedded to its Arabic form. Because the 
Koran is what is called in Sanskrit shruti (“primary revelation” or God Himself 
speaking) – unlike much of the New Testament which is smriti (“secondary 
revelation”) – and because of the nature of Arabic as a sacred language, a 
language capable of transmitting shruti, it is completely impossible to translate 
the Koran in its reality into another language. Translations are therefore unusable 
for ritual and liturgical purposes. The sound itself, of inimitable sonority and 
rhythmic power, is numinous and sacramental. (Glassé 2001, p. 267) 
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Thus, it is believed that there is something intrinsic in the language itself, which is 
uniquely and supernaturally capable of communicating the message of Islam. Religious 
services must be conducted in SA, which is, in part, why it is so widely maintained 
(Spolsky, 2010), as is the need to use Standard Arabic to fulfill one of the five pillars of 
Islam, prayer (Rouchdy, 2002). It is also the language in which the Prophet himself 
spoke. Thus, language, just like Mohammed’s other life practices, are enshrined and 
emulated in the observing of the Islamic faith.  
The fact that Standard Arabic has deep roots in the history of Islam helps to 
maintain the myth of the language and the strong ideology associated with it. The Prophet 
Mohammed specifically directed his people to learn Arabic (Suleiman, 2003). Indeed, 
throughout the Arabic intellectual tradition, theologians and historians have argued for 
the superiority of Arabic and its equivalency to being an Arab and to loving God and the 
Prophet. It is believed that the Qur’an is the “ultimate ‘standard’ of the Arabic language” 
(Joseph, 2004: 194). Not knowing it, or speaking it ‘imperfectly,’ has historically been 
seen as disgraceful because it was thought of as religious deviation (Joseph, 2004). There 
is a strong ideology of the importance of Standard Arabic in the history of Islam and the 
language is extremely powerful in diglossic Arabic language communities.  
Religion should be considered an important variable in language variation 
because it is an element of personal, community and cultural identity. This is particularly 
true for Muslim Arabs: “Religion may be regarded in the Arab world as an essential part 
of one’s identity, perhaps more so than in the west” (Bassiouney, 2009, p. 126). The 
relationship between language and religion is strongest in languages that are tied to an 
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ethnic community (Safran, 2008), which is the case the Muslim Arab community.19 If 
religion is in general an important factor in language variation it is even more so in the 
Muslim community. In the Arab world, unlike in the west, there is a view that one is born 
into the religion of one’s family and community, and thus separating from one’s religion 
is impossible (Sadiqi, 2003; Bassiouney, 2009). If it is impossible (or nearly so) to 
disengage from Islam, it follows that it will be difficult to disengage from a language 
with which it is strongly associated, if not in use than in ideology and attitude (Safran, 
2008). Given that language ideology precedes language attitudes (Gafaranga, 2010; 
Garrett, 2010), the strength of the connection between Islam and Arabic and the strong 
language ideology that Arabic speakers and Muslims hold, makes it an ideal language to 
research in terms of language attitudes. It further indicates that attitudes toward Arabic 
will be strongly influenced by level of attachment to Islam. The important question raised 
is whether this remains the case in the Muslim Arab diaspora. 
There are few quantitative studies that intentionally investigate the relationship 
between Islam and Arabic; however, there are several that have incidentally found a 
relationship between the two. Davies and Bentahila (1989) explored, via a survey, which 
language Moroccans claimed as their ‘own language’ and why. They found that many 
participants selected Arabic, whether they spoke it or not, because of its symbolic value 
as the language of Islam. In Bentahila’s (1983) language attitudes survey, the adjective 
‘religious’ was chosen more often to describe Moroccan Arabic and ‘Classical Arabic’ 
(SA) because, according to the author, of the “close association between Arabic and 
Islam” (p. 62). He also found in sentence completion tasks that participants were more 
likely to complete a sentence with reference to Islam and duty when the task was 
                                                
19 It is important to note that there are also Arab Christian communities in the Levant dating back centuries.  
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performed in Arabic (whether this was SA or Darija was not specified). These trends of 
sentences being completed with reference to duty in Arabic reflect “traditional Islamic 
philosophy” (Bentahila, 1983, p. 43). If, when speaking Arabic, religion and tradition 
come more easily to mind, it would not be surprising to find that people who were 
seeking a more modern and secular lifestyle would choose French over Arabic. 
One question that arises is whether the dialectal varieties of Arabic can take on 
any of the religious connotations of Standard Arabic. According to Joseph (2004), 
Muslims can signal themselves as full group-members with knowledge of the Arabic of 
the Qur’an, but they can also do this with whichever language is deemed the most proper 
language associated with the religion. Given that many people in the North African 
diaspora will most likely have little knowledge of Standard Arabic, dialectal Arabic may 
have taken its place as the language of Islam for that community. According to 
Bassiouney (2009) most Arabs do not distinguish between Standard Arabic and 
colloquial Arabic: 
The complexity of the situation arises from the fact that the native speakers of 
Arabic do not distinguish between MSA and [Egyptian Arabic]. For them there is 
only one [Standard Arabic]…they also use the term ‘Arabic’ to refer to the 
standard language and the colloquials of different countries. (Bassiouney, 2009, p. 
26) 
 
Although linguists distinguish between colloquial varieties of Arabic and Standard 
Arabic, speakers of Arabic view the latter as a “larger entity” which unites them. Davies 
and Bentahila (2013) support this, arguing that, although Arabic can be considered a 
classic diglossic situation, most Moroccans use the term “Arabic” to refer to all varieties. 
According to them the colloquial and the Qur’anic varieties constitute the same language. 
Chakrani (2010) found that in Morocco, dialectal Arabic was rated significantly higher 
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than MSA (SA for our purposes) for ‘modest,’ ‘sociable’ and ‘religious,’ further 
indicating that there can be a transfer of religious connotation from standard to dialectal 
Arabic. Belazi’s (1992) language attitudes study in Tunisia found that Darija was 
associated with religion significantly more than French, suggesting that SA does not hold 
a monopoly on connoting Islam as far as varieties of Arabic go.20 However, in Algeria, 
SA was rated significantly higher than Algerian Arabic as the language in which 
participants feel close to God, and the language of religious and moral values (Benrabah, 
2007).21 As a religious language, SA is thought to be particularly suited to influencing the 
secular varieties, i.e. colloquial Arabic, because it is still the basis of secular literacy and 
thus has an even greater influence on secular varieties (Fishman, 2006). Further research 
is needed in order to fully understand whether the religious prestige of SA can transfer to 
colloquial varieties in the Arab diaspora, which is one of the aims of the current study. 
It is important to note that, although English is not a language that is considered 
sacred, nor is it connected to Islam in its history or in its texts, it is a tool used in today’s 
globalized Islam. It is a lingua franca across the world for the digital Muslim community, 
and, according to Olivier Roy, together with Arabic, is one of the two primary languages 
used on websites aimed at a virtual Muslim community (Religioscope, 2004). While 
Standard Arabic is most closely associated with Islam and is consider the language of that 
religion, English plays an important functional and communicative role, especially for 
those living in the diaspora who may not have enough knowledge of Arabic to permit 
them to interact online with other Muslims. Studying attitudes toward English was 
outside of the scope of the current project, but it should be noted that it plays a 
                                                
20 However, SA was not an option in this attitudes study. 
21 It is important to note that the Arabization process and the colonial history in Algeria differs from 
Morocco and Tunisia, which may explain differences in attitudes toward SA and the colloquial variety. 
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supranational role as a language in which one can communicate with other Muslims on a 
global scale. 
 
2.3 LANGUAGE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY  
In the past few centuries, particularly since the French Revolution, language has 
become a primary symbol for the establishment of a nation and national identity. The 
German romantics of the 19th century popularized the idea of one nation one language 
with Johann Herder’s philosophy of linguistic nationalism, which is described as one “in 
which ancestral language and national continuity are intertwined” (Edwards, 2009, p. 
208).22 Herder went so far as to say that a nation cannot exist without a shared language 
(Dawisha, 2003). Johann Fichte, another German romantic, argued that the boundary of 
the nation is the language (Joseph, 2004). It has been argued more recently that, in terms 
of nationalist ideology, language is more important and worthy than territory (Fishman 
1972). This is especially relevant when considering that Herder and Fichte were writing 
in a pre-globalized world. Today, with the prevalence of migration, diaspora communities 
participate in a national identity from afar, one that is not restricted by or to territorial 
sovereignty but is connected by a language and culture that can be carried across borders 
via the technologies now available. This is what Laguerre describes as the digital 
diaspora: 
An immigrant group or descendant of an immigrant population that uses 
[information technology] connectivity to participate in virtual networks of 
contacts for a variety of political, economic, social, religious, and 
communicational purposes that, for the most part, may concern either the 
homeland, the host land, or both, including its own trajectory abroad. (Laguerre, 
2010, p. 50) 
                                                
22 Herder’s work expressed and fostered a philosophy that was at its core racist; nevertheless, his ideas 
were highly influential in the 19th and 20th centuries. 
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In the globalized Internet age, diasporic members can participate in a community online 
where the common denominator is national identity of the home country, ethnic identity 
or the language of the home country. This is how the Basque diaspora’s digital 
nationalism plays out on the web (Oiarzabal, 2010). The North African diaspora in 
France similarly uses online groups on Facebook such as ‘Tunisien(e)s en France’ or 
‘Communauté maghrébine marseillaise’ to celebrate a national or ethnocultural identity, 
with posts often in Arabic instead of French.  
Traditionally, there have been two primary conceptions of nationalism: French 
nationalism and German nationalism (Joseph, 2004). The former is based on the belief 
that a nation is formed out of a consenting alliance between the state and the individual; a 
pact entered into willingly by both parties. Ethnicity and language technically do not 
matter, therefore anyone can enter this pact. Because this form of nationalism is founded 
on a contract with the state, a state government is required in order for the nation to exist. 
It is important to note, however, that language has come to be an extremely important 
symbol of French national identity (Gordon, 1978; Oakes, 2001; Weil, 2010), moving 
closer toward the German model. German nationalism is based on a shared culture, 
ethnicity and language rather than a contract between the individual and the state 
(Dawisha, 2003). Being German was traditionally founded on having German lineage, 
German nationalism being one of the precursors for the Nazi obsession with Arian 
ethnicity. One was either born German or one was not. A German could not, according to 
this theory, cease to be German even if he or she relocated and claimed another 
nationality. For this reason, ethnic identity is often associated with or seen as tantamount 
to a sense of national identity in many countries.23  
                                                
23 Throughout this dissertation I use the term ‘national identity’ when referring to my participants’ attitudes 
toward the Maghreb. This term should be seen to embody and relate to a sense of cultural and ethnic 
identity, given that the majority of Arab states are based on this German model of nationalism. It is 
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In general, a sense of nationalism comes from believing that a group of people all 
share and participate in something that is greater than their individual differences. 
Fishman defines nationalism as:  
…the organizationally heightened and elaborated beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors 
of societies acting on behalf of their avowed ethnocultural self-interest…it is clear 
that for such societally organized goal activity to occur it is first necessary for 
populations to become convinced that they possess in common certain unique 
ethnocultural characteristics, and that these similarities, over and above local 
variations and subgroup differences, are of importance to them. (Fishman, 1972, 
p. 5) 
People search for a cultural product that they can use to bind themselves together in the 
process of nation building (Suleiman, 2003). Nationalist identity “involves romanticised 
yearnings for a past” (Edwards, 2009, p. 201), therefore, this cultural product is most 
ideal if it is rooted in the past. Having a shared history provides a sense of belonging in a 
nation and legitimizes and authenticates it. Language is the most suitable for this purpose, 
as it has no exact point of beginning or birth; it has seemingly always been present. It has 
become an important ‘myth’ for modern nationalism and is often linked with the concept 
of a glorious past: “The purported continuity of the language [is] the authenticating 
device for finding, claiming, and utilizing one’s inheritance” (Fishman, 1972, p. 45). For 
this reason language is often sanctified and there is an attempt to keep it ‘pure’ and 
unchanging. One finds language academies in many countries, most notably France, 
where the Académie Française ‘protects’ the French language. This can also be seen with 
the preservation of the Arabic used in the Qur’an, despite the development of various 
other dialects of spoken Arabic.  
                                                                                                                                            
important to note, however, that one can have a sense of ethnic identity without feeling a sense of national 
identity with a particular nation. 
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Most national identities traditionally developed from a sense of religious 
consciousness, based on a belief that one’s country has been chosen by God to succeed 
and that linguistic claims are legitimized by the connection with that religion (Safran, 
2008). For the past two centuries the emphasis has shifted from religion to language in 
building the nation or ethno-nation. This can be seen in the replacement of the state 
religion with the state language in France after the French Revolution. Safran (2008) 
notes, however, that not all nations have moved beyond religion as a foundation, citing 
Turkey and Poland as examples. Certainly manly Muslim majority countries could be 
added to that list given that “most Arab countries are by definition Islamic (the same 
clause in the Constitution commonly declares Islam the religion and Arabic the national 
language)” (Spolsky, 2010, p. 15), revealing how closely the two are related and the 
legitimizing force that that relationship lends to a claim of national sovereignty.  If 
language and religion are “the cultural materials used to shape a national identity” 
(Safran, 2008, p. 187-88), how much stronger will this be with a language so closely tied 
to the religion in question, as is the case with Arabic and Islam? Religion and politics are 
deeply enmeshed in the Arab world where “political factors are essential…and may be 
intertwined with religions in most cases” (Bassiouney, 2009, p. 105). The history of 
Islam was grounded in political goals and nation building, and as the language of Islam, 
Arabic is firmly bound to patriotism in the Muslim world and is the language of the 
“nation of Islam”  (Joseph, 2004, p. 197). Standard Arabic is still seen as the only suitable 
language for interpreting the message of the Qur’an and is held up by most Muslim 
majority states as the national language.  
SA was a unifying force for nationalism in the Maghreb after independence from 
France. Fishman (1972) writes that assertion of a strong national identity is often used to 
overcome a lost and fragmented identity. Indeed, language as a marker of cultural and 
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national identity is more potent in the postcolonial world (Gill, 1999), where colonial 
powers often imposed their own language on the native inhabitants. This was the case 
with France’s linguistic policies in the Maghreb. One finds that Arabic was and continues 
to be used as a unifying symbol of national and pan-Arab identity in North Africa 
(Bentahila, 1983) and is seen as more authentic than French (Gill, 1999). In his language 
attitudes study in Morocco, Bentahila (1983) found that sentence completion tasks done 
in Arabic, as opposed to French, more frequently produced responses that made reference 
to nationalism and Arab identity: 
 
FRENCH: My duty in society is to study hard. 
ARABIC: My duty in society is to be worthy of my country 
(Bentahila, 1983, p. 42, my underlining) 
 
Approximately 60% of Moroccans chose SA as the language that Moroccans ought to 
use, while 27% chose Darija, indicating that dialectal Arabic can participate in national 
identity in an Islamic country even if SA still holds the monopoly on this image. Only 
8.04% of participants chose French. Participants also preferred reading materials written 
in Arabic because of a similar sense of patriotism. Chakrani (2010) found that Moroccans 
considered SA and Darija more ‘patriotic’ than French, concluding, “French does not 
have a role in the construction of national identity” (p. 130). He also found that 
participants primarily completed the following phrase “It is important for a Moroccan to 
use _____________,” with Darija, SA and Berber. It is not surprising that North Africans 
would have a strong association between Arabic and patriotism given that French is the 
language of their former colonizer. It is expected that Arabic would symbolize 
independence and would invoke a sense of national identity. Bentahila and Chakrani did 
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their surveys nearly 30 years apart, and although some certain results have changed, there 
is still a clear association of Arabic with Moroccan national identity. Although the 
present study focuses on a different population, this data indicates that French will most 
likely not be associated with North African identity for a population with roots in the 
Maghreb. 
Suleiman (2003) argues that language and nationalism is an area that needs to be 
explored more empirically in order to “investigate how linguistic behavior and 
nationalism as movement or action interact with each other in the Arabic-speaking 
world.” (p. 228). He further argues that there is a need to study the language attitudes of 
Arabic-speakers in order to gain insight into the relationship between language and 
national identity. This is precisely what the present study aims to do. 
2.3.1 Arabism 
In Muslim majority countries both Islam and Arabic are strong building blocks 
for, and symbols of, national identity; however, the relationship between Arabic and 
nationalism goes beyond the borders of an individual country and extends to a sense of 
pan-Arab identity, or “Arab consciousness,” that has existed for centuries and is rooted in 
the Arabic language and Islam (Dawisha, 2003). It is important to discuss the history of 
Arab identity and its political arm, Arab nationalism, in order to highlight the importance 
that Arabic has played, and continues to play, in the ethnic and national consciousness of 
many in the Arab world. This is particularly relevant for a discussion of Arab identity in 
the diaspora, where individuals may feel alienated from the receiving country and turn 
not only to the culture of their country of origin, but also to their ethnolinguistic identity 
in order to find a sense of belonging.  For these reasons, it is important to explore the 
roots of pan-Arab identity as well as Arab nationalism. 
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Modern Arab nationalism began in the early 20th century, most notably with the 
Arab thinker Sati’ Al-Husri (1882-1968), whose goal was to politically unite all Arabic 
speakers under one sovereign state. According to Al-Husri, Arab nationalism was akin to 
German nationalism in that, unlike French nationalism, it had nothing to do with forming 
a pact between citizen and state, and everything to do with ethnocultural and linguistic 
heritage (Dawisha, 2003). This goal of a politically unified Arab state was not initially 
shared in the Arab world, but by the 1920s and 30s there was a growing sense in the 
Arabic-speaking Middle East that “beyond their immediate locale, they also belonged to 
a wider Arab fraternity, an all-encompassing Arab nation, based on a foundation of 
common language, culture, and ‘blood ties’” (Dawisha, 2003, p. 83), placing language at 
the center of pan-Arab sentiments. Ethnicity, while essential in all cultures and societies, 
is more intertwined with nationality in the Arab world (Bassiouney, 2009), and, in this 
case, language is closely tied to ethnicity.  
Arab nationalism reached its zenith in the 1960s led by Egyptian president Abdel 
Nasser, in a movement that has popularly become known as Nasserism. Nasser thought 
that “national identity is predetermined and has nothing to do with free will,” so that it 
did not matter if an Arab rejected this identity, he or she was still an Arab (Dawisha, 
2003, p. 72). Although the Arab nationalist movement was secular and largely based on 
language rather than religion (Dawisha, 2003; Bassiouney, 2009), most of the Arab 
nations that the movement was seeking to unify were made up of Muslims. Arab 
nationalism as a political movement was abandoned largely because of the defeat of the 
Arab coalition in the 6 days war in 1967, but also because of the animosity and suspicion 
of Shia and Sunni Muslims.  
There persists a strong sense of pan-Arabism (Rouchdy, 2002), not as a political 
goal, but as an ethnoreligious and ethnolinguistic group. The Arab nation is now an 
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ideological entity (Bassiouney, 2009) rather than one with territorial goals. Following 
Dawisha (2003), Arabism and Arab nationalism are distinguished as follows:  
 
The nation thus defined is: a human solidarity, whose members believe that they 
form a coherent cultural whole, and who manifest a strong desire for political 
separateness and sovereignty. Applied to the Arab world, this definition goes 
beyond the linguistic, religious, historical, and emotional bonds that tie the 
Arabic-speaking people to each other. For the purpose of conceptual precision, 
this cultural uniformity would be termed Arabism. But Arabism with the added 
element of a strong desire (and preferably articulated demands) for political unity 
in a specified demarcated territory—that is what will be termed Arab nationalism. 
(Dawisha, 2003, p. 13) 
 
Arabism, as opposed to the failed project of Nasserism, does not have the political goals 
of a unified state, but refers to a pan-Arab ethnocultural identification based on language, 
history and religion. I will use Arabism interchangeably with pan-Arab identity, neither 
of which should be mistaken with political Arab nationalism. It is important, however, to 
note that even if the political goals have vanished, the legacy of Arab nationalism may 
still influence political leaders in Muslim majority and Arab countries, resulting in the 
continued use of SA as their national language. 
Nationalism can exist without the physical boundaries of a country as an 
“imagined community” of the people who belong to that group (Anderson, 1991/2006), 
especially for a diaspora. Because the Arab nationalism movement was based on the 
German form of nationalism, which does not necessitate a state, the Arab diaspora may 
easily have a sense of pan-Arabism, without explicit political intentions. Rouchdy (2002) 
calls SA a common denominator for the Arab diaspora and an expression of identity 
evoking what she calls the “defunct term of ‘pan-Arab’ identity” (p. 143). Although the 
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political movement has died, Arabic remains “the unifying factor for the Moroccan 
nation-state, the Arab Maghreb and the Arab World” (Faiq, 1999 p. 145).  
Although there have not been any studies that have intentionally examined the 
links between Arabic and pan-Arab identity, there are several that have produced results 
that support the claim that such a link exists. When asked what language Moroccans 
ought to use, the majority of Bentahila’s (1983) participants chose SA, with one 
respondent commenting that this is “because we are Moroccans and Arabs” and another 
referring to it as the language of the Arabs (p. 32). Not only does SA symbolize patriotic 
national sentiments, it also invokes a sense of belonging to the ethnocultural group 
‘Arab.’ Similarly, one interviewee in Chakrani’s (2010) study in Morocco told him that 
children must be taught SA to preserve their identity as Arabs, and Riahi’s Tunisian 
participants stated that they preferred books and films in Arabic and accused those who 
did not of betraying their Arab identity (Riahi, 1970, as cited in Gill, 1999, p. 127), thus 
demonstrating the power of a language in carrying ethnic identity, and the strength of 
language attitudes and ideology. 
Davies and Bentahila (1989), in a study in which they asked Moroccans to 
indicate the language that they feel is their “own language,” found that many speakers 
“strongly identified with Arabic as a symbol of their religion and of unity both within 
Morocco and with the other Islamic Arabic-speaking countries” (p. 286). A Berber-
Arabic bilingual speaker who cited Classical Arabic as his ‘own language’ said “as an 
Arab and a Muslim I consider Classical Arabic my own language even though I am 
originally a speaker of Berber” (p. 285). If these participants claim Arabic as their 
language because of its identification with a broader Arab and Islamic identity, then it 
would follow that someone who did not want to identify with that world might not 
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In this chapter, I began by providing an overview of language attitudes, their 
components, relationship to use, role in language maintenance and shift (focusing 
particularly on maintenance and shift in the Arab diaspora), and stability. I also discussed 
the role language plays as a transmitter of culture and values, and how women use 
language as an expression of identity, as a tool for gaining social advantage and status, 
and, sometimes, as a way of rejecting conservative culture and traditional gender roles. I 
reviewed the major language attitudes studies done in the Maghreb, France, and in 
diaspora communities. Contextualizing the attitudes in the Maghreb specifically will 
allow for a comparison of the attitudes there and in the diaspora in France, as well help to 
understand the attitudes of the participants’ parents’ generation. This was followed by a 
discussion of the relationship between language and religion, focusing specifically on the 
special relationship that Arabic and Islam have had since the 7th century. I also explored 
the link between language and nationalism, concentrating on the connection that Arabic 
has had with national identity and Arab nationalism. In the following chapter, I discuss 
French language ideology (both its history and its status today), language policy in the 
Maghreb both during and after the colonial period, and the history and current standing of 






3. French Ideology, Language Policy in the Maghreb, and the North 
African Diaspora in France 
In order to understand properly the language attitudes of the North African 
diaspora in France, it is first necessary to contextualize the topic with a discussion of 
French language ideology, and the linguistic policies during the colonial era and post-
independence. French has long been praised and defended as the ultimate language of 
beauty and reason, an ideology that began in the 16th century and that still endures today. 
During the Revolution, it stood as a symbol of allegiance to the state and a foreswearing 
of loyalty at the communal level. Today, it is seen as the vehicle of French culture and 
has become an important symbol for citizenship and the assimilation of immigrants. 
France’s language ideology manifested itself in its use as a tool to control North Africans 
and subjugate their cultural attachments during the colonial era. The post-independence 
reaction to this was Arabization, an attempt to reassert the Arabic language. These 
colonial and post-independence language policies shaped the language attitudes of North 
Africans, attitudes that may have been carried over into the diaspora in France, where 
language continues to be used as a powerful assimilator. 
It is further necessary to contextualize the North African diaspora in France by 
discussing the history of their migration, and what life is like for them there today in 
terms of jobs, housing, language, marriage, religion and social conditions. This will shed 
light on how they view France and the French language, and will provide background for 
the participant selection portion of my methodology. This chapter is divided into three 
sections. The first is devoted to understanding the relationship between the French 
language and French national identity and culture. The second focuses on the history and 
relationship between France and the Maghreb, including the language and education 
policies during the colonial era and in the years after independence. The third section 
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examines the North African diaspora in France, both its history and its current situation 
today. 
 
3.1 FRENCH, CULTURE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY  
3.1.1 Defense & Standardization of French 
The defense and praise of French goes back at least to the 16th century. Writers 
like Joachim Du Bellay, who wrote the Défense et illustration de la Langue Française 
(1549), argued for the inherent qualities of French and the need to further cultivate it. He 
defended French as worthy of being a literary language on the par with revered Latin 
texts, encouraging people to write in it instead of in Latin (Calvet, 1998). Henri Estienne, 
another 16th century French language protectionist, condemned Italian borrowings as 
traitorous, claiming that Italy was an exporter of vices and assassination, as evidenced by 
borrowed words such as charlatan and assassin (Cowling, 2007). These kinds of attacks 
were largely motivated by the economic strength of what is today northern Italy and the 
influx of loan words caused by trade with this area (Oakes, 2001). This economic threat 
caused a reactionary strengthening of French identity in the 16th century, which would be 
seen again in the second half of the 20th century in regards to English. 
The early insistence on the inherent qualities of French led, in the next century, to 
the formation of a language academy, the Académie Française, by Cardinal Richelieu in 
1635, who based it on its Italian counterpart. Its mission was to provide stability and 
durability for the language by establishing a dictionary and grammar, in an effort to arrest 
language change, which was viewed as a kind of corruption. The Académie was also 
created in order to bring prestige to France in comparison to other European countries 
(Lodge, 1993). In addition to writing dictionaries and grammars, the Académie also 
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edited and scrutinized the works of writers like Racine and Corneille because writing was 
seen as the ultimate form of language, and therefore had to be protected. Vaugelas 
directed the first dictionary published by the Académie, and in his Remarques (1647) 
insisted on bon usage in spoken French, arguing for one correct way to speak the 
language. He asserted that good usage was how the “sensible” part of the royal court 
spoke, but also included some people who lived in the same city as the king. His 
criticisms were aimed at the masses, particularly the speech of the people in Paris, which 
he stigmatized heavily, as well as regional varieties (Lodge, 1993). In order to experience 
any kind of upward mobility in France it was necessary to have bon usage. For this 
reason there was a proliferation of guides instructing people how to get rid of their 
“regionalisms” (Lodge, 1993).  
By the end of the 18th century French had become the language of international 
diplomacy (Lodge, 1993) and was considered a universal language of Europe because of 
its ubiquity among the elite and the educated, and in the universities (Calvet, 1998). 
Authors continued to extol it for its “intrinsic” value. It became a symbol for the 
“enlightened” French culture and patrimony. Antoine de Rivarol famously wrote in the 
18th century that “what is not clear is not French” in his essay De l’universalité de la 
langue française (1784), and asserted that French was a fundamentally human and 
reasonable language (Lodge, 1993, p. 185). His writings also have strong nationalist 
undertones, unsurprising at a time when the German Romantics were beginning to write 
about language and nationalism. These authors defended French as a proxy for defending 
France and French culture, a practice that would continue into the 21st century. The 
defense and standardization of French that occurred from the 16th to the 18th century was 
the beginning of the myth of French. In order to have a cohesive nation and a strong 
sense of nationalism people need a common myth, culture and history (Suleiman, 2003; 
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Joseph, 2004). Language in general, and French specifically, was ideal for this task. It 
was perfectly situated to be used as a unifying tool during the French Revolution, and its 
‘inherent’ qualities would help to justify the French civilizing mission for centuries to 
come (Balibar, 1985). 
3.1.2 The Revolution, Language and Laïcité 
With the French Revolution (1789) came linguistic assimilation under the new 
political ideology of equality and democracy. The Revolution was focused on a unified 
and indivisible republic where communitaurisme was forbidden: no loyalty to sub-
national communities or groups would be tolerated, whether it be loyalty to religion, 
region or language. In the French vision of nationalism, nationality was based on a pact 
that a citizen willingly entered into with the state. The Jacobins believed that people had 
the right to direct and equal access to the state. Anything that came between the two 
violated the fundamental principles of the Revolution and created inequality (Safran, 
1991). It was for this reason that the state separated from the church and imposed laïcité 
(official secularism). In order to have equal access to the state and its laws, everyone also 
needed to speak the same language. Therefore linguistic differences were rejected in the 
name of formal equality (Oakes, 2011). This concept, universalism, proposed that 
equality can only be obtained if everyone is exactly the same. It is the opposite of 
multiculturalism where equality is gained via an acceptance of all differences.  
Based on the philosophy of universalism there was a call for linguistic unification 
in the form of assimilation to the Parisian dialect. According to Abbé Grégoire’s 
extensive linguistic survey in 1784 more than half of France spoke a language other than 
French as their first language (S. Judge, 2002). Linguistic unity was such a preoccupation 
that Robespierre declared language “problems” a public safety issue because certain 
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counter-revolutionary actions were associated with certain languages (Schiffman, 2002). 
He declared that all other languages in France needed to be eliminated because of their 
inherent danger (Oakes, 2001). The drive toward linguistic uniformity was motivated by 
a fear of regional uprising. Unifying the regions linguistically was a way to unify them 
politically. It was an attempt to shore up the nation and unify political power. The 
democratization of language, therefore, was not only about freedom and equality of 
access but also about suppression of the minority regional languages (Oakes, 2001).  
In 1793, the Comité du salut publique was created and slowly took on dictatorial 
power. Bertrand Barère de Vieuzac, the spokesman, is noted for saying that certain 
languages were the languages of counter-revolutionary principles, while French was 
considered the only language capable of expressing revolutionary sentiments (Salhi & 
Jeanjean, 2002), and of upholding the ideals of clarity, purity and democracy. French, it 
was again claimed, carried inherent virtue, while regional languages were seen as an 
impediment to the “modern, rational state,” (Oakes, 2001). With the Law of 2 Thermidor, 
Year II (20 July, 1794), it was declared that all “public instruments” must be in French, 
and violation of the law was punishable by 6 months in prison or dismissal in the case of 
civil servants (Calvet, 1998). Speaking a language other than French in the wrong 
contexts became a crime.  
Education was and remains the most effective way to change the linguistic 
landscape. The Law of 30 vendémiaire Year II (21 October, 1793) established state 
schools where children were taught French. The proposal of 8 pluviose Year II (27 
January, 1794) decreed that French had to be taught in all communes where French was 
not previously spoken (Schiffman, 2002). The language policies of the Revolution were 
not immediately effective, mainly because education was not yet compulsory; however, it 
laid the groundwork for further education policies. The Falloux Law (1850) stated that 
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education must be in French (A. Judge, 2007) and Jules Ferry made education universal, 
compulsory and secular in the 1880s (Oakes, 2001). The consequence of these language 
and education policies was that by the end of the 19th century, all children were in school 
and were learning in French. Their maternal language, while still spoken in the home, 
was not tolerated in the schools.  
The French Revolution undermined the political system in France by denying the 
legitimacy of the monarch’s rule by divine law and replacing it with the nation-state 
(Fenet, 2004). When the monarchy was overthrown in 1789, a new concept of nation was 
born, one that equated the state with the nation.  
 
In medieval and early modern Europe the word ‘nation’ signified essentially 
‘nation as community’, and was not automatically bound up with the state. During 
the eighteenth century, however, the notion of ‘nation as association’ appears to 
have become dominant, and in consequence there developed demands to make the 
‘nation’ and the state synonymous and to cement the bonds of association within 
the ‘nation’ by means of a common language and shared ethnicity. (Lodge, 1993, 
p. 209) 
 
While claiming that nothing, including language, should be a barrier to the state, the 
Revolution also paradoxically established the role of French as the symbol of French 
universalism, culture and patrimony, such that today not knowing French, or the ‘correct’ 
French, presents challenges in accessing the state and leads to accusations of a loss of 
French civilization. Today, accusations made by political parties, on the right and left, of 
anti-universalist sentiments among non-French speakers echo those made during the 
Revolution of the inherently counter-revolutionary nature of the regional dialects.  
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The universalist model that was established during the Revolution had lasting 
effects, not just on language use, laws and attitudes, but also on how the French 
understand the public and private spheres, and minority identity. The attempt to make all 
citizens equal before the law resulted in the denial of differences between individuals or 
groups. This includes the denial of minority community members. Since the Revolution, 
France has formally denied the existence of minorities within its borders because it goes 
against their concept of citizenship (Oakes, 2001). On January 6, 1978 a law was passed 
making it illegal to collect data on ethnicity, religion, political view etc. (Caubet, 2008), 
because the Republic is supposed to see its citizens as utterly equal (Kaya, 2009). There 
are, therefore, no official statistics on these categories in France (Caubet, 2008). 
However, the result of this ‘blindness’ to differences among French citizens on the part of 
the state is, in fact, discrimination. Minority ethnolinguistic groups are expected to 
assimilate and deny their ethnic or racial differences, all while racial, ethnic, linguistic 
and religious discrimination occurs. There is little recourse to these problems because the 
government does not recognize the differences for which they are being discriminated 
against in the first place.   
A person must further keep any differences pertaining to their origin or religion 
separate from the national and political sphere, because under the Republic there is a 
separation of public and private life (Fenet, 2004) and a philosophy of laïcité, or 
secularism. The expression of religion in the public sphere is seen as encroaching on the 
freedom of others to engage with the state free from religious “harassment.” Unlike in the 
U.S., where freedom of religion is meant to protect the individual from religious 
interference from the state, France protects the individual from religious interference 
coming between the individual and the state.  
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3.1.3 The reassertion and defense of French after the 30 glorieuses 
After WWII, and the loss of its colonies where it had spread French via its 
mission civilisatrice, France ceded its place of prominence on the international scene as 
the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the dominant post-war powers. France 
was shrinking on the global stage as a military, economic, cultural and colonial force. 
This was especially felt after the end of the trente glorieuses, the 30 years of economic 
prosperity that ended in the 1970s (Shelly, 1999). By the 1960s, the role of French as the 
language of diplomacy had diminished in the face of the new lingua franca of the cold 
war era, English (Havaşi, 2011). America had become an exporter of science and 
technology, as well as pop culture. French was losing its prestige as an international 
language, and it was felt that it was being “corrupted” by English borrowings brought in 
by way of American culture, (Gordon, 1978). René Etiemble’s 1964 book Parlez-vous 
franglais? was one of the first books to openly discuss the threat of English to the French 
language (Gordon, 1978). Etiemble thought of himself as a modern day Estienne, 
protecting French from the threats of an outside language (Cowling, 2007). This new 
assertion of French was largely a proxy for feelings of international impotence. It was in 
this context that, in 1992, France added an article to its constitution making French the 
official language of the Republic.  
France’s identity crisis resulted in a reassertion of linguistic prescriptivism and 
protectionist attitudes (Oakes, 2001). Since the 1960s, France has created a series of 
committees and councils with the purpose of legislating and protecting French. The haut 
comité de la langue française was formed in 1966 by Charles de Gaulle, which was 
highly centralized and overseen by the Prime Minister (Gordon, 1978). Its aim was the 
“purification” of French, which led to a series of laws relating to language. In 1975, the 
Loi Bas-Lauriol was passed, making French compulsory in commercials, advertising, 
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contracts of employment, and consumer information. It also stipulated that if both an 
English and a French term were available the French one must be chosen (A. Judge, 
2002). The Loi Carignon (1994) mandated that 40% of all the songs on private French 
radio must be in French or a regional language of France (S. Judge, 2002), a way of 
protecting cultural production via language.  
One of the most significant pieces of language legislation was the 1994 Loi 
Toubon, which was used to combat the replacement of French with English in the media 
(Salhi, & Jeanjean, 2002). The law defined the French language as a “fundamental 
element of France’s personality and patrimony” (Fenet, 2004, p. 40). It required that TV 
and radio programs be in French and that all manuals and consumer products include a 
French translation. The law also supported the role of French in education. It asserted that 
“the mastery of the French language […] is one of the fundamental goals of education” 
(article 11, paragraph II) (quoted in Oakes, 2001, p. 76), emphasizing the importance of 
the state producing good French-speaking citizens who have a thorough understanding of 
bon usage. The law also stated that children must learn two foreign languages (Oakes, 
2002) to ensure that if students chose to learn English, they would have to divert their 
attention to an additional language. Not only did the Loi Toubon promote French in the 
schools it protected it against English. Non-governmental associations were established, 
including Avenir de la langue française (ALF) and Défense de la langue française 
(DLF), with the purpose of initiating civil suits for violations of the Loi Toubon, and to 
defend “the essential properties of clarity, precision, and harmony” of French (Shelley, 
1999).  
In addition to linguistic insecurity vis-à-vis English, France has also faced 
national and linguistic insecurity in regards to Europe, and the European Union (EU). 
From its inception, France has argued that French should be the lingua franca of the 
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organized states. It was successful in being linguistically dominant until the 1970s, when 
the U.K., Ireland and Denmark joined the EU (Oakes, 2002). In the 1990s, France 
changed its tactics and began to lobby strongly for a multilingual policy to make sure that 
French was not eclipsed by the spread of English (Oakes, 2002), while at the same time 
arguing that the number of official languages of the EU should be reduced to a 
“reasonable” number (incidentally this included French) (Shelley, 1999). France also has 
been active in setting up French language schools in EU member states (Oakes, 2002). 
Some have noted France’s inconsistency in its support of multilingual policies outside of, 
but not within, France (Fenet, 2004). 
The most significant conflict over language in Europe, came with the debate over 
The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, proposed in 1992 by the 
Council of Europe, which promoted the recognition of indigenous minority languages (S. 
Judge, 2002). This sparked an intense debate in France about the constitutionality of such 
legislation, because it created: 
  
…specific rights in favour of ‘groups of speakers’, both in the private and public 
domain. This is the essential problem, since France does not recognise the 
existence of groups within the state. This includes ethnic, religious and linguistic 
groups, and any other minority. (S. Judge, 2002, p. 94) 
 
The Charter went against the core universalist principles of the Republic, which stipulate 
non-discrimination based on ethnicity or language (Oakes, 2001). Minority identities are 
supposed to remain in the private sphere. France’s Conseil Constitutionnel found the 
Charter unconstitutional arguing that it implied that France is not made up of a unified 
French people and that it further contradicted Article 2 Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, 
which states that “The language of the Republic is French” (S. Judge, 2002). Although 
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France supports the protection of minority languages outside of France, and has even 
argued that languages express values and are an important part of community-building, it 
is clear that this does not apply to languages within its borders (Fenet, 2004).  
France’s linguistic defensiveness has manifested itself in an effort not only to 
protect French at home but also to promote it in countries beyond France and the EU. 
This is what is called le rayonnement du français (Gordon, 1978). Organizations such as 
the Alliance Française were established to provide language instruction and cultural 
activities in order to maintain the prestige and knowledge of French. Beginning in the 19th 
century with one location in Paris, today there are 850 Alliance Française franchises in 
136 countries with approximately half a million students per year learning French 
(alliancefr.org). France has further reached out to its former colonies, providing aid and 
education, especially in Africa (Parker, 2002).  
The Francophone project emerged in the 1970s as an attempt by French-speaking 
countries, almost entirely former French colonies, to unite in order to have better 
international standing. France was at first wary of participating in the Francophone 
project for fear being perceived as colonialist, although eventually they joined the 
international organization. Margie Sudre, French Minister for Francophonie, described 
the project as a way to “give a political dimension to Francophonie,” to prioritize 
education because of the “loss” of French and the presence of English, claiming that 
“French would not survive if it was defended only by its cultural and linguistic 
dimension: there must be economic and commercial exchanges” (Ager, 1998, p. 260). 
France’s interest in the project was once again to promote itself as a global economic 
power and to protect itself from English hegemony in the US and the UN (Parker, 1998). 
French still had the strength to bind countries politically in a post-colonial situation 
where France no longer had direct political power. Both the Alliance Française and 
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France’s humanitarian efforts are widely seen as an extension of the so-called mission 
civilatrise of the colonial era. This mission was the justification used by France, and other 
countries, for colonization in the 19th and 20th centuries. Many see France’s efforts of 
rayonnement in the post-colonial countries as a kind of soft linguistic colonialism. 
3.1.4 French and Citizenship 
The French language also plays a central role in France’s conception of 
citizenship, which is necessary to discuss in order to understand fully how France views 
immigration in general, and specifically where language fits into this. There are two legal 
bases for nationality: jus sanguinis and jus soli. Nationality based on jus sanguinis (blood 
right) is founded on common ethnicity. German nationalism during the 19th and the first 
half of the 20th centuries was based on being ethnically German (Oakes, 2001). 
Nationality based on jus soli (soil right) is a nation made up of people “united around 
common laws and rights” (Oakes, 2001, p. 12) rather than ethnicity. During the 
Revolution, French nationality was synonymous with being a citizen; therefore 
nationality was based on jus soli. After the Civil Codes (1803) were written, nationality 
became based on jus sanguinis; like inheriting a family name, one also inherited being 
French (Weil, 2010, p. 168-169). In 1889, new legislation was passed and jus soli was 
reasserted, in large part because after the Franco-Prussian war France needed to increase 
its population in order to increase those who were eligible for military conscription 
(Noiriel, 1996). In 1945, the Nationality Code was modified, and later ratified in 1973. It 
stipulated that denial of French nationality could be based on a “failure to assimilate” 
(Noiriel, 1996). In 1987, President Chirac formed the Commission de la Nationalité, 
which decided “for membership in the French nation neither birth in France nor descent 
from French parents is sufficient alone unless it implies that the person speaks French” as 
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well as has a “full commitment to [French] culture” (quoted in Safran, 1991, p. 232). 
Today, a child is a French national if one parent is French (jus sanguinis). If not, the child 
will become French at age 18 if he or she was born in France to non-French parents and 
has lived in France for five years starting at age 11 (jus soli). While French nationality 
has become based on a hybrid system of jus soli and jus sanguinis, it is also heavily 
dependent on assimilation to French culture. 
There are a number of ways for an adult to acquire French nationality. One is to 
marry a French national, which accounts for a large percentage of naturalization requests. 
The other possibility is to apply alone, a long process that is “not particularly encouraged 
in France” (Weil, 2010, p. 232). The requirements for naturalization include that the 
individual demonstrate “his or her assimilation to the French community, in particular by 
a sufficient knowledge, according to his or her condition, of the French language” 
(articles 21-24) (quoted in Weil, 2010, p. 234). This highlights the importance of 
assimilating and becoming a ‘good’ citizen, and the synonymy of French culture and the 
French language. The importance of assimilation is founded on the Republican 
universalist philosophy of the French government, which is officially blind to ethnicity 
and rejects the existence of minorities (Fenet, 2004). Supposedly, if everyone assimilates 
there will be no grounds for discrimination and everyone will have equal standing vis-à-
vis the state. In order to become a citizen, one must assimilate to the culture, and in order 
to do that, it is necessary to speak French.  
In addition to knowledge of French, it is also necessary to have lived in France for 
five years before becoming a naturalized citizen. The only exception is if the applicant 
comes from a country where French is one of the official languages, in which case French 
must be their native language or they must have been in a school for five years where 
French was the language of instruction (Weil, 2010). Similarly, for children born in 
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France of non-French nationals not born in France, citizenship is conferred upon reaching 
majority, so long as the individual has spent five years in the school system (Weil, 2010). 
The requirement to spend five years in a French language school is part of the effort to 
ensure assimilation, given that French is seen as the primary vehicle for French culture 
and values (Schiffman, 2002, p. 79). The thinking is that if an immigrant has been taught 
in French he or she will presumably also have been instilled with the values and culture 
‘inherent’ to that language. French education is meant to create a “bond of nationality” 
(Weil, 2010, p. 53), and, according to the Loi Toubon (1994), give immigrants “dignity” 
(A. Judge, 2007). A crucial aspect in France’s efforts toward linguistic assimilation in the 
19th century was making French the language of instruction, and making school 
attendance compulsory. History suggests that the school system is the best way to enforce 
language policies, therefore in order to linguistically and culturally assimilate its 
immigrant population, five years of French-medium schooling is required.  
3.1.5 Language Ideology in France Today 
Although knowing French may be sufficient to become legally French, it is not 
enough to be fully accepted in French society. Bon usage is still needed to gain access to 
high positions in government and in society (A. Judge, 2007) and to be considered a good 
citizen. While previously it was the regional dialects that were looked down upon as 
‘bad’ ways of speaking, today the linguistic ‘others’ are speakers belonging to the lower 
socioeconomic class (Lodge, 1993) and to the immigrant population. This way of 
speaking is often referred to as ‘urban youth vernacular’ (Stewart, 2012), argot, or the 
langue des cités, referring to the language spoken in the multi-ethnic banlieues of major 
cities in France. These varieties of French include verlan, the practice of switching 
syllables (arabe becomes beur), and the use of loan words drawn from the languages 
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spoken by the speakers’ families at home (Arabic, Berber etc.). They are also marked by 
phonetic variation (Jamin et al., 2006). Argot is by no means a recent phenomenon either 
in France or elsewhere. Goudaillier (2002) notes that all languages have had, have today, 
and will always have a langue populaire, that is juxtaposed with the standard variety. 
The langue des cités, which draws lexical items from the speaker’s own culture 
and language of heritage, acts as a sort of identity marker and can be a symbol of non-
integration (Goudaillier, 1997). This variety of French is a solidarity language for many 
disenfranchised members of society, both of immigrant background and not. It is 
stigmatized by the majority French society (Stewart, 2012), making language one of the 
ways that the immigrant community is ostracized and alienated. 
Language in France is the lynch pin of its society, culture and national identity. 
The French have very strong attitudes toward language and cultural integration, 
especially regarding North African Arabic-speaking immigrants and their descendants 
(Stewart, 2012). What is not as clear is how these descendants view their own and others’ 
language(s) and what effect France’s deeply imbedded cult of language has had on these 
attitudes.   
3.2 FRANCE AND THE MAGHREB 
The language ideology of French was implemented not only within France, but 
also in its colonies, where it was used as a tool for culturally dominating North Africa. 
France’s language and education policies in the Maghreb affected how North Africans 
viewed French as well as Standard Arabic and Darija, attitudes that may extend to the 
diaspora in France. These policies left an imprint on that society that would have 
repercussions in the Arabization efforts in the Maghreb post-independence. It is 
necessary to examine how the importation of French came about in the Maghreb and how 
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Arabization was implemented in order to understand the attitudes of the North African 
immigrant community toward France’s staunch language ideology and toward Arabic as 
a symbol for national identity.  
3.2.1 The Maghreb: Language Policy During the Colonial Era 
France was a colonial power in the North African countries of Morocco, Algeria 
and Tunisia from the 19th to the mid-20th century. Algeria became a French territory in 
1848, and was officially considered a part of France, while Tunisia and Morocco were 
French protectorates coming under French rule in 1881 and 1912 respectively. Because 
Algeria was more entwined with France and came under its rule earlier, it had a very 
different relationship with France throughout the colonial period and in its fight for 
independence. Their separation was more violent and dramatic and has left bitterness in 
the collective French memory, more so than the independence of Morocco and Tunisia 
(1956), both of which separated from France more peacefully, relative to Algeria. In 
discussing the linguistic and colonial histories of these countries, more attention will be 
given to Algeria and Morocco than to Tunisia because the majority of North African 
immigrants to France have come from these two countries. While I distinguish to a 
certain extent the different histories and language situations of each country during the 
colonial era and during the post-independence Arabization movement, I often refer to 
them grouped together. I acknowledge that they have had different colonial and post-
colonial experiences, but for the sake of time and space, and because of the broader 
similarities, I treat them chiefly as a whole.  
3.2.1.1 The Linguistic Situation Prior to Colonization  
Arabic came to the cities of North Africa in the 7th century with the spread of 
Islam and expanded further by the 11th century (Saadi-Mokrane, 2002, p. 50). Prior to its 
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arrival, the indigenous inhabitants of that area were ethnically Berber and spoke a Berber 
language (Bentahila, 1983). Most adopted Islam and many exchanged their native 
language for Arabic. In the 14th century, Spanish, Italian and Turkish were introduced to 
North Africa (Sayahi, 2014). And in the 19th century French and, again, Spanish came 
into the Maghreb as colonial languages.  
3.2.1.2 Language and Education Policy During Colonial Rule 
When France established itself in the Maghreb, colonial fonctionnaires needed to 
find a way to control and unify the colonies. The long tradition of uniformity via 
linguistic conformity, established during the French Revolution, proved an effective 
model. French language ideology was integral to its control of the colonies and for their 
unification under the French empire (Riley, 2011). The French wanted Moroccans to 
forget their own tradition and adopt the French lifestyle and values (Bentahila, 1983), 
which for the French meant accepting the French language. “For the French colonizer, it 
was necessary to cut to the quick the Arabic and Islamic roots of a conquered land in 
order to crush its core values” Saadi-Mokrane (2002, p. 44). Language and religion were 
closely related to the values of the community, and needed to be suppressed in order for 
the French to exert control over the region. Bassiouney (2009) argues that France in the 
Maghreb provides an archetypal example of Miller’s quote: “Through language people 
can be controlled and political power exercised” (2003, p. 3). They were mostly 
concerned with replacing the prestige variety, SA, with French, and making it the 
language of bureaucracy and education; therefore, it was Standard Arabic, not Darija, that 
the French tried to eradicate (Sayahi, 2014).  
As in the past, it was via the educational system that the French attempted to 
replace SA with French as the language of prestige, administration and national identity. 
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The colonizers used education as a tool for constructing language policies and ideologies, 
leading to the belief that persists today in the Maghreb that French is the language of 
modernity and SA the language of tradition and religion (Benrabah, 2007). The language 
policy of the colonial French in the Maghreb was based on 3 principles: “(1) limitation of 
schooling to Europeans and the elite of the native population; (2) maintenance and 
encouragement of the Arab/Berber ethnic division; and (3) overall restriction of the usage 
of the Arabic language” (Sayahi, 2014, p. 39). The education system had two types of 
primary schools. First, the European-modeled schools that were reserved for the French 
residents and for the children of upper class native North Africans. Second were the 
Franco-Islamic schools. These were subdivided into schools for different social classes 
(Bentahila, 1983). According to Sayahi (2014), the lower class primary schools were 
aimed toward industry and agriculture, with limited French exposure, while the primary 
schools for the upper class focused on French instruction, French culture and science, 
with very little Arabic instruction. These schools taught their students of Arab and Berber 
descent French culture and heritage, rather than their own. There was further an attempt 
to encourage division between Arabs and Berbers in order to destabilize the country and 
decrease the chance of a joined rebellion against the French. In Morocco, Berbers were 
sent to French-Berber schools where no Arabic was taught, based on a belief that Berbers 
were more assimilatable (Sayahi, 2014). This attempted division angered the Moroccan 
nationalists, resulting in the establishment of traditional Islamic schools as a reaction; 
these excluded French and focused on Islamic religious studies (Bentahila, 1983, p. 8-9). 
In Morocco, the traditional schools were allowed to co-exist with the newly 
installed French system, whereas in Algeria the education and language policies were 
more aggressive. This is in part due to the fact that France’s rule in Algeria was much 
longer than the other Maghrebi countries, and because it was considered to be an 
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extension of France, rather than a protectorate. France shut down and banned the 
Medersas (Arabic language schools) and Qur’anic schools where SA was taught (Berger, 
2002b). This was a way to limit the learning of SA and make education only accessible 
through French schools (Bassiouney, 2009). They were reopened in the 1930s as the 
result of the budding nationalist Ulema movement led by Ben Badis (Berger, 2002b), 
although Arabic was declared a foreign language in Algeria in 1938 and was not allowed 
to be used in administrative and official documents, nor in schools (Gafaïti, 2002). This 
led to plummeting literacy rates by the time of independence (Sayahi, 2014). However, 
toward the end of colonial rule in Algeria Arabic was allowed as an elective in school 
(Berger, 2002b). Although the language policies of the colonists were the strictest in 
Algeria, all three countries of the Maghreb saw SA relegated to the religious and 
traditional domain and taken out of the school system to varying degrees. French became 
the language of education, government, and power, which had long lasting effects on the 
attitudes of North Africans toward each language.  
During the colonial period French became a symbol of more than just the 
language of modernity. It was “above all the language of colonialism, 
segregation…religious intolerance, mass destruction, and the eradication of Algerian 
identities and their linguistic expressions, whether Arabic or Berber” (Gafaïti 2002, p. 
24). The French language had come to represent colonial oppression and the suppression 
of North African culture and religion. This spurred the development in the first half of the 
20th century of a strong sense of nationalism, particularly in Algeria, that was focused on 
Standard Arabic and the Islamic tradition in reaction to French hegemony (Bassiouney, 
2009). According to Bassiouney (2009), Maghrebis began to associate SA with Islam and 
their personal identity, although there is evidence that this association existed long before 
France’s colonial rule (see Suleiman, 2003). Nevertheless, Arabic became a symbol of 
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national identity and resistance to French rule in the minds of North Africans. As the 
Algerian nationalist activist Ahmad Tawfiq al-Madani famously wrote in 1931, “Islam is 
our religion, Arabic our language and Algeria our fatherland” (Bassiouney, 2009, p. 215). 
3.2.2 The Maghreb: Independence and Arabization 
Since independence in the 1950s and 60s, a language debate has risen between 
Arabophones and Francophones focusing on the opposition of the two ideologies and 
cultures that they represent, which resulted in an effort to eradicate the use of French, 
viewed as a symbol of oppression: 
 
According to the ‘Arabophones,’ French is: the language of the enemy; the 
language of colonialism; the expression of Western culture; and the negation of 
Algerian national identity. Arabic is: the language of the Algerian nation; the 
recuperation of Algerian identity; the expression of the Algerian soul (the 
language of the Koran and Islam); and the crucible of the Arab-Muslim 
community to which Algeria belongs. (Gafaïti, 2002, p. 22) 
 
Each of the North African countries embarked on a push for Arabization in order to make 
their countries Arabic-speaking in all facets of life, primarily the administrative state and 
the education system. It was an effort to revive the role and prestige of Standard Arabic 
after decades of suppression by the French. Rejecting French was a way of rejecting 
French domination and its values, while embracing Arabic was to embrace national 
identity, religion, and Arab identity. Saadi-Mokrane (2002) explains that the etymology 
of Arabization is a translation of ta’arroub, “to become Arab.” Thus, the Arabization 
movement was not only about language and national identity but also about embracing 
Arab ethnicity. This caused conflict with the Berbers who are not ethnically Arab, and 
whose languages were suppressed not only under French rule but also under the post-
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independence governments, especially in Algeria. Algeria pursued Arabization more 
aggressively than either Tunisia or Morocco in the name of nationalism, a political 
movement that took hold in the first half of the 20th century. The Arabic language was the 
symbol of a free Algeria and “total Arabization” has been the stated goal of Algeria’s 
ruling nationalist party, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), since independence and 
is included in the constitution (Berger, 2002b). The objective of Arabization, according to 
the agenda set by the FLN in 1962, was to fight against “’the cultural cosmopolitanism 
and pervasive Westernization which has contributed to teaching many Algerians to 
disdain their national language and values’” (Saadi-Mokrane, 2002, p. 47). Algeria was 
trying to construct “a myth of a modern nation-state” (Gafaïti, 2002, p. 29), upon which it 
could build a national identity, based on an independent nation with a national language, 
Arabic, and a national religion, Islam.  
In Algeria, Arabic was seen as  “the only language that could express the 
authentic identity and culture of the people” (Gafaïti, 2002, p. 25). This was echoed also 
in Morocco and Tunisia, but perhaps not as forcefully. Although claiming to promote the 
language of the North African people, these countries chose Standard Arabic as their 
national language. Bentahila (1983) argues that the process of Arabization was simply 
replacing one foreign language, French, with another, Standard Arabic, because neither 
were languages acquired, or spoken, in the home. Arabization was enacted via the 
education system, following the French model (Saadi-Mokrane, 2002). The theory held 
by the Ministry of Education was that Darija speaking children, once Arabized in school, 
would be able to go home and “correct” their family’s use of language in order to spread 
SA (Berger, 2002b).  
The dialectal varieties were seen as illegitimate and unfit for the role of national 
language, despite being the languages spoken in the majority of homes. Proponents of 
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Arabization fought against the use of French because of its symbol as the language of 
colonization, but Darija and Berber were attacked because of Standard Arabic’s supposed 
superiority and its status as a sacred language (Gafaïti, 2002). This attack against Berber 
was fueled also by long standing prejudices against the Berber peoples of North Africa. 
Although French, Darija and Berber were all targets of the Arabization movement, it was 
the minority Berber-speakers in Kabylia, in Algeria, who first resisted this post post-
independence language policy via armed resistance in the 1960s (Benrabah, 2007). In the 
1970s and 80s, when the Algerian government shut down Berber events, such as 
Tamazight poetry lectures, and abolished the The Circle of Berber Studies at Algiers 
University, riots erupted in Kabylia (Benrabah, 2007). It was the Berberophones who 
called for official recognition both for Tamazight and for Darija. Eventually, these 
protests became somewhat fruitful in the 1990s with the creation of various commissions 
and university departments on Berber language and culture (Benrabah, 2007). 
It is important to understand this linguistic nationalist effort in the context of the 
pan-Arab movement of the 1950s and 60s, a movement based on the unification of all 
Arabic speakers. The Maghreb became independent at a time when Arab Nationalism 
was experiencing some international success (Berger, 2002b). Algeria co-opted this 
political movement for its own anti-colonialist purposes and made it about Algerian 
nationalism, whereas, Arabization efforts in other countries in the Middle East in the 
mid-20th century were about modernizing SA and making it a suitable standard language 
under which Arabs could unify. Arabization in the Maghreb was instead a political 
decision to combat “the encroachment of the French language and the continued political, 
economic, and cultural ties with France” (Sayahi, 2014, p. 51). 
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3.2.3. Language in the Maghreb Today 
3.2.3.1 Standard Arabic and French 
The Arabization movement has been somewhat successful in replacing French 
with SA as a language of prestige; however, because of the complicated relationship and 
history between French and the Maghreb this effort has not being totally realized: 
 
In North Africa the French language constituted, after independence, a 
problematic. It did so in the sense that in the three nations of Morocco, Algeria 
and Tunisia, leaders who had sought independence in order to reassert a national 
identity that was Arab were often reluctant to forfeit the French heritage which 
had become so deeply rooted in their midst, both for practical and for affective 
reasons. (Gordon, 1978, p. 147) 
 
After independence, rather than declining, knowledge and use of French increased. The 
expansion of French post-independence was due to three things: the spread of education, 
immigration, and mass media (Sayahi, 2014). In post-colonial North Africa there was 
more access to public education than there was under French rule. With this increase in 
education came access to French. Today SA is taught in the primary and secondary 
schools; however, so is French. In Tunisia, it is taught beginning in the third year of 
schooling. By the tenth year of school math and science courses are taught in French and 
in the university most subjects, outside of the social sciences and humanities, are taught 
in French, including math, science, and business (Sayahi, 2014). The situation is similar 
in Algeria and Morocco. The boom in immigration to France after independence has also 
had an effect on the spread of French in the Maghreb. North Africans who immigrated to 
France return to the Maghreb, usually for summer visits, with an improved knowledge of 
French. Their use of French is a symbol of their status as someone who lives in a foreign 
country, usually at a higher standard of living. Media has also played an important role in 
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the proliferation of French. Today, North Africans have access to French via satellite TV, 
radio, and newspapers. Berger (2002b) argues that French has become democratized, in 
that it is now available to the masses, and today represents less and less the area’s 
“subjection to colonial rule” (p.71). The younger generations are further removed from 
the memory of the violence of oppression of the colonial regime and the battle for 
independence. For them, French is just a language that will help them get a job (Davies & 
Bentahila, 2013), and gives them the ability to consume French media. 
French is still used in a large portion of the industrial and economic sectors in 
Algeria, particularly as they pertain to oil (Gafaïti, 2002). It continues to be predominant 
in education and in administration because it is representative of socioeconomic prestige 
(Sayahi, 2014) and it was already established in these domains. Because French is the 
language still used for science, technology and business it is desirable and is seen as a 
necessary tool to access the job market (Davies & Bentahila, 2013), whereas, most North 
Africans do not have much use for SA unless they work in the Arabized public 
administration (Sayahi, 2014). Despite the increase in competency in French since 
independence, and its use in administration and technology, most Maghrebis do not have 
high levels of proficiency in French, in part because of persistent high rates of illiteracy 
and high school dropouts (Sayahi, 2014). Post (2015) found that the rate of French used 
by participants in a face-to-face conversation was 5.2%, while they used it almost twice 
as often when chatting online. 
The Arabization efforts of the Maghreb after independence reinforced a 
dichotomy between French and Arabic, bolstering the idea that French is associated with 
Western culture and ideals and that Arabic is associated with tradition and religion, an 
attitude first established by the French. Arabization in Algeria was most forcefully 
promoted by Islamic fundamentalists (Bassiouney, 2009) who saw Standard Arabic as the 
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only language in which one can really be Muslim, further associating Arabic with 
conservatism. The Arabization laws and administrative rules had profound effects on the 
language attitudes of North Africans. Benrabah (2007) studied the attitudes of university 
students in Algeria in order to determine whether Arabization had been detrimental to the 
promotion of Arabic in technology and science and as a symbol of economic success and 
modernity. He found that Standard Arabic is associated strongly with religion and 
sacredness while French is associated with modernity and technology, the opposite of the 
outcome desired by the Arabization movement. Benrabah argues that this is because there 
is a more staunchly pro-Arabization stance in Algeria in contrast to Morocco, which 
eased into Arabization. However, it is important to note that French is still the dominant 
language used in business, technology and science in Morocco as well as in Algeria. 
Despite these linguistic policy battles, and local efforts to recognize SA at the 
expense of dialectal Arabic as the language of the Maghreb, the fact remains that the 
native language of North Africans is still either dialectal Arabic or Berber. SA is not the 
native language of any person. It is a learned language, rather than a ‘naturally’ acquired 
one; therefore, the effort to have children ‘correct’ their parents’ dialectal Arabic was 
always an unobtainable goal since SA is not regularly spoken at home. Although SA may 
be more prevalent than before independence, it is not the language of the home or daily 
interaction. Rather, it is the language of religious ceremonies and, in some cases, of 
education and administration. Nor is French a native language or the language of the 
home and family. It, too, is primarily used in administration and education, although 
there are some indications that it may be entering the home in Morocco via code-
switching (Chakrani, 2010).  
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3.2.3.2 Dialectal Arabic and Berber 
Today the North African countries speak primarily dialectal Arabic (Darija) and 
Tamazight as their native languages, and French and/or Standard Arabic as languages 
learned in school. Dialectal Arabic, or Darija, is the language used in the street and at 
home (Chakrani, 2010). It is not taught formally, used in official capacities or 
standardized, although Moroccan youths are very capable of communicating via Internet 
chat in Moroccan Darija in varying forms that are mutually comprehensible (Post, 2015). 
In recent years, Darija has been used more often in media and music, and in 2014 there 
was a failed push for it to be introduced into early education in Morocco (Al Jazeera, 
2014). Although Darija has not traditionally represented national identity in the Maghreb, 
there is evidence that this may be changing as well. After the Arab Spring, which had its 
birth in Tunisia, Tunisian Arabic gained prestige as a symbol of Tunisian identity, in 
which there is newfound pride (Sayahi, 2014). The same change in attitude toward 
Moroccan Arabic is also occurring as Moroccans increasingly take pride in their country 
(Rebekah Post, personal communication). This indicates that SA is not the only language 
that can symbolize national identity in the Maghreb, despite its status, to the exclusion of 
Darija, as the national language of Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. 
There is still a significant Berber-speaking community in North Africa, mainly in 
Morocco and Algeria (Bassiouney, 2009), although it is important to note, as Berger 
(2002a) has, that language in the Maghreb does not always correspond to ethnicity, thus 
there are many ethnic Berbers who only speak Darija, as well as many Berber speakers 
who are also speakers of Darija. The Berbers fought hard to sustain their language and 
culture in the face of persecution. It has recently been codified and was introduced into 
the Moroccan educational system in 2003 (Chakrani, 2010). However, the 
implementation of this language education policy change has been difficult in part 
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because it was a political move on the part of the Moroccan government, rather than a 
real effort to revamp the language education policy (Buckner, 2006). El Aissati (2011) 
found that teaching Tamazight has proven difficult because of a lack of materials, 
knowledge of the language by the teachers, and the timing of introducing the language in 
school. In the past two decades, Berber has expanded on the Internet, allowing for what 
Maddy-Weitzman (2011) refers to as an “‘imagined’ Amazigh community worldwide 
and the “construction of a ‘landscape of group identity’” (p. 131). Berber became one of 
the official languages of Morocco in 2011 (Post, 2015), and a constitutional national 
language in Algeria in 2002, after decades of efforts to be recognized. According to 
Benrabah (2007), the very survival of Darija and Berber were a form of resistance to the 
Arabization movement. 
 
3.3 THE NORTH AFRICAN DIASPORA 
Now that the linguistic and cultural context of the colonial era has been 
established, it is necessary to give an overview of migration from the Maghreb to France, 
as well as describe life for the North African diaspora in France today. This section will 
discuss the history of migration and immigration today. It will also breakdown the 
diaspora context by exploring housing, employment, language, marriage practices, life in 
France for women, religion, France’s reception of the North African immigrant 
community and the civil unrest that has resulted from living on the margins of French 
society. 
3.3.1 History of Migration From the Maghreb 
Despite the end of its colonial control in North Africa, France has maintained a 
close relationship with the Maghreb, which has manifested itself in large waves of 
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immigration to France. There was free movement between Algeria and France during the 
colonial period, allowing for large numbers of immigrants, particularly young men, to go 
to France for temporary work (Killian, 2006). Prior to World War II, immigrants to 
France came mostly from other European countries; however, after WWII, the trend in 
immigration shifted because the immigration office in France was unable to recruit 
enough migrant workers from Spain, Portugal and Italy, its preferred source of 
immigration (Hargreaves, 1995). The labor force needed replenishing after the losses 
from the war in order to aid in reconstruction (Kaya, 2009), especially during the 
economic boom of les trente glorieuses. France turned its recruitment efforts to its 
(former) colonies and emigration from these countries began to increase. In the 1960s 
Moroccans flocked to France because France needed them for economic reasons, and 
Morocco was willing to let them go in order to reduce low unemployment rates (Ennaji, 
2010). It is important to note that before Algerian independence (1962), the majority of 
Algerians who migrated to France were from Kabylie, an ethnically Berber region, 
although their numbers dropped in the decades that followed (Chaker, 2004).  
This migration was believed, by both those who emigrated from the Maghreb and 
by the French state, to be temporary (Oakes, 2001). For this reason, many still owned 
homes in the Maghreb and had family there to whom they sent back money (Ennaji, 
2010). There was an expectation on both sides that the workers would eventually return 
to the Maghreb, so there was little concern on the part of France over assimilation in the 
1960s and 70s. These expectations affected the services that were made available to the 
migrant workers. 
 
Still anxious to think of this migration as temporary, the government provided 
social services to children in public schools—including Arabic language classes 
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and religious instruction—thereby encouraging the differences that became 
grounds for discrimination. (Scott, 2007, p. 68) 
 
They provided these services for immigrants and their children, as a way to encourage 
their ties with North Africa so that they would be more likely to return. As Scott (2007) 
points out, these ties would be called into question in later decades as a sign of their 
inability to assimilate.  
France halted labor immigration in 1974 (Freedman, 2004) because of an 
economic recession and because of the 1973 oil crisis in Algeria, which was associated in 
France with “Arabs” (Kaya, 2009). Freedman (2004) argues that this was also done 
because of a growing sense of xenophobia toward North African immigrants. Following 
this cessation of immigration, the laws changed to favor immigration only for educational 
reasons or for reunification (Killian, 2006). While France was encouraging immigrants to 
return to the Maghreb in the 1970s because of the economic slowdown (Scott, 2007), 
large numbers of women and children came to France to reunite with their husbands. 
There has also remained a steady stream of illegal emigration from the Maghreb (Kaya, 
2009). Those who immigrated found work as manual laborers or in the service industry, 
which, for the most part, remains the case today. Men typically worked in factories, and 
women as domestic staff, cleaning homes, hotels and businesses.  
3.3.2 Immigration Trends Today 
Today, France is home to the largest Muslim population in Europe, a number 
estimated to be around 4.7 million (Pew Research Center, 2011). The majority of this 
number is made up of immigrants and their successive generations originating in former 
French colonies in North and Sub-Saharan Africa and Turkey, although they are 
predominately from the Maghreb. According to the 2010 census from the National 
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Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE, 2010), 8.5% of the 65 million 
people in France are immigrants, the top three countries of origin being Algeria 
(729,814), Morocco (671,225) and Portugal (588,276). 29.8% of the country’s total 
immigrants come from the Maghreb (a minority coming from Tunisia) (INSEE, 2010).24 
Of these North African immigrants the majority is, at least nominally, Muslim, based on 
figures showing that almost all Moroccans identify as Muslim (Gray, 2005).  
The ethnicity of North African immigrants in France is Arab or Berber, with the 
majority coming from the former ethnic group (Chaker, 2003). Although I am targeting 
the language attitudes of the Arabic speaking population toward Arabic and French, not 
Berber, it is nevertheless important to be aware of the significant presence of Berbers of 
North African descent living in France. Many Berberophones are also Arabic speakers, 
meaning that they too may respond to my survey, which targets Arabic speakers, rather 
than those who identify as ethnically Arab. It is often assumed popularly and by the 
French media that North African immigrants are all ethnically Arab, ignoring the Berber 
population, while officially the number of Berbers has been overestimated (Tribalat, 
1995). As of 1992, approximately 28% of Algerian immigrants, and 22% of Moroccans, 
in France were Berber, fewer than previously thought (Tribalat, 1995). Because census 
data in France does not differentiate between Arab and Berber ethnicity when collecting 
data on immigration, it is difficult to know exactly how many Berbers are in France; 
however, Chaker (2003) estimates the number to be approximately 1.5 million, with 2/3 
coming from Algeria and 1/3 from Morocco, an estimation that he sees as a correction of 
Tribalat’s (1995) allegedly low numbers. The Berber population has a unique relationship 
with France. France has been the home of musical and cultural production for the Berber 
                                                
24 These numbers do not, however, reflect the large number of immigrants from North Africa who arrive in 
France illegally, which is thought to be much higher. 
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people because of their exclusion from North African society, and it was in France that 
the first Berber language novel was published, in 1981. Chaker (2003) notes that the 
Berber network and its associations in France are very committed almost to the point of 
militancy.    
France has the highest proportion of descendants of immigrants in all of Europe 
(Bouvier, 2012). Because of the continuing waves of immigration from the Maghreb, 
there is a second-generation immigrant community, as well as third and fourth 
generations. According to the 2010 INSEE census, 6.6% of newborns in metropolitan 
France had two non-French, “étrangers,” parents; 13.3% had one non-French parent. 
Fifteen percent of births between 2006 and 2008 were children with at least one 
grandparent who immigrated. In 2008, 11% of the population (3.1 million) of 
metropolitan France were the direct descendants of immigrants, the majority with one 
parent who was an immigrant (Breuil-Genier, Borrel & Lhommeau, 2011). Forty percent 
of them have one parent who was born in Africa, predominantly from the Maghreb. Their 
age ranges from 18 to 50, with half under the age of 30.  
According to the Haut Conseil à l’Intégration the term “immigrant” refers to 
anyone born outside of France who did not have French nationality at birth and includes 
immigrants who have become French citizens. The label “immigrant” is a technical label 
referring to the status one had upon entry to France. Therefore, a person is counted as an 
immigrant for the rest of his or her life, regardless of their nationality. There are 3.8 
million ‘étrangers’ living in France. INSEE uses the term ‘étranger’ for anyone who does 
not have French nationality. Thus a child of immigrant parents is a ‘étranger’ until he or 
she reaches majority and automatically becomes a French citizen.  
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3.3.3 Housing 
Immigrant communities in France experience poorer living conditions than the 
rest of French society. In 1988, over 25% of non-French residents in France reported 
having no inside toilet and no bath or shower; 19% did not have hot water (Taïeb, 1998). 
These conditions are still described by some first generation immigrants (Killian, 2006). 
In the 1960s and 70s many migrant workers were living in shantytowns called bidonvilles 
that were built on the outskirts of large cities like Paris and Lyon because there was not 
enough existing housing to accommodate them. To help with this housing crisis the state 
built low-income housing called habitation à loyer modéré (HLM) in these areas, in what 
are called the banlieues. The HLMs are large concrete apartment complexes that are 
comparable to housing projects in the US. They are notorious for being run-down and 
dangerous: between 2005 and 2009 there were 48 deaths from three separate fires in 
HLMs that were attributed to their poor condition (Kaya, 2009). 
Banlieue is a term that is usually translated as “suburb,” although this is accurate 
only in the sense that the area is outside of the urban core. The banlieues are in reality 
much more akin to American inner cities. While in the U.S. those who live in the inner 
city are cut off from the wealthier suburbs, in France the immigrant communities are 
stranded outside of the city perimeter, typically at the end of the public transportation 
lines. Their physical alienation from the city centers mirrors their social alienation. It is 
here that the marginalized immigrant population lives, in poor housing conditions, and 
with inferior access to education. The banlieues are home to immigrants from many 
countries, but are predominantly inhabited by North and Sub-Saharan Africans who are 
largely Muslim or of Muslim heritage. Although immigrants are dispersed throughout 
France there is a high concentration of immigrants and ‘étrangers’ in the Ile-de-France 
area (Bouvier, 2012) and in Lyon, Grenoble and Marseille.  
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3.3.4 Employment  
The economic situation of immigrants in France is bleak compared to non-
immigrants. North African immigrants and their children belong largely to the lower 
socioeconomic level, tending to work in manual or unskilled labor, men in factories and 
women doing domestic work. This is particularly true for the earlier generations. Men 
who arrived from Algeria and Morocco before 1975 were almost all employed as blue-
collar workers. Although these rates later dropped (Tribalat, 1995), the majority of North 
Africans still work in manual labor, with a minority working in professional jobs (INSEE 
2010). One of the major impediments to getting white-collar jobs is that most immigrants 
from the Maghreb cannot read or write in French (Killian, 2006). Even if they were 
literate, many are in France illegally. The only work they can get is the kind that pays 
under the table, usually construction or factory work. In Killian’s (2006) study of first-
generation North African women in France, she found that almost all of her participants 
reported that they were repeatedly underpaid by their bosses who got away with it 
because of their illegal status in France.  
The North African immigrant community also experiences high rates of 
unemployment, although not necessarily much worse than the economy that they left 
behind, and sometimes better. According to French census data, as of 2010, North 
African ‘étrangers’ had an unemployment rate of between 39-46%, compared to the ‘non-
étrangers’ rate of 32%. The unemployment rate for immigrants in 2013 was 17.3%, 
which is 80% higher than the rate for non-immigrants (9.7%) (Kille & Wihbey, 2015). In 
Morocco, in 2013, the unemployment rate for people under 34 was 30% (Associated 
Press, 2013). The rate in Tunisia has ranged from 15-18% over the last few years with as 
high as 37% unemployment for people aged 15-24 in 2012 (Sana, 2014). In Algeria, the 
unemployment rate over the last 14 years has been an average of 15% (Trading 
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Economics, 2014). Today it is 9% according to the Office National des Statistiques, 
although the rates are much higher for people aged 15-24.  
It is more difficult to get official data on adult children of immigrants because 
data is not collected on ethnicity. It is estimated, however, that “around 80 per cent of 
young people with immigrant roots between 20 and 29 years old are children of 
workers…almost twice that of young native French” (Kaya, 2009, p. 31). Based on data 
collected in 1992, Tribalat (1995) found that although children of migrants are doing 
better in general than their parents, indicating that social mobility does exist between 
generations, there is a particular jobs problem for youths of Algerian descent who 
struggle to get work. Concerning employment he writes: 
 
… alors qu’ils ont fait toute leur scolarité dans notre pays, les jeunes d’origine 
algérienne nés en France connaissent de grosses difficultés et la plus forte 
précarité. (Tribalat, 1995, p. 174) 
 
…even though they have completed all of their education in our country, the 
youth of Algerian origin who were born in France know great difficulties, the 
greatest of which is [job] insecurity. (Tribalat, 1995, p. 174) 
 
 
He argues that the high level of unemployment for second generation Algerians is not 
explained by level of education, implying broader social problems. Regardless of level of 
education, more than half of youths of Algerian heritage aged 20 to 29 experienced more 
than a year of unemployment after leaving school. Based on the jobs of their parents, the 
poor economy in general in France, the negative view of immigrants, and the isolating 
housing situation, one can conclude that the majority of second-generation immigrants 
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are still struggling to get out of the lower socioeconomic level of their parents and to 
climb the social ladder.  
3.3.5 Language 
3.3.5.1 Language Practices of the first and second generations 
In the Maghreb there is a classic diglossia situation where dialectal Arabic/Berber 
is the L language (depending on the person) and Standard Arabic is the H language. 
Although many Maghrebis have some knowledge of French, not many are literate. In 
France, the linguistic situation is quite different and it is no longer accurate to describe it 
as diglossic for the Maghrebi diaspora. The majority of the Arabophone population only 
speaks the L variety, Darija (Caubet, 2003), while approximately 1.5 million speak 
Berber (Chaker, 2004). Standard Arabic, the H variety, no longer has an active role in 
day-to-day life because it is not needed or used for administration and education, even if 
it is still used in religious services (often with a translation following it). Instead, French, 
a language that is standardized and written, is used for administration, work and official 
uses, while Darija or Berber is spoken at home, in the neighborhood and with family. It 
could be argued that this situation is closer to the diglossia described by Joshua Fishman 
(1967), wherein the L and H languages are not related but are used in different domains. 
However, as Fishman himself points out, diglossia is marked by the “stable maintenance” 
of the use of each language in different domains “rather than the displacement of one by 
the other over time” (Fishman, 1967, p. 29). Although Darija/Berber may be maintained 
or revived to some degree in France, the use of French and Darija/Berber in the public 
and private domains, respectively, has not been stably maintained, and so it would be 
inaccurate to call this situation diglossic. 
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The percentage of first-generation Algerians and Moroccans in the early 1990s 
who self-reported to have mastered French ranged from 39%-61% (Tribalat, 1995). 
Women reported being worse speakers of French than men and having a harder time 
making themselves understood in French. This is possibly because they were still 
generally restricted to the home sphere in France, as is the custom in the Maghreb 
(Killian, 2006). This gives them fewer opportunities to practice French. French is largely 
learned through the school system, so the longer a person has been schooled the higher 
their French proficiency will be (Tribalat, 1995). This will be much higher for French-
born individuals, and much lower for those who immigrated later in life.  In Gray’s 
(2005) study of first generation Moroccan women in France she found that her 
participants reported speaking mainly in French, although they still used Darija or Berber 
with parents and older family members. 22 out of 25 said that they could speak Darija or 
Berber and 3 could speak/read/write in SA.25 Killian (2006) did not intentionally explore 
language in her interviews, but the topic did come up. Her participants retained 
Arabic/Berber to varying degrees. They complained that language, i.e. not knowing 
French well enough, was a barrier to getting administrative tasks done and to making 
friends, resulting in a feeling of being socially isolated.  
Because of reported high levels of illiteracy in Darija among Moroccans (60%) 
and Algerians (74%) in France, Tribalat (1995, p. 42) reports that it is difficult for first 
generation immigrants to teach Arabic formally to their children. (These participants 
were most likely referring to teaching SA, not Darija, to their children). Among 
immigrants who came to France as adults, 19% of Algerians and 26% of Moroccans 
speak exclusively Arabic or Berber with their children; 35% and 28%, respectively, speak 
                                                
25 These were also the women in her study who reported wearing a headscarf in public, indicating that 
attachment toward Islam as demonstrated in veiling may correlate with a desire to learn/speak the language 
most strongly associated with the religion. 
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exclusively French (Tribalat, 1995), although many reported speaking a mixture of 
French and Arabic/Berber with their children. Most of Killian’s (2006) participants had 
tried to teach their children either Arabic or Berber but many found it difficult and were 
unsuccessful. In general, the older children spoke better than the younger ones because 
by the time the younger ones came along, the older ones had learned more French in 
school and spoke it more often in the home. Return trips to the Maghreb were also 
correlated with higher levels of Arabic/Berber proficiency. Of the five mothers who were 
not trying to teach their children Arabic, two were married to French non-Muslims. 
Killian compares two of these situations: in the first, both parents speak Arabic and 
Berber to one another and to their kids, who can understand and speak it but do not read 
and write it. In the second situation, the woman is a widow who remarried a non-Muslim 
French man. They speak only in French to their child. Additionally, she does not practice 
Islam and celebrates Christmas as a cultural holiday. This is noteworthy because along 
with Islamic/North African religious and cultural practices she has also rejected her 
maternal language, implying a connection between religious practice and language use.  
Tribalat (1995) found that, 87% of second-generation Algerians in his study (what 
might be considered as the ‘classic’ second generation) declared French as their “mother 
tongue”. It is unclear how they understood the usage of the term “mother tongue.” Most 
of these participants would have been raised in homes with parents who were native 
Darija or Berber speakers, although he notes that language loss could potentially be 
swifter for Algerians because their parents may have known some French before coming 
to France (Tribalat, 1995). It is possible that by saying that French is their “mother 
tongue” they meant that French is now their dominant language. These second generation 
participants reportedly speak almost exclusively French to their own children. Mohamed 
(2003) found that most of the second-generation school children that he interviewed in 
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the early 1990s used Darija with their families and French at school. Of those who were 
taking Standard Arabic classes, more than half thought they had equal competence in 
Arabic and French. Again it is unclear whether the students understood him to be asking 
about Darija or SA, or whether they distinguish between the two, something that 
Bassiouney (2009) calls into doubt. It is also very common for second- and third-
generation North African youths to code switch with French and Darija, usually inserting 
Arabic words or phrases into French sentences (Sefiani, 2003). However, this is done 
largely for symbolic reasons as a statement of identity (Liogier, 2002) and does not 
indicate whether they are competent Arabic speakers. 
The data from Tribalat (1995) and Mohamed (2003) are from the early 1990s and, 
although useful for understanding the classic second generation in France, do not apply to 
the language use of the younger second generation in the 2000s. Today, Darija is 
estimated to be spoken by around 3 million people in France (Barontini, 2013). In 2008, 
the French research institutions INSEE and INED surveyed second-generation French 
men and women who were born between 1958 and 1990 about language transmission 
(Condon & Régnard, 2010). Although this may include some of the participants studied 
by Tribalat (1995) and Mohamed (2003), it also includes participants who reached 
maturity in the 2000s. For participants whose parents were both Arabic speakers from 
Morocco or Algeria, the majority reported being able to understand and speak Arabic 
(presumably Darija) well, although the numbers are much lower for writing and reading 
the language (most likely because Darija is not standardized). A similar trend in 
proficiency emerged for Berber speakers from Algeria. Barontini (2013) interviewed 
participants who were born in France or came to France before the age of 20, and whose 
parents or grand parents are from the Maghreb, about their language practices. The level 
of self-reported usage varied widely for her participants, not surprising given the range of 
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background, with some claiming to have retained nothing while others reported much 
higher levels of usage and proficiency. She points out that language transmission for this 
population does not occur in a linear fashion, but may depend on factors such as who 
they marry and how often they visit the Maghreb. One woman reported that her spouse 
helped her to improve her Darija. Barontini also found that Darija is more present today 
in the public sphere that it has previously been in France. 
3.3.5.2 Arabic and Berber Language Classes and Status 
The availability of Arabic language courses in the education system and its status 
in France is unstable. The Ministry of Culture recognized both Berber and the North 
African dialect of Arabic as a language of France in 1999 (Caubet, 2008); however, they 
failed to recognize that there are different dialects in each of the countries of the 
Maghreb. In the same year, dialectal Arabic was eliminated from the list of languages a 
student could take as an optional test on the baccalaureate (Caubet, 2008). Berber, on the 
other hand, has been an available option for oral examination since the 1970s, and since 
1995 it has been an available option for written examination (Chaker, 2003). 
There are opportunities for children to learn Arabic through the program 
Enseignement des Langues et Cultures d’Origine (ELCO). These language courses are 
primarily targeted toward immigrants of Maghrebi or Turkish descent and are available 
free of charge after school. Because ELCO courses are funded by the government of the 
country of origin, not the French state (Oakes, 2001), only the official state language is 
offered. For the Maghrebi governments this means Standard Arabic, not the dialectal 
variety spoken in the homes of these children. Although the purpose of these classes is to 
allow children to connect with their roots, they are teaching them a language that is 
somewhat foreign to them. Furthermore, the classes usually do not continue beyond the 
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French equivalent of middle school (Oakes, 2001). This demonstrates a kind of cognitive 
dissonance on the part of the French government in terms of how and where it wants to 
encourage children of immigrants to learn their maternal language. In addition to ELCO 
there are also Arabic classes available in some secondary schools, and via associations 
and private schools (Mohamed, 2003) or in the mosques and community (Selby, 2009). 
There are now some non-governmental committees devoted to promoting linguistic 
pluralism in France (Oakes, 2002), as well as new discourse, supportive of 
multiculturalism, on how to deal with the reality of immigration in France (Freedman, 
2004), although these do not represent mainstream views.  
Berber studies have also become increasingly popular over the past several 
decades. At the Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales, the number of 
students studying Berber has remained at a steady number of 100, permitting it to be 
classified as a “medium language” (Chaker, 2003). It is studied by second generation 
Berbers, as well as international Masters and Doctoral students, especially those from the 
Maghreb. Chaker (2003) argues that the relatively recent interest in Berber is due to the 
Berber cultural and linguistic movement in North Africa and the progress that Berber has 
made in being acknowledged by North African countries.  
There has also been a recent effort to revitalize SA in France. There are a number 
of reasons why North Africans in France would want to learn Arabic, foremost among 
them being religion. Many of the women interviewed by Killian (2006) and Gray (2005) 
said that they wanted to learn Standard Arabic so that they could read the Qur’an in the 
original (the only version considered to be truly legitimate in Islam). Kaya (2009, p. 87) 
writes that young Muslim immigrants use “Islamic languages” for symbolic reasons, 
indicating that language use is motivated by their religion, although it is unclear what is 
meant by “Islamic languages.” Billiez et al. (2012, p. 298) note that among the second 
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and third-generation North Africans there is a kind of “fetishization” of Arabic that is 
often associated with the home country. There is a desire to learn Arabic as a symbol of 
their identity and origin, in order to reclaim that history.  
3.3.6 Marriage Practices 
Understanding the marriage preferences and patterns of a diaspora group can be 
revealing in terms of how they identify with their community of origin in contrast to their 
country of residence and citizenship. They also influence the linguistic practices of their 
children and are a factor in language shift (Al-Khatib, 2001; Mugaddam, 2006). 
Dzialtuvaite (2006) found that second generation Lithuanians in Scotland who married 
outside of the community had children who in turn did not identify strongly with the 
Lithuanian community. Integration, which in the opinion of the French government is the 
goal for immigrants in France, depends on, among other things, attitudes toward mixed 
marriages (Ennaji, 2010). Selby (2007, 2009) did extensive interviews and ethnographic 
observations with first generation North African men and women. She interviewed 
women who came to France specifically to marry cousins who were French born. She 
found that second and third generation Maghrebi men want wives from North Africa 
because they symbolize cultural and religious purity and are seen as more ideal than 
French born women who, as one participant put it, “are too opinionated and aren’t as 
respectful toward their families” (Selby, 2009, p. 6). French-born women of North 
African descent, on the other hand, are less likely to marry first generation men from 
their country of origin. This is reflected in the fear that first generation women in both 
Killian (2006) and Gray’s (2005) studies expressed about marrying a Muslim man. One 
participant said that women who have moved to France have a tough choice: they want to 
marry a Muslim man because of religion, family wishes, or culture, but they fear that he 
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will be overbearing and have the oppressive attitudes common among Maghrebi men. 
Many said that their ideal husband would be a Muslim with western attitudes (Killian, 
2006, p. 57). Gray’s participants in France viewed fear as an integral component of 
marriage in Morocco. They described the life of Moroccan women as “marked by fear; 
fear of their fathers, fear of their husbands…” (Gray, 2005, p. 150). These women, 
having spent time in France are reluctant to live with a man who has a traditional North 
African understanding of marriage and the roles of man and wife, where the man presides 
over the marriage. This reluctance may also appear in the second generation. The 
opposite does not seem to be a concern for French born North African men, according to 
Selby (2009). 
3.3.7 Life for Women in France versus the Maghreb  
Because mostly women responded to the survey administered for this dissertation, 
it is important to look at how life differs for women in the Maghreb and in France, not 
only based on the laws in these countries, but also from the personal stories of the women 
themselves. In the Maghreb, as in most Muslim majority countries, family law, which 
deals with matters of marriage, divorce, property etc., is based on an interpretation of 
Islamic Sharia law. These laws have traditionally given more rights to men, although this 
has been changing in recent years. The dominant role of men in relation to women is 
largely based on the concept of wali, wherein a woman’s father or brother must give 
consent for marriage, getting a passport, and opening a business (Gray, 2005).  Tunisia 
was an early reformer of family law and promoter of women’s rights. The Tunisian 
courts changed their Personal Status Code in 1958, abolishing polygamy, promoting 
education for women and advocating discarding headscarves (Gray, 2005).26 Morocco, on 
                                                
26 There is a debate about whether the headscarf is a symbol of oppression for Muslim women. Muslim and 
non-Muslim women have taken both sides of the argument. In this case, it seems that at the time it was seen 
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the other hand, took 60 years to change its family law. The new Personal Status Code 
(2003) changed the legal age of marriage from 15 to 18, outlawed most cases of 
polygamy, outlawed repudiation, gave women the rights to ask for a divorce, gave 
women more rights of inheritance, and ended the need for the permission of the wali for 
marriage. Despite the legal changes to family law, the mentality has not been as fast to 
change. Women interviewed by Killian (2006) describe life in the Maghreb as being 
totally subjected to the wills of their father and brothers. They have to serve them both, 
often getting married just to get out of a bad home life situation in the hopes that their 
husbands will be better. Even girls who were highly educated were still expected to clean 
and cook, unlike their brothers, because they had to learn to be “good” wives.  
Even though their backgrounds differed, all of Killian’s 45 participants said they 
were constrained on where they could go in the Maghreb because public spaces were 
strongly restricted based on gender.27 Gray’s participants agreed: 
 
In Moroccan culture, as in most of the Arab world, the public and the private are 
two distinct spheres. They are two separate worlds for which the rules of behavior 
are different. The public refers to: the stress, men’s place, where everything is up 
for grabs, and where it is every man for himself. (Gray, 2005, p. 69) 
 
Women in Killian’s study insisted that in the Maghreb women often do not even do the 
shopping. One woman repeatedly said that in the Maghreb “we don’t go out.” Their 
sexuality was also constrained: “Smoking, drinking, talking to boys, going to movies, and 
being out after 6:00 PM are acts that are disapproved of and can cause women to develop 
                                                                                                                                            
as a symbol of oppression for many Tunisians; however, over time things shifted and women who wore the 
hijab were discriminated against.  
27 It is important to note that in France, as elsewhere, there are also cultural and social restrictions on 
behavior in the public and private spheres, but these restrictions differ from those of the Maghreb. 
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bad reputations” (Killian, 2006, p. 48). One woman said, “a girl’s virginity constitutes the 
honor of the family” (p. 49). If she loses it, the family loses their honor, which is why 
brothers in the Maghreb often take on the role of watching their sisters’ movements, often 
being harder on them than their own fathers.  
Sadiqi (2003) writes that the codes of honor and morality in Morocco “rest on 
girls’ and women’s good conduct: good upbringing, chastity, hard work, obedience, and 
modesty” (p. 60). This is because, according to her, the concept of ‘self’ is pluristic and 
part of the community, unless if you are a man, in which case actions and mistakes do not 
affect the family’s honor. Sadiqi, a self-professed feminist and defender of Islamic 
society and its treatment of women, admits that although in political discourse men and 
women are considered equal, “women are still considered second-class citizens” (Sadiqi, 
2003, p. 75).  
Women’s rights in the Maghreb today exist in the context of the history of the 
fight for independence from France. In Algeria, as well as Morocco, women played a 
large role in the battle for independence for their country. However, once independence 
was gained, they were again relegated to their traditional roles (Gray, 2005) and confined 
to the “domestic sphere.” In Algeria, Sharia law was nationalized and “legal and political 
restrictions” were made on women (Berger, 2002b, p. 72). Many women felt betrayed 
because they had been welcome to participate in the public sphere for the purpose of 
obtaining independence from France, but once that had been achieved they were again 
denied access to that world. Women were also encouraged to wear the veil after 
independence, with a threat of violence by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) if they did 
not (Berger, 2002b).  The FIS “called for control of women’s activities along lines they 
associate with Islam” (Khanna, 2002, p. 110). The family law that the ruling FLN party 
put in place “reinforced what was constructed as traditional Islamic law, which 
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concerned, in particular, women’s status and access to the public space” (Khanna, 2002, 
p. 110).  
Interviews and questionnaires with first generation North African immigrants in 
France reveal a general sense of appreciation for the freedoms that they enjoy in France, 
while noting that sexism does exist there as well. One woman said that because she has 
lived in France all her life she knew that she had more rights than women in Morocco 
(Gray, 2005, p. 150). One of Killian’s interviewees “firmly insists that women have more 
rights in France” (p. 75), referencing schooling, speaking freely and directing the family. 
Many of the women, especially those who immigrated in the 1970s and 80s, had seen 
first hand the low levels of education for girls in their home countries, and so were 
appreciative of the educational opportunities in France for themselves and for their 
daughters. Participants liked that they could enjoy city life and go out in the evenings to 
go dancing or to the movies without worrying about someone seeing them and chastising 
them. They also liked the cultural opportunities and the diversity of the country. Gray’s 
participants felt that the laws in France protected them and allowed them to exert control 
over their lives. One woman said that if it had not been for the French legal system, she 
would have been married against her will and would not have been able to pursue a 
career (Gray, 2005, p. 173). An illustrative example was given by a woman from 
Killian’s study who explained that when flying back to France from visiting Algeria she 
regularly sees women taking off the veil and putting on makeup. She describes them as 
being different women as they cross the border (Killian, 2006, p. 121).  
Mohamed’s (2003) interviews with second generation girls in the early 1990s 
reveals that there is a pull between the traditional lifestyle of the family and the secular 
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French lifestyle encountered in school and in popular culture.28 Girls admit that they do 
not introduce their boyfriends to their parents, unless they are planning to get married, 
because their parents would not approve. They find strategies to compromise or deceive 
their parents in order to realize their desire for freedom but also to avoid rupture with 
their family. Begag (2007) writes that a cultural break from a Maghrebi family is 
extremely difficult, calling it “violent.” Although it is hard for sons, “it is even more 
difficult for girls, for whom the expression of their individuality often results in open 
conflict with the father” (Begag, 2007, p. 78). Mohamed (2003) writes that:  
 
La confrontation avec les tabous de leur culture d’origine (marquée  par le statut 
de supériorité de l’homme) et leurs propres désirs, accentués par la libération des 
moeurs du pays d’accueil et l’influence des mass-média, va les écarteler. 
(Mohammed, 2003, p. 57) 
 
Confrontation with the taboos of their culture of origin (marked by the superior 
status of men) and their own desires, accentuated by the liberation of the 
customs/morals of the receiving country and the influence of mass media, will 
tear them apart. (Mohammed, 2003, p. 57) 
 
According to Mohamed, this tension between daughters and their families sometimes 
results in the families sequestering girls and forcing them to marry in the country of 
origin. Indeed, most of the narratives and books written by second-generation Maghrebi 
women deal with personal freedom in relation to their community of origin (e.g. Gray, 
2005; Killian, 2006). Many women do seek out and find this personal freedom, but often 
times with strong push back from their families and painful ruptures. It is important to 
                                                
28 It should be noted, however, that in most immigration contexts, daughters are symbols of a family’s 
honor and so their actions are often scrutinized more than the actions of sons in the family (Espiritu, 2003). 
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understand this tension when studying the linguistic and cultural attitudes of women in 
the North African diaspora, because language attitudes and language use can be a way to 
express these cultural choices. 
3.3.8 Religion  
The religion of the Maghreb is almost entirely Islam. In Morocco, over 98% of 
the population is Muslim (Gray, 2005). The current project is to understand the attitudes 
of the grown children of first generation immigrants from the Maghreb toward language, 
but also toward religion, in order to investigate the interaction between the two. To do 
this, it is necessary to understand how Islam is practiced in France. Although the focus is 
on the second generation, it is important to review how religion is and has been practiced 
over the last couple of decades by the first generation as well. Gray (2005) and Killian 
(2006) both conducted interviews with first generation North African women. Their 
responses cannot be generalized to the male population, or to the North African diaspora 
in general because the sample size was too small; however, their interviews do offer 
some insight into the contemporary experiences and views of immigrants from the 
Maghreb. It is important to note that almost all of these participants were highly educated 
which may influence their views on religion.  
Killian (2006) found that one third of her participants did not actively practice 
Islam, although they all self identify as Muslim because, according to them, one is born 
Muslim and that cannot be changed. Gray (2005) found similar rhetoric from one woman 
who said that in Islam it does not matter what country or ethnicity you are from. She 
considers herself “first and foremost as part of the umma [community of Muslim 
believers]” (p. 77), demonstrating her devotion to religion over nation. The women in 
both studies practiced Islam to varying degrees, in terms of fasting, prayer etc., but one 
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common thread that emerged is that these women were practicing Islam in a more 
individualized and personal way, with little reliance on institutions in the community. 
They felt that they could renegotiate what Islam meant to them. They found a way to 
redefine what it means to be ‘good’ Muslim women, focusing more on the internal rather 
than on North African norms (Killian, 2006). This led the women in both studies to 
practice Islam on the weekends. Only two of Killian’s participants veiled outside the 
house, but many of them wore traditional clothing and headscarves on the weekends at 
home. They practice what Killian calls “accommodation” whereby they adapt features of 
their religion to the French secular culture, e.g., praying to themselves rather than in the 
traditional fashion, which would draw attention to them. While approaching Islam from a 
more individualistic stance, they still wanted to learn more about it. Most of Gray’s 
participants were trying to understand Islam better, even those who claimed to have 
rejected the religion. They learned about their religion via websites because, according to 
them, there are few resources available in France where one can learn about Islam. In this 
way, they participate in the Muslim community online, much like Laguerre’s (2010) 
digital diaspora.  
Tribalat (1995) did an extensive survey of religious practices of first- and second-
generation immigrants (data collected in 1992), focusing on reported attendance of 
religious ceremonies and adherence to the dietary restrictions of Islam. He found similar 
behavior between first generation Moroccans and Algerians, noting that there was a 
relatively low attendance of religious ceremonies, as low as 11% for Algerians, 6% for 
women and 15% for men. Tribalat explains that the disparity between male and female 
attendance is due to the mosque being part of the public sphere, which in North Africa is 
largely male-dominated. Women, however, reported adhering to the Ramadan fast more 
often than men, although there were overall high levels of reported adherence. Tribalat 
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notes that it is easier for women to fast because, even in France, the cultural practice of 
restriction to the home sphere for women persists to some degree. Tribalat argues that 
following the food restrictions stipulated in Islam (e.g., refraining from consuming pork 
and alcohol) does not indicate levels of religiosity, because, according to him, they are 
largely being practiced as cultural not religious traditions. Even if the first generation is 
practicing Islam in a more individual way with less reliance on institutions, and is more 
focused on the cultural rituals than on the religion itself, this does not tell us about how or 
if their children, the second generation, practice Islam. It is sometimes the case that the 
children of immigrants will embrace their culture and religion of origin more than their 
parents, as a way of laying claim to an identity. Yag ̆mur and Akinci (2003) found just this 
in their study of first and second-generation Turkish immigrants in France. The younger 
generation had more positive attitudes toward Islam than their parents’ generation, 
although the relationship between attitudes and action is disputed.  
Tribalat (1995) also looked at religiosity of second-generation Algerian 
immigrants in France. He found that the younger generation was less practicing than their 
parents. Second generation Algerian immigrants rarely went to their place of worship, 
half as often as their parents’ generation, with one third saying they do not have a 
religion. Their rates of attendance to religious ceremonies were similar to the average 
French person’s attendance. Eighteen percent of women and 10% of men said they 
practice regularly. Although they reported not going often to Mosques or other religious 
centers, two thirds of them reportedly fast during Ramadan and refrain from eating pork, 
and one half refrain from consuming alcohol (all practices required by Islamic law). They 
seem disinterested in religion based on their attendance to religious ceremonies; however, 
further investigation revealed that they practice Islam on a daily level in the form of 
adherence to food interdictions. Tribalat argues that the practice of these rituals is cultural 
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and not religious, based on the contradiction in responses. Another possibility that 
Tribalat does not explore is that Islam may be practiced differently in the diaspora than in 
Muslim majority countries. The interviews with first generation immigrants from the 
Maghreb reveal that Islam is being practiced in a more individual manner and that they 
rely less on institutions. Perhaps in the diaspora going to religious ceremonies is less 
important, and less available.  
Mohammed (2003) also found that most of the participants that he interviewed in 
the early 1990s did not practice Islam and did not even know some of the basic 
prescriptions of the religion, although they understand it to be the religion of their 
country of origin and the religion of Arabs. He found that instead there is a symbolic 
attachment to Islam. Kaya (2009) also argues that Islam has symbolic value for Muslim 
youths but is not practiced.29 Like Tribalat (1995), Mohamed (2003) found that girls 
practiced Islam more than boys, although he later contradicts this conclusion. It is 
important to note that girls may over report practicing Islam because there is stronger 
family and community pressure on them than there is on boys. 
The data on the second generation from Tribalat’s and Mohamed’s studies, while 
interesting and certainly informative, is out of date. Data from the early 1990s gives us a 
picture of youths who grew up in France in the 1980s and whose parents immigrated in 
the 1960s and 70s. To assume that the sentiments and practices of this time would remain 
consistent is unrealistic. The shifts in global politics, specifically regarding Islam, have 
changed the global Muslim community and how they relate to one another and to the 
state, not only in France, but in America as well. GhaneaBassiri (2010) writes that the 
Muslim diaspora in America became more self aware and confident to organize and 
                                                
29 This is not backed up by any recent data.  
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congregate after the Islamic revolution in Iran (1979). It is possible that a similar 
phenomenon occurred following the increased scrutiny of Muslim communities in the 
wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
Several authors argue that there is new interest in Islam among the Muslim 
diaspora youth in France. Referencing Cesari (1999) Gray writes that there is a  “renewed 
Islamization whereby young French Muslims are looking for ways to assert their cultural 
and religious affinity which their parents’ generation practiced in the shadows of the 
mainstream culture” (Gray, 2005, p. 46). Rather than trying to blend in and practice 
religion on the weekend, the children of Muslim immigrants are bold about their practice. 
This renewal in interest in Islam is reflected in the growth of mosques in France. 
According to the Minister of the Interior and Religion, there were 150 mosques in 1976, 
900 in 1985, 1555 in 2001 and 2052 in 2011 (Guénois, 2011). This indicates that not all 
children of immigrants are trading in the religion of their parents for the secular French 
life, nor are they necessarily practicing religion in the private way that Killian’s (2006) 
first generation participants are. In addition, individuals today can seek out information 
about Islam on the Internet and can participate in religious ceremonies online with a 
virtual community of believers in a way that they could not in the 1980s and 90s, which 
may increase their religiosity.  
Begag (2007), himself a second-generation North African, writes about the shift 
in attitudes toward Islam from the 1980s to the 2000s. Whereas in the 1980s Maghrebi 
youth tried to hide their ethnicity and religion, attempting to blend into the French 




…a reactivated identification with minority ethnic origins, and Islam has now 
emerged on the scene as a rallying point in the sociological construction of a 
significant number of young Arabs. Now you can see in the hoods [banlieues] 
bearded young men and not-so-young men holding Muslim prayer beads in their 
hands, wearing white or gray djellabas, and sporting brand-name American 
athletic shoes. Not only are today’s young Arabs no longer ashamed of 
themselves. They make a deliberate, ostentatious display of themselves as a kind 
of provocation... (Begag, 2007, p. 32) 
 
He observes that there is an embrace of Islam and Arab identity in the younger generation 
today that was not present when he himself was a youth. Scott (2007) supports this, 
noting that there was a more “visible and outspoken Islamist presence in France in 2003 
than there was in 1989” (p. 35), and that in 2003 there were more of what she calls “hot 
spots”: “schools in which young male militants were seeking ways to challenge secular 
values and practices” (p. 35). Two of Killian’s (2006) first-generation participants found 
that there is a militancy in the second generation in France today. While noting that the 
second generation themselves are not necessarily strictly observant (some smoke and 
drink), they describe them as very judgmental of the behavior of the women interviewed. 
One woman reports that youth in her neighborhood approach her and criticize her for 
marrying a non-Muslim man who converted to Islam. Another woman reports them being 
very intolerant of people smoking or breaking the Ramadan fast (Killian, 2006, p. 154). 
Scott (2007) references French intellectual Olivier Roy who sees this rediscovery of 
Islam as similar to born-again Christians, charismatic Catholics, orthodox Jews or the 
New Age movement (p. 126). This renewed enthusiasm may reflect the “fetishization” of 
Arabic that Billiez et al. (2012) describe is happening in France. As enthusiasm for Islam 
increases, there may be a parallel increase in enthusiasm for Standard Arabic.  
One argument for why there has been a renewed interest in Islam in France is 
because African immigrants and their descendants feel like outsiders of French society, in 
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large part because of France’s anti-Islamic rhetoric and stance. They live physically and 
socially outside of the majority culture. In Melliani’s (1997) study, a North African youth 
described feeling like an immigrant in France and in the Maghreb:  
 
Ces jeunes ne se sentent appartenir à aucune nation, ne sentent à leur place ni ici, 
ni là-bas, sont comme des citoyens de nulle part, immigrés de nulle part. 
(Melliani, 1997, p. 127) 
 
These youths do not feel like they belong to any nation, do not feel at home here 
or there, are like citizens of nowhere, immigrants from no where. (Melliani, 1997, 
p. 127) 
 
Kaya (2009) calls the practicing of Islam in France an “Islamic parallel societ[y]” that is 
a result not of inherent conservatism, but as a reaction to their marginalized status (Kaya, 
2009, p. 85). These individuals, according to Kaya, are not experiencing a true 
conversion, but are acting out as a statement against the state. In religion they are 
accepted and find a sense of belonging that is lacking in the dominant French society. 
Gray (2005) contrasts the experience of being Muslim in France with being Muslim in 
Morocco. In Morocco Islam is an “omnipresent reality,” but in France it is “the faith of a 
disenfranchised minority” (p. 24). It is this minority status that drives them toward 
religion. Scott (2007) summarizes it in this way: 
 
For young peoples from impoverished immigrant communities, Islam seemed to 
offer a way out of the demeaning circumstances of a compromised French 
nationality. It could be a means of refusing both parental discipline and social 
pressure. Here was an imagined international community to which they could 
aspire, one which rewarded their discipline and purity and which aligned them 
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with what seemed revolutionary forces, resisting the corruptions of secular, 
Western capitalism. (Scott, 2007, p. 137) 
 
Rather than having to self-identify as the marginal minority population in France, they 
can instead identify with a large and established community of Muslims, even if they 
have only met a small number of its members. Religion for them is a resistance to the 
state because of the state’s rejection of them. Scott (2007) notes, however, that this is not 
the case for people of a higher socioeconomic status, whose embrace of Islam is a call for 
integration and respect for religious and cultural differences, not a rebellion against the 
establishment.  
3.3.9 Reception from France and the Affaire des Foulards 
There is a perception in France that in the last few decades there has been a 
drastic increase in immigration and a fear that these immigrants are taking jobs away 
from French natives; however, the rate of immigration has, in fact, remained steady. The 
difference is that the demographics of the immigrants have changed over the decades. 
Whereas previously the majority of immigrants came from other European countries, 
today they come predominately from non-European countries, in particular Morocco and 
Algeria (Freedman, 2004).30  In fact, the percentage of immigrants from the Maghreb 
jumped from 2% in 1946 to 39% in 1982 (Hargreaves, 2007). At the heart of this sense of 
an “invasion” of immigrants is the fact that the North Africans who are coming to France 
are predominantly Muslim. Immigration can be a source of tension in any country 
because of fear that immigrants will take away jobs or affect wages, a topic that is widely 
disputed. However, in France, the debate about North African immigration has largely 
revolved around concerns about Islam. The development of fundamentalist Islam in 
                                                
30 Portuguese is the largest European immigrant population in France, although there are fewer Portuguese 
there than North Africans. 
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various countries over the years has resulted in the fear that this will happen in France, 
which is historically catholic (Tribalat, 1995). This has been especially true since the 
Iranian Revolution in the late 1970s when the discussion of immigrants shifted from 
economic fears to the danger that Islam allegedly poses to the French Republic (Scott, 
2007). Ennaji (2010), who focuses on Moroccans but whose argument can be extended to 
all Arab immigrants and their descendants, argues that xenophobia toward Moroccans has 
risen since the attacks on September 11, 2001. According to him, Moroccans are used as 
scapegoats for problems in France, and that violence toward Muslims in Europe is on the 
rise as an expression of Islamaphobia. Islam too is seen as a scapegoat and is blamed for 
all of the problems that have arisen between the immigrant population and the French 
state. The narrative of the danger of immigrants makes it more difficult for migrant 
communities to incorporate themselves into society, and results in them affirming their 
“ethno-cultural and religious identities” (Kaya, 2009, p. 9). This in turn seems to confirm 
France’s concerns over assimilation spurring them to continue viewing Muslim 
immigrants as unassimilatable.  
The generally negative attitudes toward immigrants from Muslim-majority 
countries are evident in surveys and legislation both from thirty years ago and today. 
Although some believed that Muslims can be integrated, most people in France did not in 
the 1980s (Safran, 1991). In a 1989 poll, 50% of French people said that Maghrebi 
immigrants are the hardest to integrate into French society (Hargreaves, 2007), 
presumably because of the Islamic faith. These negative attitudes seem to have worsened 
in recent years. Le Monde reported on a poll from 2013 that showed that 74% of those 
polled thought that Islam is not compatible with the values of French society (Le Bars, 
2013). In the more recent survey, these negative attitudes spanned the political 
ideological spectrum revealing that the cold reception of Muslim immigrants is not 
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restricted to membership in a particular political party, even if the far right Front National 
party is the only one to openly express its prejudices. It has been argued that Islam 
represents a barrier or impediment standing between the individual and the State, both for 
the Muslim and for those interacting with Muslims in public. Religious differences, it is 
thought, ought to be kept entirely in the private sphere, and remain unacknowledged by 
the state. Recognizing or granting rights to a particular group contradicts the universalist 
ideal of equal treatment before the law and the unity of the nation. The idea that there can 
be other identities alongside the French national identity is rejected by the Left, out of a 
fear of ghettoizing minorities, and by the Right, out of a fear of separatism and a loss of 
national cohesion (Safran, 1991).  
In addition to negative attitudes toward Islam and doubt over whether Muslims 
can assimilate, the speech of the Maghrebi immigrant community, including the second 
and third generations, is stigmatized (Melliani, 1997). In order to solidify a national 
identity, a country needs an ‘other’ against which to juxtapose itself (Oakes, 2001), 
including a linguistic ‘other.’ Before the Revolution the linguistic ‘others’ were Italian 
speakers. During the Revolution they were regional language speakers. Today, the 
linguistic ‘other’ against which France can solidify its own linguistic and cultural identity 
are not only English speakers, but Arabic speakers or Arabic heritage speakers, largely 
from the Maghreb, who speak French with an accent and often mix it with Arabic words 
and phrases. They speak a variety of French, sometimes called argot, langue populaire or 
langue des cités, that includes verlan and other neologisms, that has become an identity 
marker for them and differentiates them from French majority society. This variety is 
highly stigmatized and is a point of tension between these communities. In order to tap 
into the attitudes of Parisians toward immigrant community language use Stewart (2012) 
asked people to rate how well one could learn “good French” in various neighborhoods 
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and cities in the Paris area, as well as to rate the reputations of these neighborhoods and 
ability to access city amenities within them. He found that participants thought it was 
harder to learn “good French” in the poorer immigrant-dominated neighborhoods. Their 
negative language attitudes toward neighborhoods correlated more with the reputation of 
the neighborhood than with actual access to city amenities. This study demonstrates that 
there is a strong stigmatization of the French spoken by the predominantly North African 
immigrant communities of Paris.  
These negative views of Muslims have resulted in racism toward North Africans, 
fueled by the memory of Algeria’s traumatic war for independence. According to the 
Open Society Institute (2009) Maghrebi youth are 7 times more likely to get stopped by 
police (Stewart, 2012, p. 188). Daily identity checks in the banlieues are common 
practice. Similar to the dynamic between police and inner city African Americans in the 
U.S., the Maghrebi youth-police relationship is based on resistance on the part of the 
Maghrebi youth, and targeting and abuse on the side of the police. This leads, as it did in 
2005, to the easy escalation of routine interactions. Discrimination toward North Africans 
further manifests itself in job hiring. Job applicants with North African or Arab sounding 
names are significantly less likely to be called for an interview than those with non-Arab 
names (Gill, 1999). Killian’s (2006) participants describe being discriminated against 
because of their names, so much so that they have given their children Arabic names that 
are easily pronounceable in French. A personal contact in France described how doctors 
with North African last names have trouble staying in business because people will not 
go to them, causing many to resort to changing their names. This has resulted in a tension 
between these communities that is based on ethnicity 
 
 133 
3.3.9.1. The Affaires des Foulards 
The antagonism between the French state and its Muslim immigrant community 
has been most pronounced in the ongoing controversy over the legality of girls wearing 
headscarves in public schools.31 This debate is now commonly called the affaires des 
foulards. The first affaire occurred in 1989 when the headmaster of the Collège Gabriel 
Havez in Creil (a Parisian suburb) would not let three girls of North African origin come 
to school wearing headscarves. This provoked media attention and heated debates on 
both sides of the issue. The argument was that the schoolroom is a public space and a 
place where one “accesses” the state. Wearing religious symbols was viewed as 
inappropriate in this space, first, because it promotes the idea that everyone is not equal 
and the same before the state, that there are minority differences. This was deemed 
unacceptable for a country that does not acknowledge minorities. Second, it indicates that 
there are allegiances that come before loyalty to the state (communitaurisme), i.e., 
religion. The headscarf was being banned in the name of laïcité (secularism). This 
occurred during the bicentennial of the French Revolution, which fueled some of the 
public discourse about the need to protect French universalist values (Scott, 2007), which 
originated in the fight against the Catholic Church in the 18th century. The headmaster’s 
decision was eventually overturned by the Minister of Education, Lionel Jospin, who 
received sharp criticism from the Right and the Left (Kaya, 2009).  
Another affaire occurred in 1994 when François Bayrou, the Minister of 
Education, announced that “‘ostentatious’ signs of religious affiliation would henceforth 
be prohibited in all schools” (Scott, 2007, p. 27). These signs were taken as a form of 
                                                
31 The word used in French is foulard, meaning scarf, although the Arabic hijab is also frequently used 
when discussing the issue. While most Muslim women in France who wear the hijab are only covering 
their hair, not their face, in English language publications, it is common to see the word veil used instead. 
This is misleading because it makes it seem as though women are covering their head and face, which often 
provokes a stronger reaction. 
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proselytizing and were primarily focused on Islamic headscarves. Bayrou, in arguing his 
case, claimed that France is a Judeo-Christian country even though the girls were being 
barred from school in the name of laïcité (Killian, 2006). This resulted in 69 girls being 
kicked out of schools for disobeying the pronouncement, again provoking a flurry of 
public debate over the issue, with many teachers, feminists and intellectuals coming 
down on the side of the French government (Scott, 2007). However, the Council of State 
ultimately rejected Beyrou’s pronouncement and left it to teachers and administrators to 
rule on a case-by-case basis. In 2003, the debate was once again revived when two sisters 
went to school in headscarves and were subsequently expelled. This time, the French 
government responded more resolutely. A law was passed in 2004 that stipulated that: 
 
In public elementary, middle and high schools, the wearing of signs or clothing 
which conspicuously manifest students’ religious affiliations is prohibited. 
Disciplinary procedures to implement this rule will be preceded by a discussion 
with the student. (Scott, 2007, p. 1) 
 
This law technically applies to all religions and includes wearing large crosses and 
yarmulkes; however, it is widely acknowledged that the law was focused on getting the 
headscarf out of schools. “Headscarves were deemed an intrusion of religion into the 
sacred secular space of the schoolroom, the crucible in which French citizens are formed” 
(Scott, 2007, p. 90). The school had to be “protected” at all cost because it is the root of 
universalism, where equality before the state begins and communitaurisme ends. It is 
where assimilation takes place. The headscarf thus became a symbol of the Muslim 
immigrant who is not assimilatable, and a reflection of France’s inability to cope with its 
former colonial subjects in a post-colonial world: 
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That the veil continues to be at issue in France’s struggle to come to terms with its 
colonial past and its ethnically mixed population in the present ought not to be 
surprising. Drawing the line at wearing of the veil is a way of drawing the line not 
only at Islam but at the differences Arab and Muslim populations represent, a way 
of insisting on the timeless superiority of French ‘civilization’ in the face of a 
changing world. (Scott, 2007, p. 89) 
 
Even though it is no longer a colonial power, France still asserts its dominance over its 
North African population by insisting, as it did during colonial rule, on the suppression of 
its religion in public and the need to accept ‘French’ values of secularism. France at once 
says that in order to be properly French one must abandon religion and cultural identity 
when entering the public sphere, while also saying that these are a people who can never 
fully become French, leaving North Africans in a confusing and uncertain position.  
The reaction in the Muslim community in France to the headscarf ban has not 
entirely been one of resistance, nor is the response homogenous. In 1989, a survey 
revealed that 45% of Muslims agreed that the headscarf should not be worn in school 
(Scott, 2007), although it is not clear if these were first or second generation Muslims. 
This reflects the responses from Gray’s (2005) participants (Moroccan women in France) 
who largely supported the concept of laïcité and were “ambivalent” about the headscarf 
ban. It is important, however, to note that Gray’s participants were highly educated 
women, who may not be representative of the Muslim immigrant population in France. 
Gray further observed that in the HLMs in the banlieues, many girls are pressured by 
their brothers and peers to wear the hijab, and are threatened with violence if they do not. 
Women who work in centers for “filles en difficulté” said that the new ban helps these 
girls, by giving them an excuse not to wear the headscarf to school (Gray, 2005, p. 159). 
This indicates that even in the banlieues there is resistance to wearing a headscarf among 
young girls. Gray reports three primary reasons that girls wear the foulard in France: 
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personal choice, pressure from family and friends, or to avoid violence. More recently, in 
2003, only 14% of Muslim women polled reported wearing the hijab (“Sondage 
exclusif,” 2003).  
While acknowledging that many women do not wear a headcovering, Gray (2005) 
argues that more and more women are donning the hijab due to an increasing feeling of 
alienation. While it is not clear whether that number has actually increased after the 
passing of the 2003 law, it is widely thought that the most recent headscarf affaire, rather 
than being a force for secularization, has instead become a rallying point for Muslim 
identity. The headscarf debate, and the broader debate that the republic is under threat 
because of this symbol of Islam, has actually helped to reinforce the community of 
Muslims as they rally behind the hijab as a common value, even if they do not all wear it 
(Scott, 2007). Veiling has become a sign of rebellion against the establishment, 
comparable to how western youth used to wear a Che Guevara shirt as a symbol of anti-
establishment sentiments (Gray, 2005). The headscarf ban struck a nerve that enhanced 
Muslims’ feeling of being singled out and excluded from the dominant culture and 
society, and has lead many in the community to find solace and solidarity in their 
religious identity (Begag, 2007, p. 76).  
A large part of the tension between the French majority society and the North 
African community in France rests in the troubled history between the two communities 
stretching back to the colonial era. There is a sense in which this community is still seen 
as colonial subjects and is largely rejected by the majority society. France’s staunch 
secularism and official blindness to ethnic and religious differences further complicates 
the position of immigrants in France. If, as suggested above, the North African youth in 
France are turning toward religion as a reaction to French society, this suggests that their 
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religiosity, and perhaps their language and cultural attitudes, might differ if they lived in 
another diasporic setting such as Canada or Belgium. 
 
3.3.10 Civil Resistance  
This sense of being singled out and rejected by French majority society because 
of their alleged ‘unassimilatablility’ has led to an increase in the tension, which has 
expressed itself in a reassertion of North African cultural and religious identity (as 
discussed above), strained loyalties, and violent reactions. In 2005, in the banlieues of 
Paris, riots began that brought to national and international attention the precarious 
condition of France and its marginalized population of immigrants and their descendants. 
Police officers were chasing two youths in the banlieue of Clichy-sous-Bois, which 
ended in the accidental death by electrocution of the young men in a power station. Their 
deaths sparked protests and riots not only in the Paris area but also in cities across the 
country. Every night dozens of cars were torched and people took to the streets. The 
animosity between the police and the residents of these neighborhoods had boiled over. 
According to Kaya (2009), the 2005 riots were caused by “two centuries of colonialism 
and racism, compounded by recent poverty and exclusion” from society, rather than 
because of cultural differences and Islamism (Kaya, 2009, p. 81). The high rates of 
unemployment, poverty and isolation in the deteriorating banlieues played a significant 
role in the confrontation, as did the colonial history between France and the Maghreb and 
the violent wars for independence. Whereas Beur protestors in the 1980s were peaceful 
(for example the marche des beurs in 1983, which was meant as a parallel to the 1963 
March on Washington), Kaya (2009) argues that today they are radicalized and more 
similar to Malcolm X than to Martin Luther King. Although it is important to note that 
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there had been riots in banlieues in the previous two decades, they had always been fairly 
localized, and never before had they spread across the country as they did in 2005. 
This civil resistance and unrest has its root in the rejection of the North African 
population from mainstream France. Begag (2007) argues that the “integration policy” in 
France has been unsuccessful, and that both the right and the left have failed to protect 
the rights of the immigrant population. They have neither been integrated fully into 
French society, nor does the government acknowledge their differences. Migrants and 
their children see the French model of universalism as exclusionist (Kaya, 2009) because 
it denies their ethnicity and ignores their history: 
 
Despite their European citizenship, many [Moroccan] migrants find it hard to 
integrate into European society because they are often required to make 
compromises with the host country. These compromises have pushed many 
migrants to espouse a minority discourse. They celebrate their cultural specificity 
and marginality and struggle against all forms of segregation. (Ennaji, 2010, p. 
16) 
 
The French state is so determined for there to be officially one unified people of France, 
and it upholds this narrative so vehemently, that it ends up pushing people to define and 
separate themselves based on their ethnicity and religion. “The inability to fully join in 
the dominant cultural landscape may encourage immigrants to reinforce the boundaries 
that separate them from French people” (Killian, 2006, p. 84). This narrative is woven 
into the educational curriculum. Begag points particularly to the failure to educate the 
public about the colonial period and the violence and injustice done against Muslims in 
Africa, referring to a kind of “historical amnesia” (Begag, 2007, p. 30). It glosses over the 
history of the Maghreb and its North African citizens. Even though fifty years have gone 
by since the first wave of Maghrebi immigrants came to France, they and their 
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descendants are still being rejected because of what Begag calls the “ghosts of the 
colonial period.” They are still seen as colonial subjects, as the descendants of “natives.” 
They are French citizens who are not accepted as such because many in France feel in a 
sense that now the former French colonial subjects are colonizing France.  
The second and third generations of immigrants in particular feel their loyalty 
pulled in two directions. Mohamed (2003) describes them as growing up between two 
cultures: that of their parents’ heritage and that of French society. Although there are 
major problems with unemployment and living conditions in the banlieues, which have 
been one of the causes for rioting, Maghrebi youths who make it out of the banlieues 
often struggle with being shunned by their former friends. They are given a hard time for 
studying at the university and are insulted by being called “French” (Begag, 2007). Other 
insults include “pig eater” and “token Arab,” as though engaging with the dominant 
society is a betrayal, not just of their friends, but also of their religion and ethnicity. The 
children of immigrants are torn between these two cultures and have lost their identity 
because they are accepted by neither (Ennaji, 2010). This may be why we see an 
increased embracing of religion and North African culture among the descendants of 
Maghrebi immigrants. They are staking claim to their existence and to belonging to the 
culture of the banlieues. 
More recently, another, more extreme, expression of this resistance has emerged. 
Since the summer of 2014, with the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS), a self-proclaimed Muslim caliphate, there have been approximately 1800 French 
and Belgian men of North African descent who have joined the fight with ISIS (Ruthven, 
2015). It has been argued in the news that they have done this both out of a sense of 
religious devotion and duty, as well as in an effort to seek out belonging in ISIS because 
they are denied acceptance at home (Claudet, 2014), that it is yet another way of resisting 
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French society. This has brought a renewed discussion about radical Islam into the 
national discussion about immigration. This was elevated even further with the murders 
of more than a dozen cartoonists at the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo over drawings 
of the prophet Mohammed (January 2015), an attack that was perpetrated by French 
citizens of North African heritage under the banner of al-Qaeda. It is important to note 
that all but three of the participants who took the survey for this dissertation responded 
prior to the Charlie Hebdo incident.  
There are undeniable problems in terms of the relationship between France and 
the North African diaspora in France. The descendants of African immigrants, who are 
French citizens, are excluded from the dominant narrative of French national identity and 
French patrimony. This exclusion extends both to the religious and linguistic domains. 
One aspect of the resistance to French society that has not been discussed is in what ways 
language attitudes, and by extension language choice, are involved in constructing this 
differentiation, and how they act as expressions of resistance to the French state. This 
topic is particularly relevant given the role that language has played throughout the 
history of France as a tool for colonization and assimilation, and as a symbol of national 
identity and citizenship. Investigating the language attitudes of the marginalized North 
African diaspora will provide insight into how language acts as a proxy for feelings of 
alienation, and will help to improve our understanding of this volatile situation and the 
repercussions of France’s legacy of language policy and language ideology. 
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have reviewed the history of French language ideology in order 
to contextualize the language policies that were implemented in the Maghreb during the 
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colonial era, the reactionary Arabization movement post-independence, and the linguistic 
situation that the North African community in France faces today.  I further discussed the 
history of migration from the Maghreb and what the lives of this immigrant community 
are like today in terms of housing, language, marriage, work, religion and their 
acceptance by French society. This provides a context for the selection of the population 
of second generation North African immigrants that will be presented in the following 
chapter. In the following chapter, I review language attitude methodology before 





4. Methodology  
The primary goal of this dissertation is to assess the language attitudes of second-
generation North African immigrants living in France, and to understand how these 
attitudes are related to attitudes toward religion, national identity and proficiency. In 
order to achieve these goals I constructed an original language attitudes questionnaire, 
which also includes questions on proficiency, religion, culture and national identity. 
There are a number of ways to investigate language attitudes, including interviews, 
societal treatment studies, matched guise technique and questionnaires. Although I use a 
questionnaire in the current project, it is important to understand the other approaches to 
assessing language attitudes, both their advantages and their drawbacks, in order to 
motivate this choice. In this chapter, I present these alternative methodologies and argue 
for why I have chosen to use questionnaires, before moving on to a presentation of the 
methodology used for this study.  
 
4.1 METHODS FOR COLLECTING LANGUAGE ATTITUDES 
Interviews or oral surveys are sometimes used to assess attitudes, although they 
are not as common in the language attitudes field (see Hogan-Brun & Ramonien, 2005, 
however, for an example). They typically consist of a pre-determined set of questions 
asked by the researcher who notes the responses with scales and rubrics (Oppenheim, 
1992). One of the primary benefits of this methodology is that it allows the researcher to 
ask follow-up questions in order to clarify a participant’s response, or to rephrase a 
question when necessary. It also allows for the notation of things like facial expression 
and body language of the participants, providing additional information (Oppenheim, 
1992). Despite these benefits, interviews are prone to a number of difficulties including 
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social-desirability bias where the participant answers questions based on what he or she 
perceives as socially acceptable (Garrett, 2010), and interviewer bias, where the 
respondent replies based on what he or she thinks the interviewer would say. These can 
seriously affect the responses that a participant feels comfortable giving.  The ethnicity, 
gender, age, socioeconomic status, and language of the interviewer may also affect 
responses (Garrett et al., 2003), resulting in inaccurate reported attitudes. Interviews are 
time-consuming, in terms of conducting, analyzing, and transcribing them (Agheysi & 
Fishman, 1970). They are furthermore not as likely to be comparable to other studies 
because they are fluid and unpredictable. For these reasons, I chose not to use interview 
methodology, especially because of the effects my position as a western woman might 
have had on their responses. 
Societal treatment studies focus on the attitudes of society as a whole rather than 
on individual attitudes (Agheysi & Fishman, 1970; Garrett et al., 2003). This approach 
often uses books, newspapers, cartoons etc., in order to extract and analyze the language 
attitudes of the society (Garrett, 2010). Because of its reliance on texts, it is most useful 
in providing insight into historical and institutional attitudes and in examining official 
language use and language policies (Giles, Hewstone and Ball, 1983). It is related to the 
field of institutional language socialization, which explores the effect that official policies 
and institutions have on habituating individuals, particularly immigrants, into using the 
language sanctioned by the state (di Lucca, Masiero & Pallotti, 2008; Jacquemet, 2011; 
García-Sánchez, 2011; Riley, 2011). Language socialization looks at the results that 
language attitudes and policies produce, while societal treatment studies look at the 
attitudes that are inherent in the policies. Both the societal treatment and language 
socialization approach can help to provide context for the language attitudes held by 
individuals. Although this is not my primary methodology, I used aspects of the societal 
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treatment to present and contextualize the linguistic situation in France and in the 
Maghreb in chapter three.  
The matched guise technique (MGT) was developed by Lambert et al. (1960) in 
an effort to indirectly access language attitudes. The MGT involves a participant listening 
to the same speaker reading the same paragraph in multiple languages, while being told 
that a different person is speaking each language. In this way, participants supposedly 
make judgments based solely on the language, not the speaker. Often ‘filler’ speakers are 
included in order to distract the participants from the similarity in voice quality 
(Bentahila, 1983). The chosen passage is emotionally neutral in order to minimize its 
effect on the respondents’ views of the speakers, although whether a text can truly be 
neutral is debatable. Typically, the respondent fills out a questionnaire regarding their 
attitudes to the ‘different’ speakers. The MGT has been expanded to assess not only 
attitudes toward different languages but also toward different accents, dialects and code 
switching (Bentahila, 1983; Zahn & Hopper, 1985; Garrett, 2010), often juxtaposing high 
and low-prestige varieties. In accent and dialect studies, the same speaker will ‘put on’ 
multiple accents (Garrett et al., 2003). The benefit of the MGT is that it allegedly 
accesses privately held beliefs about language without the participant being aware of it, 
thus tapping into covert, rather than overt, attitudes (Giles & Billings, 2004), while it has 
been argued that questionnaires can only access overt attitudes of which people are 
consciously aware (Garret et al., 2003; Giles & Billings, 2004; Garrett, 2010).  
There are, however, several drawbacks to the MGT. One is that it is not clear 
whether the attitudes of the listener is based on his or her own views on language or 
whether the speaker is expressing different aspects of his or her own identity when 
speaking in different languages, as suggested by Koven (2007). Koven had second-
generation female Portuguese immigrants in France tell un-scripted personal stories in 
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Portuguese and French to bilingual Portuguese-French listeners, in order to understand 
the fluid identity of bilinguals. She had the listeners describe the personality of the 
speaker when speaking in each language. Rather than examining language attitudes, she 
studied what ‘side’ of their identity these women express in each language and what the 
participants pick up on. This raises questions about the MGT because it indicates that it is 
not just a matter of the listener’s attitudes toward the language, but also the experiences 
that the speaker has had in each language and how their personality has developed 
differently within each. Therefore, the MGT may not be isolating language attitudes as 
thoroughly as has been thought.  
Further problems with the MGT include salience perception problems, accent 
authenticity and style authenticity (Garrett et al. 2003). MGTs that test attitudes toward 
accent rather than language, are questionable because it seems improbable that a single 
individual could successfully produce ten authentic accents, as described in Garrett 
(2010). They would inevitably begin to lose their authenticity, which would affect the 
listener’s reaction. Davies and Bentahila (2013) make two useful observations about the 
drawbacks of the MGT. The first is that MGTs create artificial situations in which people 
may give stereotyped answers and assess speakers in a way that they never would in a 
real-life scenario (p. 101). The second is the specific problem of attempting to do an 
MGT comparing Standard Arabic (SA) and dialectal Arabic, because while dialectal 
Arabic is spoken as a native language, SA is not. It is highly formal and would not sound 
like spontaneous speech. It would “evoke entirely different contexts and motives as well 
as possibly different personalities” (p. 100) reinforcing Koven’s (2007) participants’ 
comments about feeling like a “different person” in either of their two languages. For 
these reasons, I do not employ the MGT in my study. Despite the claims that the MGT is 
a better assessor of ‘true’ attitudes, there are serious problems with the methodology in 
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general, and more specific ones that would affect this study because of the languages in 
question.  
 
4.2 QUESTIONNAIRE METHODOLOGY  
In this section, I examine attitude survey methodology including a review of how 
surveys are designed and constructed, how the questions themselves are formed and what 
scales of measurement are used. I do this in order to present the rigor with which surveys 
can and ought to be constructed, and to contextualize my own methodology. According 
to Barker (1992), one of the greatest failings in language attitude studies is the rarity with 
which researchers make reference to previous research, particularly non-linguistic 
attitude theory. Without drawing on this research methodology researchers may repeat 
the methodological mistakes of the past, such as using non-scalar questions, or scales 
with uneven intervals, leading to results that are not accurate or clear. Not only do they 
spend unnecessary additional time recreating materials that are already available in the 
literature, such as format and question formation, they do so without understanding the 
nature of survey methodology and the study of attitudes. Unfortunately, many language 
attitudes researchers have done exactly this (see Galindo, 1996; Marley, 2004). These 
studies insufficiently reference previous language attitudes literature and attitudes 
surveys, and do very little in the way of introducing the construction of their surveys. To 
avoid such missteps, I will go into some detail discussing attitude assessment and survey 
construction. 
Oppenheim (1992) warns that an improperly designed survey can lead a 
researcher to draw conclusions about causality that are either inaccurate or only provide 
part of the picture. The function of a questionnaire is measurement; therefore, it is 
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necessary to know what is being measured by having an operational statement for each 
variable being tested and to know what type of instrument to use with it. Oppenheim 
emphasizes the need for a methodical process when designing a survey which includes 
the following: 1) identify general and specific aims (hypotheses), and statements of the 
variables, 2) write a literature review, 3) have a clear conceptualization of the study, 4) 
make design decisions, 5) identify hypotheses to pursue, 6) design the research 
instrument, 7) pilot the work, 8) make a decision about the sample, 9) select the 
participants, 10) do field work, 11) process the data (coding etc.), 12) do a statistical 
analysis, 13) test the hypotheses and 14) write the research report—i.e., draw whatever 
conclusions possible. Although it is easy to make generalizations based on surveys, if 
they are not well designed then conclusions drawn from them may not be valid. The 
above process is meant to break down the design in order to circumvent potential pitfalls, 
although Oppenheim does admit that depending on time and resources some of the steps 
may be omitted, including pilot work. I have used this list as a guideline for my own 
questionnaire methodology. 
4.2.1 Question Formation 
How a question is worded and formed is important for ensuring that participants 
are able successfully to complete the questionnaire and answer in a way that is sincere 
and honest (Baker, 1992; Oppenheim, 1992; Garrett, 2010). Questions that are loaded or 
prime the respondent to answer in a certain way must be avoided. Oppenheim (1992, p. 
128-30) gives a list of rules for question formation including: a) keep length under 20 
words, b) avoid double-barreled questions (two questions wrapped in one), double 
negatives and proverbs (which people may be unaware of), c) include “don’t know” or 
“not applicable,” response options, d) use simple words, e) be aware that people use 
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words differently and that some words are ambiguous, f) do not use leading questions or 
loaded words, and g) use an even number of positively and negatively worded answers. 
He also advises the researcher to give adequate instructions especially for a self-
administered questionnaire and to make the process attractive, with a consistent format. 
Many other researchers have expressed similar concerns (Garrett et al., 2003; Dillman, 
2008). It is important to keep in mind that attitudes are emotional and therefore questions 
should not be too rational or clinical and one should not shy away from creating exciting 
questions that discuss fears, hates, hopes, etc. (Oppenheim, 1992).  
Attitude surveys usually contain a section on background information including 
age, gender, birthplace, etc. Oppenheim (1992) notes that these factual questions may 
seem simple but are quite difficult to form and are subject to social desirability bias, 
although this is usually more of a risk for non-factual questions. It is necessary to use 
delicate wording in order to minimize how intrusive personal questions appear. 
Promising anonymity can help to mitigate these effects. The section on personal 
information should generally be given at the end of the survey because it may be off-
putting for participants to divulge personal information such as job, marriage, age, salary, 
etc., unless the survey is long and there is concern that some participants will not finish 
all of the materials, in which case it can be moved up. 
4.2.2 Types of Questions   
It is necessary to pay attention not just to the formation of the questions but also 
to the response possibilities (Oppenheim, 1992). There are two types of questions that 
can be constructed in a survey: open-ended and close-ended. Open-ended questions do 
not have a structured response field, so that the participants may answer the question in 
any way they choose. Close-ended questions offer only a limited number of possible 
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answers, such as yes/no, multiple choice or scalar responses (Agheysi & Fishman, 1970). 
Open-ended questions are more spontaneous and can give detailed insight into the 
attitudes of the participants; however, they are labor intensive and difficult to score and 
analyze. The response also may not really answer the question that was asked (Agheysi & 
Fishman, 1970; Oppenheim, 1992). Close-ended questions are less spontaneous and can 
lead to bias if formed poorly; but, they are time-efficient, do not require the participant to 
write extensively, are easier to analyze and are easier to compare between groups 
(Oppenheim, 1992). Language attitude researchers tend to use closed-ended questions 
because of the ease of administration and analysis, some using them exclusively (see 
Bourhis, 1983; Landry and Bourhis, 1997). However, most researchers opt to use a 
combination of closed and open-ended questions (Garrett et al., 2003), with an emphasis 
on the former.  
4.2.3 Scalar v. Non-Scalar Questions 
Close-ended questions can be either scalar or non-scalar. Most language attitude 
studies use scalar questions because of their nuance in capturing degree of attitudes, 
although some do a combination of both in order to approach a topic from multiple 
angles. Baker (1992) emphasizes the need for scalar responses rather than a single item in 
order to give the survey internal reliability, and Oppenheim (1992) has pointed out the 
insufficiency of binary questions and the importance of using scales because they are 
more objective, comparable and truly are measurements. Linear interval scales allow for 
statistical analysis because they employ the use of integers.  
The main type of scale used is the Lickert scale where participants are given a 
question or statement and asked to rate the degree to which they agree or disagree (Baker, 
1992). This technique allows for more specific questions about attitudes and 
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hypotheticals. An example from Baker (1992) is the phrase “Welsh is a language worth 
learning” (p. 141). The scale may be a 5, 6, or 7-point scale, depending on the researcher 
(Bourhis, 1983; Baker, 1992). Whether a scale should contain an even or odd number has 
been debated because there is doubt as to whether there can truly be a ‘neutral’ attitude 
that rests at a mid-point on the scale (Garrett, 2010). That said, most studies use either a 5 
or 7-point scale.  
Non-scalar questions in language attitude studies usually involve asking 
participants to either assign adjectives to a language or ask them which language is the 
most useful, modern etc. Bentahila (1983) gave participants 10 adjectives and asked 
participants to indicate which they associated with French, SA and Darija. He then asked 
them pointed questions such as “what language do you find the most beautiful?” (p. 31). 
These questions have a limited number of responses, and so are closed and quantitatively 
analyzable, but are not scalar. This is a methodology used across the language attitude 
field that makes studies easily comparable, and provides a general understanding of how 
languages are viewed and with what they are associated. 
4.2.4 Language of the Questionnaire 
For language attitude surveys of two or more languages it is important to consider 
the language of the survey materials and whether it should be made available in both. 
Several researchers have offered all or part of their materials in two languages, including 
Bentahila (1983), Chakrani (2010), Garrett et al. (2003), Garrett, et al. (2009) and Post 
(2015). Choosing which language to take the questionnaire in may be an important 
indicator of language attitudes, because it allows participants to express a preference. 
However, Garrett et al. (2003) found that the language in which their participants chose 
to take the questionnaire was reflected in the self-reports of language proficiency, 
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indicating that rather than measuring preference it may just measure proficiency, which is 
more easily assessed with direct questions in the questionnaire. It may also be impractical 
to offer the questionnaire in two languages when one language is not commonly written, 
like dialectal Arabic, or when a population has low levels of literacy in one of the two 
languages. Bentahila (1983) was only able to offer part of his survey in both French and 
Moroccan Arabic, because of “problems of translation and terminology” (Bentahila, 
1983, p. 30).  
Beyond practical concerns, there is a more profound reason for refraining from 
offering survey materials in two languages. The language in which a survey is taken may 
actually affect the attitudes of the participants. Richard and Toffoli (2009) compared 
responses to an attitudes survey taken in Greek and English by Greek-English bilinguals 
arguing that because “language is a carrier of values” (p. 997) participants are expected to 
respond differently in each language. They found a significant language effect and warn 
that this may be a problem for researchers carrying out studies on ethnic identity. Garrett 
et al. (2003) also noted that there was a difference in language attitudes between teachers 
who took a questionnaire in Welsh versus those who took it in English. Bentahila (1983) 
tested language and worldview by asking participants to complete a series of sentences 
both in French and in Arabic, and found very different results. The Arabic sentences 
often ended in reference to religion, family and cultural values, while French sentences 
did not. These studies bring into question whether the results of an attitude survey 
administered in two languages are really comparable. Therefore, for a reliable analysis, 
the researcher should control for language.  
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4.2.5 Drawbacks of Questionnaires 
There has been concern that language attitudes questionnaires may not 
sufficiently explore the complexity of attitudes (Giles et al., 1983) because they tap 
directly into overt language attitudes, rather than covert attitudes (Garrett et al. 2003; 
Giles & Billings, 2004; Garrett, 2010). They are thought to have a “high degree of 
obtrusiveness” (Garrett et al. 2003, p. 24) because of their direct nature. According to 
researchers such as Garrett (2010) and Giles and Billings (2004), the MGT is much better 
at accessing true language attitudes; however many authors who critique questionnaires 
in this manner then go on to use them, Garrett being an obvious example. He criticizes 
the “direct” approach (2003, 2010) and yet uses it as the sole methodology in his study of 
the Welsh diaspora (Garrett et al., 2009). If questionnaires are by nature “obtrusive,” then 
they should be insufficient without the MGT or other supplementary tools, and yet this is 
not the trend that has emerged in the field. 
Some argue that the ideal way to assess language attitudes is to use multiple 
methodologies: the MGT, questionnaires, interviews, focus groups, etc. (e.g. Bentahila, 
1983; Chakrani, 2010). However, few researchers within the field have discussed the use 
of multiple techniques within a questionnaire, for example, using varying question 
formats to target similar attitudes or by simply creating nuanced questions. Researchers 
have assumed that it is not possible to construct indirect and nuanced survey questions 
that access covert attitudes; however, the sentence completion task that Bentahila (1983) 
employs in studying worldview is highly nuanced and instructive about language 
attitudes. Stewart (2012) used a questionnaire to investigate the language attitudes of 
Parisians toward the speech used in the banlieues by asking them about where the best 
French can be learned, rather than where the best French is spoken. His methodology 
indirectly assessed language attitudes. He specifically designed it to get around the 
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apprehension of participants in a previous study toward expressing negative attitudes 
toward the language used in the banlieues (Stewart & Fagyal, 2005). These studies 
demonstrate that questionnaires can investigate covert attitudes and do not have to be 
blunt instruments.  
Survey questions can easily be poorly formed and prime the respondent to answer 
in a certain way or may contain multiple questions wrapped up in one (double-barreled 
questions) (Garrett et al., 2003). As discussed above, these problems can be avoided by 
careful construction of the questionnaire. Another drawback of written surveys is that it 
limits the pool of possible participants to those who are literate (although this would also 
be a problem with the MGT). Other problems with surveys include social acceptability, 
acquiescence bias, and characteristics of the researcher’s ethnicity, gender, age, SES, and 
language use affecting the way participants respond (see also Oppenheim, 1992; Baker, 
1992; Garrett, 2010). These concerns are valid whether one is using the MGT, a 
questionnaire or an interview. These drawbacks should not deter investigation of 
language attitudes via surveys; however, the researcher should take care to note the 
possible influence of these factors, and try to mitigate against them to the extent possible. 
One way to do this is to launch the study online and make the results anonymous.  
Online surveys have their own particular drawbacks. First, they are only able to 
attract participants who have Internet access and are comfortable using an online tool 
such as a survey. These participants may tend to have a higher socioeconomic level, 
although this is less and less the case as the prevalence of smart phones expands.32 
Second, the researcher is unable to monitor the participants while taking the survey. This 
                                                
32 As of 2012, 83% of French people were Internet users (had access to the Internet at home), ranking 10th 
in the world for access and usage (Internet Live Stats, 2014). The growth of low cost smartphones has 
grown in recent years, including from the French company Wiko, which offers smartphones for 70 Euros 
(Economist, 2014). In 2014, 49% of France was using a smart phone (On Device Research, 2014). 
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could lead to participants taking the survey while watching a movie or listening to music, 
which may result in them being distracted while answering or having these mediums 
influence their responses. They may also ask the opinions of others around them rather 
than answering for themselves. A third drawback is that, while the anonymity of the 
questionnaire may solve other problems, it makes it impossible to conduct follow up 
interviews with participants in order to clarify their answers or dig deeper into interesting 
results. To address this, researchers can provide room for participants to comment after 
each question.  
 
4.3 METHODOLOGY  
The questionnaire methodology reviewed above was taken into consideration in 
the construction of the survey used for this dissertation. In the following section, I review 
the methodology used for this project including the research questions that were posed, 
the research materials, the method of distribution of the survey, the target respondents, 
and the analysis of the data.  
4.3.1 Research Questions  
The goal of this dissertation is to examine the language attitudes as well as the 
cultural and religious attitudes of second-generation North Africans living in France and 
to explore whether and how these attitudes are related. In order to explore this I have 
constructed the following research questions to guide my investigation. For Research 
Questions 3-7 I include hypotheses, in order to motivate one-tailed statistical testing:  
RQ1. What traits or values do young second-generation North Africans associate 
with French, Standard Arabic, and Darija? 
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RQ2. What are the religious and cultural attitudes of this population? 
RQ3. Are positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic and Darija associated with 
positive attitudes toward Islam? 
Hypothesis: Based on the centuries old association of SA with Islam, it is 
expected that attitudes toward SA and attitudes toward Islam will be positively 
correlated. No predictions are made on the association of attitudes toward Islam 
and Darija.  
 
RQ4. How are attitudes toward Darija and French associated with attitudes 
toward the Maghreb? 
Hypothesis: Because Darija is the native language of many North Africans, it is 
predicted that attitudes toward Darija will be positively correlated with attitudes 
toward the Maghreb. There is no predicted direction of correlation for attitudes 
toward French and the Maghreb.  
 
RQ5. Are positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic and Darija associated with 
positive attitudes toward individuals from other Arab countries? 
Hypothesis: Based on SA’s role in the Arab nationalism movement, it is expected 
that attitudes toward SA and pan-Arab identity will be positively correlated. No 
predictions are made concerning the directionality of significance for Darija and 
pan-Arab identity.  
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RQ6. How are attitudes toward French and Darija associated with attitudes 
toward France? 
Based on the literature indicating that language attitudes are often substitutes for 
attitudes toward the culture most closely associated with that language, it is 
expected that attitudes toward French will be positively correlated with attitudes 
toward France. There are, however, no expected outcomes for the direction of 
correlations for attitudes toward Darija and France. 
 
RQ7. Are high levels of proficiency in a language predictive of positive attitudes 
toward that language and the culture associated with it? 
Hypothesis: Based on previous research that found links between proficiency and 
language attitudes (Baker, 1992; Coupland et al., 2006), it is expected that 
proficiency in a given language will be positively correlated with attitudes toward 
that language. Because of the association of cultural attitudes and language 
attitudes, and the link between language attitudes and proficiency, it is expected 
that proficiency in a language will be positively correlated with attitudes toward 
the culture most closely associated with that language. Therefore, it is predicted 
that a) proficiency in French will be positively correlated with attitudes toward 
French, b) proficiency in Darija will be positively correlated with attitudes toward 
the Maghreb and c) proficiency in SA will be positively correlated with attitudes 
toward the Maghreb (SA is associated with Maghreb as its national language).  
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4.3.2 Research Materials 
In order to study the language attitudes of the North African diaspora in France 
and answer the research questions presented above, I constructed an original language 
attitudes questionnaire that draws from the language attitudes literature including, but not 
limited to, Bentahila (1983), Baker (1992), Oppenheim (1992), Garrett et al. (2003), and 
Chakrani (2010). I followed the guidelines of the authors above in order to create clear 
and concise questions and avoid the pitfalls of questionnaires described earlier in this 
chapter. I used both closed and open-ended questions: the close-ended questions are 
mostly scalar and allow for more easily analyzable data while the open-ended questions 
provide insight into the thoughts and views of the participants toward language and 
culture outside of the statistical analysis. The scalar questions are also able to truly 
measure attitudes (Oppenheim, 1992), which is preferable to questions where participants 
are simply asked yes/no questions. Questions were carefully constructed in order to avoid 
confusing, leading, or double-barreled questions. In addition, attitudes were measured in 
more than one format in order to capture more nuanced responses. For example, rather 
than only having participants select adjectives that they associate with a given language, 
they were also asked statement agreement questions to assess their attitudes. Finally, the 
order of the sections of the survey was carefully selected in order to ensure that the most 
critical sections were at the beginning in case of participation drop-off. The survey was 
reviewed by the Office of Survey Research at the University of Texas at Austin. 
The questionnaire was made up of the following six sections presented in the 
order in which they appeared:33 
 
1. Language proficiency  
                                                
33 The complete survey can be found in Appendices A and B. 
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2. Traditional language attitudes  
3. Attitudes toward language, religion and nationality (close-ended) 
4. Personal Information 
5. Attitudes toward language, religion, and nationality (open-ended) 
6. Language Use 
 
In the first section, the participants were asked to rate how well they speak and 
understand French, Standard Arabic, Darija and Tamazight on a scale of one to five 
where one equals ‘not at all’ and five equals ‘perfectly.’ I included Tamazight in case 
some participants had a parent who was of Berber descent, which could produce an 
interesting follow up analysis. I chose not to ask about reading and writing in order to 
keep the survey as short as possible and because I am more concerned with the languages 
that they use in daily interactions with people. It should be noted that this is a limited 
evaluation of proficiency that is based on participants’ own self-assessments. There is 
some debate about whether or not individuals are able to assess accurately their own 
proficiency. MacIntyre, Noels and Clément (1997), for example, found that participants 
who expressed anxiety about language performance tended to underestimate their level of 
proficiency while less anxious participants overestimated their proficiency. However, it is 
notable that Garrett et al. (2003) found that the language in which their participants chose 
to take a language attitudes questionnaire was reflected in their self-reports of language 
proficiency, indicating that self-assessment can sometimes be a helpful indicator of actual 
proficiency.  
The second section contained more traditional language attitude questions drawn 
from previous studies (see Bentahila, 1983). The participants were given a list of 29 
adjectives and were asked to check as many as they felt applied to French, SA and Darija 
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(each language was presented separately). After being prompted for each language, 
participants were given the option to comment. I selected ten of these adjectives for the 
next set of questions where the participants were asked which language was the most, for 
example, beautiful. Of the ten adjectives, six were deemed positive (beautiful, moral, 
modern, cool, practical and fun), three were neutral (religious, traditional and modest), 
and one was negative (boring). Given that not all of the adjectives listed in the selection 
task could be included, these ten were chosen because they were considered the most 
informative and the most important, despite not making up an equal number of 
positive/negative adjectives. Fun and cool indicate solidarity language attitudes, while 
modern and practical indicate instrumental language attitudes. Religious and traditional 
pertain to the research questions on religious and national attitudes. Relatedly, moral and 
modest were used because of their associations with religion. Boring and beautiful 
indicate positive and negative prestige. Some of these adjectives were also chosen based 
on the superlative adjectives used in Bentahila’s (1983) study in Morocco for the sake 
comparability. Participants were allowed to select French, SA or Darija. After each 
superlative adjective question participants were again given the option to comment on 
their choice. The goal of this section is to understand the attitudes of participants toward 
each language in a format that is comparable to other language attitudes studies that have 
been performed in North Africa. In the second section, participants were also asked what 
language they considered their ‘own’ language and why, following the methodology of 
Davies and Bentahila (1989). Participants were allowed to choose from French, SA, 
Darija and Tamazight and were given space to comment.  
The third section was made up of a series of nineteen statements having to do 
with religion, North African identity, French identity, pan-Arab identity and language, for 
example, “I prefer to marry someone who speaks Darija.” Participants were asked to rate 
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their degree of agreement for each statement on a one to five scale where one equals 
“completely disagree” and five equals “completely agree.” They were provided room to 
comment at the end of this section. The goal of this section is to understand in more detail 
how the participants view religion, national identity, and language. Simply asking, “are 
you a practicing Muslim/Christian/Jew?” would provide less nuance than a scalar 
question stating, “religion should be a part of children’s education.” Furthermore, by 
asking multiple questions about each topic a fuller picture of the attitudes of the 
participants can be obtained.  
The fourth section presented questions on background information, mostly in the 
form of close-ended questions with multiple-choice answer options. I asked about where 
they live, where they were born, level of education, what line of work they and their 
parents are in, whether they were married, with whom they lived, as well as several other 
questions.  
The fifth section, similar to the third, is aimed at capturing a more nuanced report 
of the views of the respondents toward life, culture, religion and national identity, 
although this section was made up of open-ended questions. Participants were asked to 
complete a series of sentences in any way that they wanted to. For example, “A good 
Muslim speaks…” Sixteen sentences were presented to the participants in this way. In the 
results and discussion chapters, I will only discuss the results from this section in so far 
as they a) reflect attitudes toward language, religion or national identity or b) shed light 
on the responses to the close-ended questions from the other sections. Therefore, not all 
of the sixteen sentences will be discussed. 
The sixth and final section was on language use. Respondents were asked a series 
of scalar questions about how often they use French, Darija or a mixture of French and 
Darija in various settings and with various people, as well as for doing and 
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communicating certain things. However, this data will not be discussed in this current 
analysis for two reasons. First, the original purpose of looking at usage was to compare 
between genders. As was discussed in the introduction, a gender comparison was not 
possible, making an examination of usage less of a priority for the current study. Second, 
due to the length of the survey, and the placement of this section at the end, many 
participants did not reach it. The language use section was deemed the lowest priority and 
was put at the end in anticipation of a low completion rate. A more thorough piloting 
process before launching the survey may have helped to avoid this problem in one of the 
following two ways: a) moving the section toward the first half of the survey, or b) 
shortening the survey overall. Moving the language use section toward the first half 
would have meant de-prioritizing other more important sections on language and cultural 
attitudes. In future surveys, I will be more sensitive to the length of the survey in order to 
improve the chance of participants completing all sections.  
The survey was written in French and proofread by two native French speakers to 
ensure authenticity. The survey was administered in French, rather than SA or Darija 
because most participants would not have been literate enough in SA to take it in that 
language. Even if I had found participants who were literate in SA, it would be a self-
selected group who may already have had relatively positive attitudes toward SA because 
they had chosen to study it. It would also not have been feasible to administer the survey 
in Darija because it is a language that is primarily transmitted in the diaspora verbally 
from one generation to the next and does not have a standardized written form that would 
have been accessible to all participants. Even if some participants could read and write in 
the language, many would not, which would have significantly narrowed my participant 
pool. It was further deemed preferable to offer it in only one language because of 
concerns that surveys done in different languages are not comparable because the 
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language in which participants take the survey affects how they respond (Richard & 
Toffoli, 2009). 
The survey was made completely anonymous in order to reduce the risk of 
researcher bias, where the participant responds in the way they think the researcher would 
prefer. Although the participants still could have answered in a way they think would be 
acceptable to a researcher from the US, it minimized this risk. The anonymity also 
allowed for more freedom on the part of the participants to respond honestly without any 
chance of their identity being detected. This was especially important given that the 
survey asks questions about religious and cultural views, something not usually done in 
France.  
The survey was designed to last between twenty to thirty minutes, a length that 
may have discouraged completion of the survey. Because this is the primary data for a 
dissertation it was deemed preferable at the time of construction to ask more questions at 
the risk of receiving fewer completed responses. I therefore had anticipated a high drop 
out rate for the survey, not only because of the length, but because this often occurs for 
surveys (personal communication from the Office of Survey Research at the University 
of Texas at Austin). For this reason, I structured the survey to have the most important 
questions at the beginning, so that if participants quit, I would still get responses to the 
most desired questions, those specifically targeting language and cultural attitudes. 
Ideally, of course, the survey would be a length that would encourage a high rate of 
completion. The survey was given to a colleague who shares a similar profile with the 
target population for the study in order review the materials. She provided feedback for 
both content and flow of the questionnaire. 
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4.3.3 Distribution of the Survey 
The questionnaire was administered online via the survey software Qualtrics from 
September 2014 to March 2015, with all but three people responding between September 
and December 2014. The target population has access to technology and media in a way 
that no other generation before them has, which makes an online distribution not only 
feasible but also preferable because it expands the pool of participants one can access. 
The online format was also useful because I wanted the survey to ‘snowball’ and get 
passed on from person to person. In order to facilitate this, I created an online flyer that 
could easily be pasted into an email or posted to social media. The flyer explained the 
goal of the survey and the profile for the participants I was targeting and included the link 
to the actual survey. They flyer can be found in Appendix C. 
The flyer was also meant to motivate people to want to participate in the survey. 
Oppenheim (1992) suggests that in order to do this it is necessary for participants to feel 
like they are contributing to something important and meaningful. They also need to 
understand how they are helping the researcher. I described to potential participants how 
this project was meant to give a voice to a population in France that is often under-
studied and is in need of representation. I also explained that their participation would not 
only contribute to a better understanding of languages in general, but specifically of their 
language(s), in order to give them a sense of ownership and of duty in helping in this 
exploration. I made sure to include that they would be helping a doctoral student, in the 
hopes that this would cause them to sympathize with my position and engage the survey. 
The text of the flyer was proofread by a native French speaker to ensure authenticity 
before distribution.  
I used a number of methods in order to find participants for the survey. I began by 
reaching out to sociolinguists who specialize in working in France particularly in the 
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banlieues with the second and third-generation North African population. I emailed 
individual researchers as well as circulated the flyer on two list serves: Paris Linguists 
and Réseau Francophone de Sociolinguistique. This method did not produce any results 
so an alternate strategy was engaged. I found groups on the social media site, Facebook, 
with names that indicated their members would fit the profile of my target participants, 
such as “les musulmans de Montpellier” or “communauté algérienne en France.” I 
targeted religious and secular groups equally in order to avoid only recruiting participants 
who identified with Islam, given that religion and language is one of the main 
interactions explored in this study. I emailed the administrators of these groups, explained 
my research to them, and asked them to repost the link to the flyer on their site. Many of 
the administrators were excited about the work I was doing and were very willing to 
share the link on their group’s page. Their endorsement of the survey certainly helped to 
encourage members of these groups to read the flyer and begin the survey. I would 
suggest to the group administrators that they post the link to the flyer with a caption 
saying some variation of: 
 
Voulez-vous répondre à un sondage pour aider à une meilleure compréhension 
des attitudes envers l’arabe et le français? Si oui, cliquez sur le lien pour en savoir 
plus !  
(Would you like to take a survey to contribute to a better understanding of 
attitudes toward Arabic and French? If so, click on the link to find out more!) 
 
I also contacted a number of Mosques and secular community centers located in 
neighborhoods with historically high numbers of North African families as well as in 
major metropolises. By using these methods to find participants I was trying to avoid 
only getting participants who were highly educated, and instead find people from 
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different socio-economic levels. Based on responses to the question about how they heard 
about the survey, the social media campaign was the most successful method for getting 
respondents.  
There are, of course, drawbacks to canvassing for participants on social media. 
One of these is that there may be unforeseen consequences to reaching out to the 
administrators of Facebook groups. Because I was messaging Facebook members with 
whom I was not friends, sometimes multiple people per day, Facebook was alerted and 
they shut down my ability to message users who were not my friends for one month. I 
changed tactics and began friend requesting the administrators before messaging them. I 
eventually received notification from Facebook that I should only be messaging people 
whom I knew in real life. This was an unanticipated speed bump in my data collection. In 
the future, researchers should start well in advance of launching the survey to begin 
fostering an online presence that would encourage natural interaction with the target 
population and with people who might know members of the target population. Another 
drawback of canvassing on social media sites in the manner that I did is that the people 
participating in these groups may already identify with North African or Muslim identity 
given that they are going out of their way to associate with other people with similar 
backgrounds on this medium.  
4.3.4 Respondents 
The target population for this study was the ‘new’ second generation of North 
African Arabophone immigrants in France. Because of the very different linguistic 
histories of Arabic and Berber-speaking North Africans, and because I am studying 
attitudes toward French and Arabic, but not Berber, I tried to limit my research to Arabic 
speakers to the extent possible. They also have a different history of immigration in 
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France because of their different ethnolinguistic heritage. Berber-speakers in France do 
need to be studied, but it was outside of the scope of the current project to try to find an 
even number of Arabic and Berber speakers. Despite this attempt to focus on 
Arabophones, it is very likely that Berber-Arabic bilinguals will respond to the survey, 
which is why Berber was included in discussions of previous literature and history in 
Chapters 2 and 3. 
With every wave of immigration from the Maghreb there is a new first generation 
of immigrants, and subsequently, when they have children, a new second generation. 
There are, therefore, multiple second generations living in France. My research is focused 
on the population of second-generation North Africans who are between the ages of 18 
and 30. These are the most recent wave of the second generation who has reached 
maturity. They are voters and in the work force and represent the contemporary North 
African voice in France. It is important to understand how this group views themselves 
and their position linguistically vis-à-vis the French state and French cultural patrimony 
because it can act as a sort of litmus test of the relationship between France and the 
descendants of its former colonies. In order to target this group, I advertised for people 
ages 18 to 30 who were born in France, but whose parents were born in North Africa and 
were Arabic speakers.  
Most studies on language attitudes, especially those in the Maghreb, have 
collected data from highly educated individuals (Chakrani, 2010; Benrabah, 2007), 
because this is a population who is guaranteed to be literate, is easy to contact and is 
easier to convince to participate in a study. Researchers are more likely to have contacts 
at universities, which allows for access to students and which provides institutional 
credibility to the researcher. Unfortunately, this means that only a slice of the population 
gets studied because those with a university education are literate and tend to belong to a 
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higher SES, or if they did not upon entering school, they most likely will after receiving 
their degree.  
For these reasons, I tried to collect data from participants from a range of SES 
levels, by not going through the university to find participants. However, I was unable to 
avoid focusing exclusively on the literate population because of the nature of written 
surveys. Doing oral interviews was not considered an acceptable alternative out of 
concerns of interviewer bias. Because I am investigating the attitudes of a highly 
marginalized population that is predominantly ethnically Arab and of Muslim heritage, 
my position as a white Western woman could cause problems were I to interact with 
them in a face to face manner. I was concerned that participants would either have been 
too timid to meet me and answer questions openly, a problem that Killian (2006) 
encountered, or that they would have answered questions according to what they thought 
I viewed as socially acceptable in terms of the majority French culture.  
 
4.4 ANALYSIS OF DATA 
The data from the survey was analyzed in three ways. The first was to gather the 
percentages of responses to questions about language proficiency from section one of the 
survey, language attitudes from section two and responses to scalar questions on cultural 
and religious identity from section three. This is the primary method of analysis used in 
most language attitude surveys (Bentahila, 1983; Chakrani, 2010; Benrabah, 2007). 
Following this procedure allows for comparison between studies and also provides a 
basic understanding of how languages are viewed by the population being studied.  
The second method of analysis was to examine the qualitative open-ended 
sentence completion questions from section five and the comments from throughout the 
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survey in order to look for trends in responses, particularly those that refer to religion, 
language, North African identity or attitudes toward France. I also looked for responses 
that could shed light on the quantitative answers from the rest of the survey.  
The third method of analysis was to run correlations to look at the relationships 
between a) religious attitudes and language attitudes, b) national identity and language 
attitudes, and c) proficiency and language attitudes. I used a Pearson’s product moment 
correlation to run the correlations. Analysis of the data in sections one and three was 
straightforward because the majority of questions were either scalar or multiple-choice. 
However, in order to analyze the questions from section two, where participants were 
asked to select adjectives to describe each language, the responses needed to be coded as 
either positive or negative, as seen in Table 4.1. Not all of the adjectives were used in the 
dichotomy because they did not always fit. For example, ‘religious’ may be a positive 
attribute to one person but a negative one to someone else, depending on whether they 
themselves are religious. In addition to the adjectives with which I provided the 
participants, they sometimes wrote in their own. When possible I assigned these as 
positive or negative as well. It could be argued that the decision of which adjectives were 
deemed positive/negative is arbitrary; however, for the most part the dichotomy is clear. 
This methodology follows in the language attitude tradition of categorizing responses 
into different domains for the purpose of analysis, such as solidarity traits versus status 
traits (Bentahila, 1983; Chakrani 2010). In this way the analysis can be more nuanced, 
and go beyond raw percentages of responses. Of course, when making these decisions 
there is a certain amount of risk of subjectivity that must be accepted. 
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Table 4.1 Adjective Selection Coding 
POSITIVE NEGATIVE 
Practical Dead 
Moral  Not useful 
Rich  Obsolete  
Flexible  Close minded 
Beautiful Boring  
Modern  Ugly  
Alive Impolite  
Necessary Absurd  
Prestigious  Poor  
Cool  Severe  
Proud  
Educated  




The relationship between religious attitudes and language attitudes was tested by 
running correlations between the scalar responses to statement agreement questions about 
religion with a) the scalar responses to statement agreement questions about language, 
and b) the number of positive and negative adjectives selected to describe each language. 
To test the relationship between national identity and language attitudes, I similarly ran 
correlations between the scalar responses to statements about France, the Maghreb and 
pan-Arab identity with the scalar responses to statements about language as well as the 
number of positive and negative adjectives selected to describe each language. The same 
method was again used when testing the relationship between proficiency and language 
attitudes. One-tailed tests were used for correlations for which there was a hypothesis on 
the direction of significance. These hypotheses were stated with the relevant research 
question. Two-tailed tests were used for the correlations for which there were no 
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hypotheses concerning direction of significance. Two-tailed tests are indicated with an 
asterisk next to the p-value.  
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
In the language attitudes field there are multiple ways of assessing attitudes 
including interviews, the MGT, societal treatment studies and questionnaires. Each 
method has its own specific goal in terms of prioritizing certain aspects of language 
attitudes, as well as its own benefits and drawbacks. For the purpose of this study, 
questionnaires were the most appropriate given my status as a Western woman and the 
anonymity that an online questionnaire could provide to participants being asked 
sensitive questions about religion and national identity at a time when tensions are 
running high in France. The survey was carefully constructed using previous language 
attitudes studies as a source and guide. It was then distributed via social media to groups 
that identified as part of the North African diaspora in France, both secular and religious.  
The data was analyzed 1) in terms of raw numbers and percentages, 2) qualitatively, and 
3) by running correlations. In the next chapter, I discuss the response rates and the 






In the previous chapter, I reviewed the types of methodology commonly used in 
the assessment of language attitudes and motivated my choice to use a questionnaire. I 
presented my methodology, including participant selection, questionnaire design, data 
collection and analysis. In this chapter, I present the results from the questionnaire, 
including the background information of the participants, the raw data from the questions 
on language attitudes, culture and religion, and the results of the correlations. Where 
appropriate and illustrative I make reference to the comments left by participants or to the 
qualitative responses from section five. The results of the questionnaire are presented 
according to each of the research questions that are repeated below for convenience.  
RQ1. What traits or values do young second-generation North Africans associate 
with French, Standard Arabic, and Darija? 
RQ2. What are the religious and cultural attitudes of this population? 
RQ3. Are positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic and Darija associated with 
positive attitudes toward Islam? 
RQ4. How are attitudes toward Darija and French associated with attitudes 
toward the Maghreb? 
RQ5. Are positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic and Darija associated with 
positive attitudes toward individuals from other Arab countries? 
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RQ6. How are attitudes toward French and Darija associated with attitudes 
toward France? 
RQ7. Are high levels of proficiency in a language predictive of positive attitudes 
toward that language and the culture associated with it? 
5.1 PARTICIPANTS 
A total of 119 people opened the link to the survey. Out of these 119 respondents, 
48 (40%) completed the survey up through section three.34 By section four, the 
background section, participants begin to drop out, with an acceleration in dropout in 
section five, which consisted of open-ended questions. A 40% completion rate was not 
unexpected, given the length of the survey. Participants who completed the survey took 
between 20 minutes to an hour and a half to complete it, although the majority took 
between 20 and 40 minutes. It is not clear whether those who took an hour or longer were 
actually engaged in the survey the entire time, or whether they left their computer and 
came back to it later.  
The goal was to find a balanced number of male and female participants in order 
to have an accurate and generalizable picture of the language attitudes of the second-
generation North African population in France. It was also desirable so that I could look 
for correlations between attitudes and gender, given that women may have more positive 
views toward French because of its association with the material freedom available to 
women in France as compared to the Maghreb. Unfortunately, out of the 48 participants 
who completed the survey through section four, only five were male, making a gender 
comparison impossible. The male respondents were, therefore, eliminated from the 
                                                
34 These participants sometimes skipped individual questions. The reason for this is unclear but will 
contribute to varying total response numbers in the data. 
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correlations in order to make the results from these analyses cleaner. I will be able to 
draw clearer conclusions if the correlations are done solely on the female participants, 
rather than on a group of mostly women where I would not be able to make inferences 
about women in the North African diaspora in France in general.  
In addition to the 48 people who completed sections one through four, 17 people 
answered only portions of these sections. While these additional participants are not 
included in the correlations because their response pattern was erratic, they are included 
in all tables showing the raw responses for questions from sections one, two, three and 
four. The five male participants were also included in these tallies. For these reasons, the 
tables for raw percentages will vary in number of participants. The correlations will have 
between 39 and 43 participants because participants skipped some questions.  
5.1.1 Background of Participants 
All but 4 of the 48 participants who reached the background section were born in 
France. These four participants, who were born in North Africa, were included in the 
analysis not only because of the low number of participant responses overall, but also 
because it was not clear at what age they came to France. They rated themselves as 
highly proficient in both French and Darija, indicating that they either began learning 
French early in North Africa before coming to France, or that they came to France as 
young children and learned French through the French education system and with friends. 
Rumbaut (2002) defines people who immigrate before the age of 18 as members of the 
“1.5-generation,” because they are neither fully part of the first generation nor the second. 
Thirty-nine participants stated that their parents were born in the Maghreb (Table 5.1). Of 
the five who selected ‘other,’ two left comments explaining that one parent was born in 
the Maghreb and one in France. Four participants selected ‘France’ as the place of their 
 174 
parents’ birth. The average age of respondents was 25. Because of low completion rates I 
accepted one 33 year old.  
Table 5.1 Parents’ Place of Birth 
ANSWER RESPONSE % 
France 4 8% 
Algeria 17 35% 
Morocco 15 31% 
Tunisia 7 15% 
Other* 5 10% 
Total 48 100% 
 
*OTHER: 
Algeria and Morocco 
France/Tunisia 
My father in Tunisia and my mother in 
France.  
 
When asked what city they reside in (Table 5.2), the majority of respondents 
reported living in either the Lyon or the Montpellier areas. Only two came from Marseille 
and four from the Paris area. The other nine lived in different cities throughout France, 
with one living in Spain. 
     Table 5.2 City of Residence 
CITY NUMBER 
Lyon (and surroundings) 16 
Marseille  2 
Montpellier (and surroundings) 15 
Paris (and surroundings) 4 
Other: 9 
Total 46 
Participants were also asked with whom they live (Table 5.3). Fifty percent said 
that they reside with their parents, although it is not clear if they have not yet moved out 
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or whether their parents have come to stay with them and their family.35 Of those who did 
not report that they lived with their parents, the majority live with their spouse.  
Table 5.3 With Whom Participants Live 
ANSWER RESPONSE % 
My parents 24 50% 
My Spouse 15 31% 
My Friend(s) 2 4% 
My Grandparents 0 0% 
Alone 5 10% 
My Friend/Girlfriend 1 2% 
My children 1 2% 
Total 48 100% 
 
Participants were also asked whether and how often they go back to the Maghreb 
to visit family (Table 5.4). This was done in order to understand how strong their ties are 
with their parents’ country of origin. Only one participant reported never going to North 
Africa. Forty-seven percent said that they go less than once a year and 51% said that they 
go one time a year or more. Of those who reported visiting the Maghreb, the majority 
reported that they speak Darija while visiting there, with French coming in second (Table 
5.5). Five participants reported speaking Tamazight while in North Africa indicating that 
some of the participants may have at least one parent of Berber origin or that they are 
visiting an area where Berber is often spoken. The reported frequency with which family 
from the Maghreb visits the participants in France is much lower than visits to the 
Maghreb (Table 5.6). Sixty-three percent said members of their family who live in the 
Maghreb never visit France. Only 22% said that family comes once or more per year. 
  
                                                
35 This is consistent with a 2011 poll that found that 48% of young people ages 18-29 living in European 
Union member states lived with their parents, or the parents of their spouse (Eurofound, 2014). 
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Table 5.4 Frequency of Visiting the Maghreb 
ANSWER RESPONSE % 
Never 1 2% 
Less than once a year 22 47% 
Once a year 14 30% 
More than once a year 10 21% 
Total 47 100% 
Table 5.5 Language(s) Spoken When in the Maghreb 
ANSWER RESPONSE % 
French 13 27% 
Dialectal Arabic (Darija) 29 60% 
Standard Arabic 1 2% 
Tamazight 5 10% 
Total 48 100% 
 
Table 5.6 Frequency of Family Visiting from the Maghreb 
ANSWER RESPONSE % 
Never 29 63% 
Less than once a year 7 15% 
Once a year 6 13% 
More than once a year 4 9% 
Total 46 100% 
 
The majority of participants (61%) said that they are neither married nor engaged 
(Table 5.7). This is consistent with data from the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe that found that the average age of first marriage for men and women in France 
in 2010 was 30 and 31.8, respectively. Of those who are married or engaged, 42% said 
that their spouse/fiancé was born in North Africa and 47% said that he/she was born in 




Table 5.7 Number of Participants Married or Engaged 
ANSWER RESPONSE % 
Married/Engaged 19 39% 
Not Married/Engaged 30 61% 
Total 49 100% 
Table 5.8 Spouse or Fiancé’s Place of Birth 
ANSWER RESPONSE % 
France 9 47% 
North Africa 8 42% 
England 0 0% 
Spain 0 0% 
Netherlands 0 0% 
Other 2 11% 
Total 19 100% 
 
Participants were also asked whether they were religious, and if so, what religion 
they belonged to. As displayed in Table 5.9, only 1 of the 48 participants who reached 
this portion of the survey claimed not to be religious. Of the 47 who are religious, 45 
participants identified religiously with Islam. The two who did not, identified as 
Christian. 
 
Table 5.9 Religious Identity of Participants 
ANSWER RESPONSE (CHRISTIAN) (MUSLIM) % 
Religious 47 (2) (45) 98% 
Not 
Religious 1 - - 2% 
Total 48 - - 100% 
 
The results for years of schooling for the 48 participants who completed the 
background section of the survey can be seen in Table 5.10. Although there are some 
 178 
individuals who are highly educated (19% had their master’s degree), there are also 
several who have not gone beyond high school (19%). It is important to note that many of 
the participants were between ages 18 and 22, and may still have been in the process of 
completing their education at the time of taking the survey. Therefore, this data does not 
necessarily indicate the highest level of education they will attain. 
Table 5.10 Years of Schooling 
ANSWER RESPONSE % 
Middle School 1 2% 
High School 9 19% 
Some years in College 10 21% 
College Degree 19 40% 
Masters Degree 9 19% 
Doctorate 0 0% 
Total 48 100% 
 
Forty percent of respondents were currently students when they took the survey 
(Table 5.11). This is unsurprising given that 33% of participants were between ages 18 
and 22, and that the average age of university students in France is 21.5 (Rey-Lefebvre, 
2011). The rest of the participants are somewhat distributed in terms of occupation, 
although there are none who worked as doctors, engineers or in computer science, jobs 
that would indicate being on the high end of the SES spectrum in France. However, there 
were three people who reported being in middle management positions, and one who is a 
translator and professional writer.   
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Table 5.11 Employment of Participant 
ANSWER RESPONSE % 
Student 19 40% 
Computer Science 0 0% 
Medicine 0 0% 
Engineering 0 0% 
Education 2 4% 
Manual Labor 2 4% 
Executive/Middle Management 3 6% 
Homemaker 4 8% 
Bureaucrat 5 10% 
Unemployed 4 8% 
Other* 9 19% 




Skilled shipping worker 
Office worker 
Translator, professional writer 




Participants were also asked about their father and mother’s employment, the 
results of which can be seen in tables 5.12 and 5.13 respectively. More than 50% of 
participants said their fathers worked in blue-collar jobs or were out of work. None had 
fathers who were doctors or engineers or were in education. Fifty-two percent of 
participants’ mothers were homemakers. For families where the mother also worked, 
most worked in childcare and house cleaning, although one did work in computer 
science. 
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Table 5.12 Father’s Employment 
ANSWER RESPONSE % 
Education 0 0% 
Computer Science 0 0% 
Medicine 1 2% 
Engineering 1 2% 
Manual Labor 25 52% 
Executive/Middle Management 3 6% 
Homemaker 0 0% 
Bureaucrat 3 6% 
Unemployed 2 4% 
Other* 13 27% 











Social worker specializing in social integration and 






Table 5.13 Mother’s Employment 
ANSWER RESPONSE % 
Education 2 4% 
Computer Science 1 2% 
Medicine 0 0% 
Engineering 0 0% 
Manual Labor 4 8% 
Executive/Middle Management 2 4% 
Homemaker 25 52% 
Bureaucrat 4 8% 
Unemployed 2 4% 
Other* 8 17% 












The results for languages spoken can be seen in Table 5.14. Participants were 
allowed to choose as many responses as they wanted. Seventy-five percent claim to know 
Darija, and a surprisingly high number of participants claimed to speak Standard Arabic 
(35%). Forty-two percent of participants said they speak other languages in addition to 
those listed, generally English and/or Spanish. Despite my efforts to avoid Berber 
speakers, several participants did claim some proficiency in Berber in addition to other 
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languages (10 out of 48). These participants were included in the analysis because they 
may have been the children of one Berber and one Arabic speaking parent. One notable 
anomaly is that only 47 of the 48 participants included in this table claim to speak 
French. Clearly the one participant who claimed not to speak French was able to take the 
survey, leading me to conclude that a) she assumed that it was a given that she speaks 
French and that I was asking what other languages she speaks, b) it was just an accident 
that she did not select it, or c) someone was with her translating the survey for her. In any 
case, she was able to complete the survey.  
 
Table 5.14 Languages Spoken by Participants 
ANSWER RESPONSE % 
French 47 98% 
Darija 36 75% 
Standard Arabic 17 35% 
Tamazight 10 21% 
Other 20 42% 
 
Participants were asked to rate themselves on a scale of one to five in how well 
they speak and understand French, Darija, Standard Arabic (SA) and Tamazight, as seen 
in Tables 5.15 and 5.16. The mean for speaking and understanding French was very high 
(4.61 and 4.87, respectively), which is not surprising given that these students were, for 
the most part, raised in France and went through the French school system. The second 
most spoken and understood language of the participants is Darija (3.26 and 3.67 
respectively), followed by SA and then Tamazight. A moderate to low level of 
knowledge of SA is reported, which is unsurprising given that language classes are 
available in some Mosques and universities, although it is not as prevalent or available as 
 183 
it is in North Africa. It is worth noting that the responses range from 65 to 68 total 
participants for these questions. It is not clear why a participant would rate their 
proficiency in French and Darija, but not in Standard Arabic and Tamazight. It is possible 
that these participants either did not understand the format, or did not rate themselves in 
the languages that they do not speak/understand.  
Of the four participants whose parents were born in France, all rated themselves at 
high levels of comprehension of Darija. For speaking Darija, two responded well or 
perfectly, and the other two responded not at all or not well. This indicates that having 
parents born in France does not necessarily imply low proficiency in Darija. 











WELL PERFECTLY TOTAL RESPONSES 
French 1 0 2 18 46 67 
Darija 10 14 10 16 18 68 
SA 31 15 7 9 3 65 















WELL PERFECTLY TOTAL RESPONSES 
French 1 0 0 5 61 67 
Darija 7 11 6 16 27 67 
SA 19 21 14 9 4 67 
Tamazight 43 5 6 5 7 66 
 
5.2 RESULTS 
The results of the survey will be presented based on how they pertain to each of 
the seven research questions. Any additional findings are reported at the end of this 
section.  
5.2.1 Language Attitudes 
The first results that I present are those pertaining to the first research question, 
which concerns basic language attitudes: 
 
RQ1. What traits or values do young second-generation North Africans associate 
with French, Standard Arabic, and Darija? 
 
The results in this section come from questions from sections two and three of the 
survey and include all participants who completed each question. This number ranges 
from the 44 to 66. In Table 5.17 the results from the question “what language do you 
consider your ‘own’ language” are presented. The majority of participants chose French 
as their own language (73%); however, some also chose Darija (20%). Based on the 
follow up question of ‘why,’ most participants appear to have chosen their ‘own’ 
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language based on the language that they know the best, which for these participants was 
French. However, for those who chose Darija, the reasons given had more to do with 
family, identity, and their origins, rather than proficiency. These results, and the 
comments that participants left, will be considered in more detail in the discussion 
chapter.  
 
Table 5.17 Participant’s ‘Own’ Language 
ANSWER RESPONSE % 
French 48 73% 
Tamazight 3 5% 
SA 2 3% 
Darija 13 20% 
Total 66 100% 
 
Tables 5.18-20 display the results from the adjective selection task for French, 
Standard Arabic and Darija respectively. Participants were allowed to choose as many 
adjectives as they wanted and were also given room to leave comments. French is most 
widely seen as necessary (52%), rich (43%), and practical (43%), all fairly perfunctory 
adjectives, in the sense that the language is necessary and practical for daily life in 
France. French was also described as educated (29%), not surprising given that it is the 
language of education in France, as well as alive (29%), and beautiful (29%). There were 
only four comments concerning this task, some of which indicated confusion about how 
adjectives could be applied to a language.36 Some of the additional adjectives that were 
selected to describe French included useful, stupid, arrogant, and difficult.  
                                                
36 In a future study, this confusion could be mitigated by instructing participants to answer the question like 
a free association talk, indicating that I would like them to assign adjectives that they associate with the 
language, rather than adjectives that describe the language, given that languages do not have inherent 
qualities. 
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Most of the responses for Standard Arabic were positive (Table 5.19). Seventy-
one percent of participants chose religious, 68% found it to be beautiful, and 57% viewed 
it as rich, all of which follows from the strong relationship between SA and Islam and the 
centuries of accompanying language ideology. Other adjectives that were selected by 
over 40% of participants were interesting (48%), necessary (43%), traditional (43%) and 
prestigious (41%), overall a very positive view of the language.  
The top three adjectives selected for Darija were practical (61%), traditional 
(52%), and necessary (50%) (Table 5.20). Darija may be practical and necessary for 
communicating at home where Darija is predominantly spoken, while it is traditional 
because it is the language of their heritage. Other adjectives that were selected were free 
(30%), cool (26%), fun (26%), and flexible (26%), indicating that Darija is a language in 
which the second generation feels comfortable and informal. The two additional 
adjectives that were added were useful and spoken. 
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Table 5.18 Adjectives Selected to Describe French 
ANSWER RESPONSE % 
Dead 1 2% 
Obsolete 1 2% 
Religious 1 2% 
Ugly 1 2% 
Impolite 1 2% 
Not Useful 2 3% 
Severe 2 3% 
Fun 2 3% 
None of these 2 3% 
Modest 3 5% 
Boring 3 5% 
Absurd 3 5% 
Moral 4 7% 
Poor 4 7% 
Traditional 5 9% 
Cool 6 10% 
Proud 6 10% 
Other 6 10% 
Flexible 7 12% 
Modern 9 16% 
Close-Minded 9 16% 
Free 10 17% 
Intelligent 12 21% 
Interesting 15 26% 
Prestigious 16 28% 
Beautiful 17 29% 
Alive 17 29% 
Educated 17 29% 
Practical 25 43% 
Rich 25 43% 





Table 5.19 Adjective Selected to Describe Standard Arabic 
ANSWER RESPONSE % 
Obsolete 0 0% 
Not Useful 0 0% 
Impolite 0 0% 
Severe 1 2% 
Boring 1 2% 
Ugly 1 2% 
Close-Minded 1 2% 
None of these 1 2% 
Poor 2 4% 
Dead 2 4% 
Absurd 2 4% 
Modest 2 4% 
Fun 3 5% 
Flexible 5 9% 
Other 5 9% 
Cool 6 11% 
Free 7 13% 
Moral 8 14% 
Modern 9 16% 
Proud 14 25% 
Practical 19 34% 
Alive 19 34% 
Intelligent 20 36% 
Educated 21 38% 
Prestigious 23 41% 
Traditional 24 43% 
Necessary 24 43% 
Interesting 27 48% 
Rich 32 57% 
Beautiful 38 68% 






Table 5.20 Adjectives Selected to Describe Darija 
ANSWER RESPONSE % 
Close-Minded 0 0% 
Dead 0 0% 
Absurd 1 2% 
Prestigious 1 2% 
Severe 1 2% 
Ugly 2 4% 
Impolite 2 4% 
Boring 2 4% 
Obsolete 2 4% 
Intelligent 2 4% 
Other 2 4% 
Poor 3 6% 
Educated 3 6% 
Not Useful 3 6% 
Proud 4 7% 
Moral 4 7% 
None of These 4 7% 
Modest 5 9% 
Religious 6 11% 
Modern 8 15% 
Beautiful 10 19% 
Interesting 11 20% 
Rich 11 20% 
Cool 14 26% 
Fun 14 26% 
Flexible 14 26% 
Free 16 30% 
Alive 18 33% 
Necessary 27 50% 
Traditional 28 52% 




After completing the adjective selection portion of the language attitude section, 
participants were asked which language was the most X, where X represents an adjective. 
Table 5.21 shows the responses for “Which language is the most beautiful?”, with SA 
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receiving by far the most votes (82%). Many of the comments that accompanied this 
response made reference to the sonority and richness of the language. Two people made 
reference to it being the language of the Qur’an. One participant said that they did not see 
a difference between SA and Darija, one praised SA for being a universal language and 
another called it the “la vrai langue arabe” (“true Arabic language”).  




French   
 
7 13% 
Darija   
 
3 5% 
SA   
 
45 82% 
Total  55 100% 
 
SA was also chosen as the most moral language (Table 5.22), although by a 
slightly smaller margin. Two people argued that SA is moral because of its connection 
with the Qur’an, one noting that it is sacred because it is the language of the revelation of 
Islam’s holy book. Of the eight comments that were left, four either said that a language 
cannot be moral or expressed hesitation about labeling a language in this way. One 
participant responded this way to several of the superlative adjective tasks. She is 
cautious about assigning some types of adjective to a language (e.g. modern, modest, 









French   
 
10 20% 
Darija   
 
6 12% 
SA   
 
34 68% 
Total  50 100% 
 
French was considered the most modern language (Table 5.23), with Darija and 
SA tied for second place. One notion that came up more than once in the comments for 
this question was the idea that French is more modern because it is a more ‘recent’ 
language than Arabic, as opposed to it representing modernity in a cultural sense. The 
comments from those who chose Darija mentioned that it is innovative, or used for new 
fashion trends and music.  




French   
 
30 58% 
Darija   
 
11 21% 
SA   
 
11 21% 
Total  52 100% 
 
Darija was selected as the coolest language over French and SA by a margin of at 
least 20% for each language (Table 5.24). Only those who selected Darija left a 
comment. One said that it has fewer grammatical rules and is more “subject to 
evolution.” While others said that it has phrases that are not translatable into French, is 








French   
 
11 23% 
Darija   
 
23 49% 
SA   
 
13 28% 
Total  47 100% 
 
Although practical was widely chosen to describe French, SA and Darija in the 
adjective selection tasks, French came out clearly as the most practical language with 
69% of the participants selecting it (Table 5.25). This is not surprising given that it is 
required for school, work and interacting with the state, and is used on a daily basis.  
 




French   
 
38 69% 
Darija   
 
8 15% 
SA   
 
9 16% 
Total  55 100% 
 
SA was chosen by 85% of participants as the most religious language (Table 
5.26), an expected result given that SA is the language of the Qur’an and the Hadith. Of 
the two participants who chose French as the most religious language, one was Christian. 
Fifteen percent of participants chose Darija, instead of SA, as the most religious 
language, indicating some possibility for the dialect to take on some of the religious 
associations of the standard variety. Only people who chose SA left comments, all of 
which cited SA’s relationship to the Qur’an. One comment in particular gave more detail 
on the topic:  
C'est une langue, qui même si on ne peut la comprendre, on la connaît, on la parle 
surtout lors de la prière ou de la lecture du Coran. Par exemple en Turquie, il ne 
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parle pas arabe, mais beaucoup connaissent la Fatiha, la récite en arabe, sans 
forcément comprendre l'arabe. 37 
It is a language that, even if you cannot understand it, you know it, you speak it 
especially during prayer or the reading of the Qur’an. For example, in Turkey, 
they don’t speak Arabic, but many people know the Fatiha, the recitation in 
Arabic, without actually understanding Arabic. 
 
This participant emphasizes the strong role of SA in the practicing of Islam throughout 
the Muslim world, even in countries where no dialect of Arabic is spoken. It also 
highlights that positive attitudes can coexist with low levels of proficiency. 




French   
 
2 4% 
Darija   
 
6 11% 
SA   
 
46 85% 
Total  54 100% 
 
Fifty-seven percent of participants chose French as the most boring language 
(Table 5.27), followed by Darija (30%) and SA (14%). The comments indicate that 
French was selected most often because it is the language that is used in daily interactions 
and mundane duties outside of the home. Darija, too, is used for mundane duties in the 
home, but is not seen by as many people as boring. 
 




French   
 
25 57% 
Darija   
 
13 30% 
SA   
 
6 14% 
Total  44 100% 
 
                                                
37 The Fatiha is the first chapter of the Qur’an. 
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Darija was chosen by the majority of participants as the most traditional language 
(Table 5.28), presumably because of its ties to the tradition and history of the families of 
the participants. It is the language of their ancestral home. As one participant pointed out, 
Darija is the language that all of the generations of her family speak the best. Two 
participants commented that they would have liked to select two languages: SA and 
Darija, and French and Darija. 
 




French   
 
6 12% 
Darija   
 
33 65% 
SA   
 
12 24% 
Total  51 100% 
 
Darija was seen by 73% of participants as the most fun language (Table 5.29). 
The comments both here and from the adjective selection task indicate that participants 
view Darija as a language without grammatical rules and one that can be more easily bent 
and played with. As discussed above, this may be due to the fact that it is a language that 
is not formally taught, unlike French and SA where grammar is strongly emphasized and 
proper form required, especially in the French school system.  
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French   
 
8 16% 
Darija   
 
36 73% 
SA   
 
5 10% 
Total  49 100% 
 
Darija was also chosen as the most modest language (49%), although this time the 
margins are smaller between Darija, and French and SA (Table 5.30). The comments 
indicate that Darija was considered modest in terms of its rules and structure because it is 
viewed as not having grammatical restrictions, rather than having to do with modesty in 
the society associated with the language. There were no comments left by participants 
who chose French or SA. 




French   
 
12 26% 
Darija   
 
23 49% 
SA   
 
12 26% 
Total  47 100% 
 
In section three, the participants were asked some more specific questions about 
their attitudes toward Darija and French. They were asked to rate their level of agreement 
with statements on a five-point scale where one equals don’t agree at all and five equals 
completely agree (Table 5.31). The mean for the level of agreement with the statement “I 
prefer to marry someone who speaks Darija” is 2.79. The mean is much higher for the 
statement “I would like my children to speak Darija” at 4.19. The chances of a child 
speaking Darija are greatly increased if both parents speak Darija, and yet the desire to 
have a spouse who speaks Darija is much lower than the desire to have a child speak the 
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language. This supports the theory that in language attitudes surveys multiple questions 
should be asked about similar topics in order to obtain more nuance in understanding 
participants’ attitudes. As concerns French, there was a moderate sense that one is freer to 
express oneself in French with a mean of 3.13; however, 16 participants selected the 
arguably neutral 3 on the scale.38 It is further necessary to note that 23 participants 
selected the extreme points on the scale rendering a bi-modal distribution. Thus the mean 
is deceptive in indicating overall neutral attitudes toward this statement because it 
conceals that approximately half of the participants felt very strongly one way or the 
other about this question. 
Table 5.31 Statement Agreement Questions on Darija and French 
STATMENT 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL RESPONSES MEAN 
I prefer to marry 
someone who speaks 
Darija 
13 9 9 9 8 48 2.79 
I would like my 
children to speak 
Darija 
3 0 11 5 29 48 4.19 
I am freer to express 
myself in French 11 2 16 6 12 47 3.13 
 
The results from the language attitude portion of the survey indicate that French is 
seen as being a necessary and practical part of life. Participants selected adjectives like 
necessary, rich, practical and educated and elected it as the most modern of the three 
languages. Standard Arabic appears to have maintained its status as the language of 
                                                
38 It is important to note that there is some doubt in the language attitudes field over whether the mid-point 
on a scale truly represents a neutral attitude. 
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religion, beauty and morality, while Darija is associated with tradition, on the one hand, 
and with being cool and fun on the other.  
5.2.2 Attitudes toward religion and nations 
In order to understand how religion, culture and national identity are related to 
language attitudes, it was necessary to construct questions that specifically targeted these 
topics. Before discussing the results of the correlations between these questions and the 
results from the language attitude questions, I will present the raw data in order to get an 
overview of how these participants view France, the Maghreb, and religion, which 
addresses the second research question: 
 
RQ2. What are the religious and cultural attitudes of this population? 
 
The results from this section come from the statement agreement task from 
section three in the survey. Three questions in the survey dealt specifically with attitudes 
toward the Maghreb (Table 5.32). On the subject of pride of being of North African 
origin, participants had very positive attitudes, with a mean of 4.67. However, when it 
comes to taking action on this pride the average is lower. The mean for agreeing with the 
statement “one day I’d like to live in the Maghreb” was 3.45. While this is still relatively 
high, it is lower than the mean for the previous statement. When it comes to marrying 
someone from the Maghreb, the mean level of agreement was only 2.73. While this 
appears to be a fairly neutral mean, it is important to look more closely at the distribution. 
Sixteen participants completely disagreed and 11 completely agreed with this statement. 
Fifteen chose the arguably neutral point on the scale. The mean therefore conceals that 27 
 198 
of the 49 participants who responded to this question had very strong feelings concerning 
their marriage preferences, and were not at all neutral on the issue.  
 
Table 5.32 Attitudes toward the Maghreb  
STATEMENT 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL RESPONSES MEAN 
I am proud to be of 
North African origin 0 0 5 6 38 49 4.67 
One day, I’d like to live 
in the Maghreb 7 5 13 7 17 49 3.45 
I would like to marry 
someone who was born 
in the Maghreb 
16 5 15 2 11 49 2.73 
 
The responses to questions that asked about attitudes toward France are displayed 
in Table 5.33. There was a low level of agreement with the statement about feeling freer 
in France than in the Maghreb. Seventeen participants completely disagreed with this 
statement, which implies that participants feel very strongly about whether France offers 
them more freedoms. However, it is worth noting that there was moderate agreement to 
the statement from the previous section that one is freer to express oneself in French. To 
the statement “I feel at home in France,” the mean was only 2.66, indicating that the 
participants do not feel highly comfortable in France. Fifty-six percent of participants 
responded that they strongly disagree or disagree with that statement. There were 
similarly strong feelings about how religious France is compared to the Maghreb. The 
mean level of agreement with the statement that France is a more religious country was 
only 1.92, with 23 participants completely disagreeing with it. 
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Table 5.33 Attitudes toward France 
STATEMENT 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL RESPONSES MEAN 
I feel like I have more 
freedom in France than 
in the Maghreb 
17 2 12 8 9 48 2.79 
I feel at home in France 12 16 7 7 8 50 2.66 
France is a more 
religious country then 
the Maghreb 
23 13 8 1 3 48 1.92 
 
Participants were also asked about the extent to which they identify with people 
from other Arab countries (Table 5.34). The mean for this statement was 3.61, indicating 
a fairly high level of pan-Arab identification. This is the only question asked on the topic 
and so the conclusions that can be drawn are limited.  
 
Table 5.34 Attitudes Toward Pan-Arab identity 
STATMENT 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL RESPONSES MEAN 
I identify with people 
from other Arab 
countries 
5 2 14 14 14 49 3.61 
 
The questions concerning religion show that this population holds overall very 
positive attitudes toward religion (Table 5.35). They agreed strongly that religion is 
important to themselves, their parents, and as a part of their children’s education. The 
lowest mean for agreement comes for the question on participating in religious activities. 
While still fairly high at 3.52, it is lower than the other questions, which all had means 
well over 4.  
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Table 5.35 Attitudes Toward Religion 
STATEMENT 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL RESPONSES MEAN 
Religion is important to me 3 0 0 4 41 48 4.67 
Religion is important to my 
parents 2 0 6 10 30 48 4.38 
I regularly participate in 
religious activities 6 5 11 10 16 48 3.52 
Religion should be a part of 
children’s education 1 1 6 6 34 48 4.48 
 
Finally, participants were asked to complete the sentence “I identify as” and were 
permitted to choose as many answers from a list provided to them (Table 5.36). The top 
two responses were French (56%) and French of North African origin (40%). Of the 27 
participants who selected French, all but two of them also selected another adjective that 
referenced their North African heritage to describe themselves. Therefore, of the 48 
participants who answered this question only two of them selected French alone. These 
two participants, as well as why so many participants selected French, will be explored 




Table 5.36 Self-identification Task 
ANSWER   
 
RESPONSE % 
Berber-French   
 
2 4% 
Tunisian-French   
 
3 6% 
French-Berber   
 
3 6% 
Other   
 
4 8% 
Moroccan-French   
 
5 10% 
Arab-French   
 
5 10% 
French-Tunisian   
 
5 10% 
Tunisian   
 
6 13% 
French-Arab   
 
7 15% 
Algerian-French   
 
7 15% 
French-Moroccan   
 
7 15% 
Moroccan    
 
8 17% 
French-Algerian   
 
11 23% 
Berber   
 
12 25% 
Algerian   
 
13 27% 
French of North African Origin    
 
19 40% 




Overall, the participants in this study expressed high levels of pride in their North 
African heritage, although slightly lower levels of willingness to take action based on this 
pride when it comes to things like marrying someone from the Maghreb. Their attitudes 
toward France were fairly negative in terms of feeling at home and feeling free there, 
while their attitudes toward religion were very positive. They also expressed a general 
sense of identifying with people from other Arab countries, although this should be 
explored further.  
5.2.3 Language Attitudes and Religion 
The third research question that I pose in this study concerns the interaction 
between language attitudes and attitudes toward religion:39 
 
                                                
39 Note that only the female participants’ responses were used in the correlations. 
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RQ3. Are positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic and Darija associated with 
positive attitudes toward Islam? 
I computed a Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient to assess the 
relationship between number of positive and negative adjectives that participants selected 
both for Standard Arabic (SAPos and SANeg) and Darija (DarPos and DarNeg), and the 
level of agreement on a one to five scale with statements on religion labeled REL1, REL2 
and REL3 (Table 5.37).40 As discussed in the previous chapter, adjectives were coded as 
positive or negative (see Table 4.1), and the number of positive and negative adjectives 
was tallied for each participant.41 For each language, the number of positive and negative 
adjectives used was correlated separately with each statement on religion to look for a 
relationship between them. As noted in the previous chapter, all correlations were one-
tailed unless noted with an asterisk.   
 
Table 5.37 Statements on Religion 
CODE STATEMENT 
REL1 Religion is important to me. 
REL2 I regularly participate in religious activities. 
REL3 Religion should be a part of children’s education. 
 
The significant results from the correlations between selection of both positive 
and negative adjectives for Standard Arabic, and level of agreement with statements 
concerning religion are presented in Table 5.38. There was a very strong positive 
                                                
40 A Pearson product-moment correlation was used for all correlations in this study. 
41 Note that not all adjectives fell into categories of positive/negative, for example, the adjective 
“religious.” 
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correlation between choosing positive attitudes to describe Standard Arabic and agreeing 
with REL2 (r=.51, n=42, p<.001), indicating that participation in religious activities is 
correlated with positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic. There was a negative 
correlation between selection of negative adjectives to describe Standard Arabic and 
REL1 (r=-.29, n=43, p=.03), where the fewer negative adjectives that participants 
selected the more they agreed that religion is important to them. There was also a 
negative correlation between number of negative adjectives selected for Standard Arabic 
and the statement REL2 (r=-.30, n=42, p=.03), such that the fewer negative adjectives a 
participant chose for SA the more she participates in religious ceremonies.  
 
Table 5.38 Correlations Between Standard Arabic and Religion 
VARIABLES P-VALUE CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENT (R) 
N DEGREES OF 
FREEDOM 
SAPos & Rel2 p < .001 r = .51 42 40 
SANeg & Rel1 p = .03 
r = -.29 
43 41 
SANeg & Rel2 p = .03 
r = -.30 
42 40 
There were no significant correlations between positive and negative adjectives 
selected for Darija and the statements on religion; however, there were significant 
correlations between level of agreement toward statements on religion and statements 
concerning Darija labeled DAR1 and DAR2 (Table 5.39).  
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Table 5.39 Statements on Darija 
CODE STATEMENT 
DAR1 I would prefer to marry someone who speaks Darija. 
DAR2 I would like my children to speak Darija. 
 
There were significant correlations between agreeing with the statement DAR2 
(“I would like my children to speak Darija”) and statements REL1-3 (Table 5.40). DAR2 
and REL1 are highly positively correlated (r=.56, p<.001), DAR2 and REL3 are highly 
positively correlated (r=.5, p<.001), and DAR2 and REL2 just reach significance (r=.26, 
p=.05), indicating a relationship between the importance of Darija in raising children and 
positive attitudes toward religion.   
 
Table 5.40 Correlations Between Darija and Religion 
VARIABLES P-VALUE CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENT (R) 
N DEGREES OF 
FREEDOM 
Dar2 & Rel1 p < .001 r = .56 42 40 
Dar2 & Rel2 p = .05 r = .26 42 40 
Dar2 & Rel3 p < .001 r = .5 42 40 
 
A separate question was asked in section 3 that specifically targeted the 
intersection between Darija and religion, in order to see whether it has taken on some of 
the language ideology usually attributed to SA when compared with French (Table. 5.41). 
The mean agreement on a scale of one to five for whether Darija supports religious 
values better than French was 2.85, indicating that there is a weak association between 
Darija and Islam when the language is compared with French.  
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Table 5.41 Darija and Religion 
STATEMENT 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL RESPONSES MEAN 
Darija can support my 
religious values better 
than French 
11 10 10 9 8 48 2.85 
 
In addition to the quantitative data, I looked at the qualitative questions in section 
five where participants were asked to complete a series of sentences. For the phrase 
beginning “A good Muslim speaks…” 10 out of 35 (29%) participants made reference to 
Arabic. Some examples of comments include: 
 
…ce qu'elle veut, mais le coran doit être récité en arabe, alors si elle connait 
l'arabe cela lui facilitera la tâche. 
(…whatever she wants, but the Qur’an must be recited in Arabic, so if she knows 
Arabic it will help facilitate the task.) 
 
…arabe littéraire et toutes les autres langues car l'islam n'a pas de nationalité. 
(…Standard Arabic and all other languages because Islam has no nationality.) 
 
…sa langue et apprend la langue de sa religion. 
(…his/her language and learn the language of his/her religion.) 
 
…l'arabe dialectal ou littéraire et fait des efforts chaque jours pour s'améliorer. 
(…dialectal or Standard Arabic and make daily effort to improve him/herself.) 
 
Almost one third of participants who completed this sentence have a sense that 
although Muslims may speak many languages, they ought all to have some familiarity 
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with Arabic. Some specify Standard Arabic by referring to the language of the Qur’an or 
“arabe littéraire” while others just use the term “Arabic.” One participant, however, 
argues that the Qur’an is beautiful in all languages so it does not matter what language a 
Muslim speaks.  
The results from this section indicate that positive attitudes toward Standard 
Arabic are associated with positive attitudes toward religion. Attitudes toward Darija are 
also positively correlated with positive attitudes toward religion, although only when it 
comes to raising children with Darija as part of their life.  
5.2.4 Language Attitudes and National Attitudes 
In this section, I present the results from the questions and correlations having to 
do with language attitudes and attitudes toward North Africa, France and the Pan-Arab 
identity in order to examine the answers to research questions 4-6. The data comes from 
sections two and three in the survey. I begin with research question 4: 
 
RQ4. How are attitudes toward Darija and French associated with attitudes 
toward the Maghreb? 
The same methodology used to assess RQ3 was used for RQ4. I computed a 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient to assess the relationship between the 
number of positive and negative adjectives each participant selected (based on my coding 
system) for Darija (DarPos and DarNeg) and their level of agreement, on a one to five 
scale, with statements concerning the Maghreb labeled MAG1, MAG2, and MAG3. 
These statements on the Maghreb can be seen in Table 5.42. The same type of correlation 
was run between the number of positive and negative adjectives participants selected to 
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describe French (FRPos and FRNeg) and their level of agreement, on a one to five scale, 
with statements about the Maghreb. For each language, the number of positive and 
negative adjectives was correlated separately with each statement to look for a 
relationship. 
Table 5.42 Statements on the Maghreb 
CODE STATEMENT 
MAG1 I am proud of being of North African descent. 
MAG2 I would like to live in North Africa one day. 
MAG3 I would like to marry someone who was born in North Africa. 
Only two correlations were significant for Darija (Table 5.43). There was a highly 
significant positive correlation between the selection of positive adjectives to describe 
Darija and the level of agreement with the statement MAG3 about the desire to marry 
someone who was born in North Africa (r=.37, p <.01). There was also a negative 
correlation between negative adjectives selected for Darija and level of agreement with 
statement MAG1 (r=-.27, p=.04), where the fewer negative adjectives that were chosen 
for Darija the more participants agreed that they are proud of their North African 
heritage. These correlations indicate a relationship between positive attitudes toward 
Darija and positive attitudes toward the Maghreb. 
 
Table 5.43 Attitudes Toward Darija and the Maghreb 
VARIABLES P-VALUE CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENT (R) 
N DEGREES OF 
FREEDOM 
DarPos & Mag3 p < .01 r = .37 43 41 
DarNeg & Mag1 p = .04 r = -.27 41 39 
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Correlations were also run between level of agreement with statements about the 
Maghreb (MAG1-3) and statements about Darija (DAR1-2). There was a weak positive 
correlation between DAR2 and MAG2 (r=.26, p=.05), and DAR2 and MAG3 (r=.26, 
p=.05) indicating a connection between a desire to teach children to speak Darija, and 
both a desire to live in North Africa and a desire to marry someone born in North Africa 
(Table 5.44). There were also positive correlations between DAR1 and MAG1 (r=.25, 
p=.05), and DAR1 and MAG3 (r=.36, p<.01), although the correlation with MAG3 was 
much stronger. Preference to marry a Darija speaker (DAR1) is correlated both with pride 
in North African heritage (MAG1) and a desire to marry someone who was born in North 
Africa (MAG3), indicating that attitudes toward Darija and attitudes toward cultural 
heritage are related. 
 
Table 5.44 Attitudes Toward Darija and the Maghreb  
VARIABLES P-VALUE CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENT (R) 
N DEGREES OF 
FREEDOM 
Dar2 & Mag2 p = .05 r = .26 42 40 
Dar2 & Mag3 p = .05 r = .26 42 40 
Dar1 & Mag1 p = .05 r = .25 42 40 
Dar1 & Mag3 p < .01 r = .36 42 40 
 
I also ran correlations on the relationship between attitudes toward French and 
attitudes toward the Maghreb (Table 5.45), using the same methodology as used above. A 
negative correlation emerged between the number of positive adjectives selected for 
French and level of agreement with the statement MAG3 (“I would like to marry 
someone who was born in North Africa”). The more positive adjectives selected to 
describe French, the lower the rate of agreement with MAG3. This indicates that positive 
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attitudes toward French are associated with negative attitudes toward the Maghreb; 
however, this was the only significant correlation that emerged, necessitating further 
research on the relationship between attitudes toward French and attitudes toward the 
Maghreb before any conclusions can be made. 
Table 5.45 Attitudes Toward French and the Maghreb 
VARIABLES P-VALUE CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENT (R) 
N DEGREES OF 
FREEDOM 
FRPos & Mag3 p = .02 r = -.32 43 41 
 
Participants were also asked questions specifically directed at the relationship 
between Darija and North African identity (Table 5.46). For the statement “I feel more 
North African when I speak in Darija” the mean level of agreement on a scale from one 
to five was 3.10, a fairly neutral score; however 18 people gave a 1 or 2 and 22 gave a 4 
or 5. This indicates that rather than the population feeling ambivalent about the question, 
they are divided on the issue of Darija and national/cultural identity, especially when 
asked in this forthright manner.  The second statement, “All French people of North 
African origin should know Darija” prompted a slightly higher mean agreement of 3.36. 
This points towards a sense of cultural loyalty to their country of heritage and a language 
that they closely associate with it, Darija.  
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Table 5.46 Darija and North African Identity 
STATEMENT 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL RESPONSES MEAN 
I feel more North 
African when I speak in 
Darija 
11 7 8 10 12 48 3.10 
All French people of 
North African origin 
should know Darija 
 
7 7 8 12 13 47 3.36 
 
Because of the historical link between Arabic and pan-Arab identity, I looked to 
see whether there were a relationship between SA and Darija and attitudes toward a Pan-
Arab community for this population:  
 
RQ5. Are positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic and Darija associated with 
positive attitudes toward individuals from other Arab countries? 
Using similar methodology as was used for RQs 4 and 5, I ran correlations 
between the number of positive and negative adjectives chosen to describe both SA and 
Darija and the level of agreement with the statement PAN, concerning pan-Arab identity 
(“I identify with people from other Arab countries”). There were no significant 
correlations. However, because of the low number of participants it is possible that 
correlations would emerge between language attitudes and pan-Arab identity in a larger 
group. This is something that could be explored in more depth in a future study.  
In addition to quantitative data on the question of language attitudes and pan-Arab 
identity, I also explored this topic via an open-ended qualitative question. In section five, 
participants were asked to complete the sentence beginning “An Arab speaks…” Out of 
36 responses, 13 made reference to Arabic (36%), either alone or in addition to other 
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languages, most often French. This implies that there may be a link in the minds of some 
participants between being Arab and speaking Arabic. It is possible that more participants 
feel this way than expressed it in the question. Many simply responded with “…his/her 
language” or “his/her language of origin,” which could refer to Arabic.  
The final aspect of language and national identity to explore is the extent to which 
attitudes toward French and Darija are associated with attitudes toward French national 
identity, as stated in research question 6: 
 
RQ6. How are attitudes toward French and Darija associated with attitudes 
toward France? 
To explore this question, I ran correlations on the number of positive and negative 
adjectives that participants assigned to both French (FRPos and FRNeg) and Darija 
(DarPos and DarNeg) and the level of their agreement with statements about France 
labeled FRAN1 and FRAN2 (see Table 5.47 for statements). The correlations are 
displayed in Table 5.48. There was a strong positive correlation between the number of 
positive adjectives selected for French and level of agreement with feeling at home in 
France (FRAN1) (r=.44, p<.01). There was also a positive correlation between the 
number of positive adjectives chosen for French and a sense of having more freedom in 
France (FRAN2) (r=.3, p=.03). There was a negative correlation for number of negative 
adjectives selected for French and level of agreement with FRAN2 (r=-.32, p=.02), where 
the fewer negative adjectives selected, the more participants felt they had more freedom 
in France than in the Maghreb.  
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Table 5.47 Statements on France 
CODE STATEMENT 
FRAN1 I feel at home in France. 
FRAN2 I have more freedom in France than in the Maghreb. 
 
Table 5.48 Attitudes Toward Language and France 
VARIABLES P-VALUE CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENT (R) 
N DEGREES OF 
FREEDOM 
FRPos & Fran1 p < .01 r = .44 43 41 
FRPos & Fran2 p = .03 r = .3 42 40 
FRNeg & Fran2 p = .02 r = -.32 42 40 
 
There were no correlations between attitudes toward Darija and attitudes toward 
France, although participants were also asked two questions about French and Darija and 
their relationship to French national identity (Table 5.49). For the statement, “A good 
French citizen only speaks French” there was a very strong negative response. The mean 
level of agreement on a one to five scale was 1.15 with 44 out of the 48 participants 
responding that they completely disagreed with this statement. The second statement, 
“It’s not important to speak Darija because I live in France” garnered only a 1.75 mean 
agreement rating with 29 of the 48 participants completely disagreeing. Participants do 
not see living in France as a reason to give up the language of their heritage. The 
comments for the statement agreement section were very emotional and had mostly to do 
with the question about being a good French citizen: 
 
C'est un cliché raciste qu'etre un bon français c'est parler que français et ça 
m'ennerve. 
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(That’s a racist cliché to say that being a good French person means only speaking 
French and it irritates me.) 
 
‘Un bon citoyen français parle uniquement français’ NOOON !! 
(A good French citizen only speaks French’ NOOO!!) 
 
Participants went on to explain that they see multiculturalism as part of France’s heritage 
or how they have come to speak both Darija and French.  
 
Table 5.49 Attitudes toward French, Darija and France 
QUESTION 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL RESPONSES MEAN 
A good French 
citizen only speaks 
French 
44 2 1 1 0 48 1.15 
It’s not important to 
speak Darija 
because I live in 
France  
29 7 9 1 2 48 1.75 
 
To summarize, the results from this section concerning RQ4, RQ5 and RQ6 
indicate that attitudes toward Darija and attitudes toward cultural heritage are related, 
especially when it concerns marriage preferences and feeling North African while 
speaking Darija. There is also a sense that the Maghrebi diaspora should know Darija. 
The relationship between attitudes toward French and attitudes toward the Maghreb is not 
entirely clear, with only one significant correlation emerging. There was no correlation 
between language attitudes and pan-Arab identity; however, the qualitative data indicates 
that Arabic and Arab identity are linked for some participants. There is a correlation 
between positive attitudes toward the French language and France, while there does not 
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seem to be a relationship between attitudes toward Darija and France, although 
participants reject the idea that only good citizens of France speak French and that Darija 
is unimportant in their lives. 
5.2.5 Proficiency, Language Attitudes & Cultural Attitudes 
The final research question that I explored concerned the relationship between 
proficiency and attitudes: 
 
RQ7. Are high levels of proficiency in a language predictive of positive attitudes 
toward that language and the culture associated with it? 
I ran correlations between level of proficiency in speaking and understanding 
Darija (SpkDar and UndDar), French (SpkFR and UndFR) and Standard Arabic (SpkSA 
and UndSA) with the number of positive and negative adjectives that participants 
assigned to each language (Table 5.50). Only one correlation was significant. The better a 
person rated themselves at speaking Darija the more positive their attitudes were toward 
that language (r=.29, p=.03). Two other correlations that had to do with proficiency, and 
a combination of language attitudes and national identity were also significant. The 
correlation between speaking Darija and agreement with the statement MagDar1 (“I feel 
more North African when I speak Darija”) barely reached statistical significance (r=.26, 
p=.05) while understanding Darija and MagDar1 were highly significantly correlated 
(r=.37, p<.01). Why only proficiency in Darija was correlated with language attitudes 




Table 5.50 Proficiency and Language Attitudes  
VARIABLES P-VALUE CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENT (R) 
N DEGREES OF 
FREEDOM 
SpkDar & DarijaPos p = .03 r = .29 42 40 
SpkDar & MagDar1 p = .05 r = .26 41 39 
UndDar & MagDar1 p < .01 r = .37 42 40 
 
There were a number of significant correlations between proficiency in a 
language and attitudes toward the Maghreb and France (Table 5.51). Speaking Darija was 
highly correlated with agreement with the statement MAG3 (“I would like to marry 
someone who was born in North Africa”) (r=.41, p<.01) and was significantly correlated 
with the statement MAG2 (“I would like to live in North Africa one day”) (r=.32, p=.02). 
Understanding Darija was weakly correlated with agreement with MAG2 (r=.25, p=.05). 
Understanding Standard Arabic was also significantly correlated with agreement with the 
statement MAG3 (r=.33, p=.02). Speaking and understanding French were both 
positively correlated with agreement with MAG1 (“I am proud of being of North African 
descent”) (r=.34, p=.03; r=.46, p<.01).  
 
Table 5.51 Proficiency and Cultural Attitudes 
VARIABLES P-VALUE CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENT (R) 
N DEGREES OF 
FREEDOM 
SpkDar & Mag3 p < .01 r = .41 42 40 
SpkDar & Mag2 p = .02 r = .32 42 40 
UndDar & Mag2 p = .05 r = .25 43 41 
UndSA & Mag3 p = .02 r = .33 43 41 
SpkFR & Mag1 p = .03* r = .34 42 40 
UndFR & Mag1 p < .01* r = .46 43 40 
* Indicates a two-tailed test 
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5.2.6 Additional Findings 
In addition to the correlations that were related to the research questions, two 
more correlations emerged (Table 5.52). There was a strong negative correlation between 
agreement with statements REL3 and FRAN1 (r=-.41, p<.01). The more people agreed 
with the statement “Religion should be a part of children’s education,” the less they 
agreed with the statement “I feel at home in France.” There was also a significant 
negative correlation between REL2 and FRAN1 (r=-.31, p=.047), where the more a 
person agreed with the statement “I regularly participate in religious activities,” the less 
they reported feeling at home in France. 
Table 5.52 Attitudes Toward Religion and France 
VARIABLES P-VALUE CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENT (R) 
N DEGREES OF 
FREEDOM 
Rel3 & Fran1 p < .01* r = -.41 42 40 
Rel2 & Fran1 p = .047* r = -.31 42 40 
*Indicates a two-tailed test 
5.3 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I reviewed the background information of the participants who 
took part in this language attitudes survey and presented the results of the data as they 
pertain to each of the research questions. Participants were predominately women, with 
an average age of twenty-five who, based on their employment and the employment of 
their parents, come from a mid- to low-socioeconomic level. Most claim to speak more 
than one language, usually French and Darija. As a group they tend to view French in a 
utilitarian manner and do not express much affection for it, while viewing Standard 
Arabic as a language of prestige, beauty and religion. Darija is seen as representative of 
their culture and tradition but is also viewed as cool and flexible. Attitudes toward North 
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African culture are overall positive, with a strong sense of pride in their heritage and 
positive attitudes toward religion. Attitudes toward SA, and to a lesser extent, Darija, are 
correlated with positive attitudes toward religion. There are strong correlations between 
attitudes toward Darija and the Maghreb, and French and France. Proficiency seems to be 
most relevant when it comes to correlations concerning Darija and the Maghreb. In the 
following chapter, I will discuss the results presented above in more detail and the 




6. Discussion  
In this chapter, I review each of the research questions in view of the results, 
which were presented in the previous chapter. After each research question is presented, I 
discuss the results that pertain to it, specifically addressing the ways in which they relate 
to previous research, and what they reveal about the second generation North African 
community in France.  
6.1 RESEARCH QUESTION 1: LANGUAGE ATTITUDES  
RQ1. What traits or values do young second-generation North Africans associate 
with French, Standard Arabic, and Darija? 
6.1.1 French  
In order to discuss RQ1, which explores language attitudes in a diaspora context, I 
will present the language attitudes of the participants by addressing one language at a 
time, beginning with French. For the question, “Which language do you consider your 
‘own’ language,” participants overwhelmingly chose French (73%). The comments from 
participants indicate that they chose French because it is the language they use most 
often, are the most proficient in, or because they were born and live in France. 
Participants also replied that French is their “langue maternelle” (“mother tongue”). One 
said that it is his “langue maternelle” but that he wished he had been taught “les langues 
arabes” (“the Arabic languages”) when he was young. Another said that French is her 
“langue maternelle” because she was born in France. Both these comments indicate that 
respondents are using the phrase “langue maternelle” as a way of describing their 
proficiency rather than out of a sense of affection for the language or because it acts as a 
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symbol for their identity. Tribalat (1995) similarly found that his second-generation 
participants chose French as their “langue maternelle”, although it was unclear if they 
understood the question to be asking about proficiency or identity. 
The participants were intentionally given little instruction for this question; 
however, the goal was to get at a sense of ownership of language in terms of identity. 
Davies and Bentahila (1989) found that participants often claimed a language as their 
‘own’ but went on to comment that it was a language that they did not speak. Thinking of 
one’s ‘own language’ as a way to express identity did not emerge as strongly for my 
participants, although it appeared more often for those who selected Darija. 
There was one participant who did address the role of French as an identity 
marker. She wrote in her comment that she chose French, but meant “argo” (“argot”). 
She detests the French spoken by “les blancs ‘français’”  (“white ‘French’ people”) 
because it is “ni mon identité ni mon univers” (“neither my identity nor my universe”). 
This highlights the ethnic/racial divide felt by this population due to their marginalization 
by the majority French society and the French state. Speaking  “argo” makes her feel like 
an “arabe de France” (“an Arab from France”) and gives her a sense of brotherhood, “on 
se sent frères” (“one feels like brothers”), presumably among other Arabs in France. This 
woman implies that it is through a variety of French that she can reinforce her ethnic 
identity and distinguish herself from the white French population. This suggests a 
distinction that people may make between standard French, which is taught in the schools 
and spoken, as this participant sees it, by white French people, and the French that is used 
within the Arab community. The latter is the variety of French with which she identifies, 
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and which is spoken by others who share a similar heritage or ethnicity. She gives an 
example of how “argo” is different from the French of “les blancs” by explaining that she 
speaks it quickly and contracts “il” into “i” and “elle” into “é.” She appears to want to 
distance herself from formal and standardized pronunciation. While the “argo” she 
describes represents solidarity with other French people of Arab ethnic descent, she 
expresses feelings of estrangement from the French of the non-immigrant, “white”, 
population. Future studies on language attitudes in France could explore this distinction 
between the two dialects of French, especially given the stigmatization of “argo” speech 
(Stewart, 2012). The correlations between attitudes toward this “argo” in the North 
African communities in France and rate of Arabic code-switching/borrowing in this 
“argo” should also be explored (see Lawson & Sachdev, 2000, for a study on language 
attitudes and code switching in Tunisia, and Post, 2015, for a similar study in Morocco). 
The top three adjectives that were selected to describe French by participants were 
necessary (52%), rich (43%), and practical (43%). French is necessary for these 
participants because in France it is needed in order to excel in a practical way in terms of 
jobs etc., but it is also needed in order to be accepted culturally (A. Judge, 2007) because 
of the emphasis that the country puts on the language as a symbol of national identity as 
demonstrated in the 1994 Loi Toubon (Fenet, 2004). The comment section reveals that 
many chose French as the most practical language because it is “useful on a daily basis” 
or because they live in France. While necessary and practical are considered positive 
adjectives overall, they may also indicate a certain level of detachment for this 
population. Needing to speak a language to get by economically or socially does not 
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necessarily indicate affection for a language. By selecting rich to describe French it is not 
clear whether they view the language itself to be rich in terms of beauty, literary tradition 
etc., or whether they associate it with wealth. There was only one comment that discussed 
the use of rich when applied to French, and this participant used the term to refer to its 
beauty. French, like SA, has for centuries been defended and praised as a superior 
language (Lodge, 1993); however, it is also the language of power and status in France, 
which may lend itself to a perception of wealth. Although both definitions would 
associate the language with prestige, the former indicates admiration of the language 
itself, while the latter implies that it is an instrument for attaining wealth. 
Other adjectives that were selected by more than 25% of participants were 
educated, beautiful, and prestigious. French is the language of education in France, as 
well as in the Maghreb, and this image of French as educated and prestigious seems to be 
somewhat maintained among this population, although I would have expected it to be 
more prevalently viewed in this way. This may be because most people speak French in 
France, so it does not necessarily index being educated. Attitudes that French is beautiful 
and prestigious are consistent with the language attitudes of people living in North 
Africa, where French has for many decades been viewed as a language of prestige 
(Bentahila, 1983; Chakrani, 2010); however, the majority of participants did not view it 
this way, indicating a decrease in its prestige in the diaspora.  
French was selected as the most modern language (58%), which is similar to 
findings from studies done in the Maghreb. Chakrani (2010) argued that French is viewed 
as more open-minded in Morocco because it is the gateway to modernity and other 
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cultures. Benrabah (2007) similarly found French to represent modernity and Western 
culture in the minds of his participants in Algeria. However, when given the chance to 
comment on this choice, a few participants from the current study said that their 
assessment of French as modern has to do with the history of the language and French’s 
perceived temporal recency when compared with Arabic. This could be because, unlike 
their counterparts in North African countries, the diaspora in France is surrounded by 
modernity. They do not have to seek out French in order to access it because they all 
must learn and speak French anyway. Whether this affects their attitudes toward French 
as being representative of modernity needs to be investigated further. However, others 
may have understood the question as having to do with modernity in terms of western 
culture, technology etc., as the participants in the studies in the Maghreb did. 
Although the percentage of participants who selected close-minded and free was 
less than 20% each, these are two very different ways of seeing French that merit 
discussion. On the one hand, it is a language that is viewed as close-minded. This is the 
language that is used in school, by the government and by people in power. France has 
had a troubled past with its immigrant populations, and has not been accepting of their 
cultures and religions, which may explain why participants would associate the language 
with the close-minded aspects of the country. On the other hand, some participants view 
French as a free language. It is possible that this refers to freedom of grammar, although 
this is unlikely given the strong prescriptive tradition of the French language and strict 
teaching methods used in the French schools for French grammar. Elsewhere in the 
survey participants describe Darija as being without grammatical restrictions, indicating 
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that they are aware of grammatical flexibility enough to comment on it. If they had felt 
that French was free in this way, I would have expected it to come up somewhere in the 
comments. Furthermore, it is worth noting that none of the participants who selected 
close-minded also selected free, indicating that these two adjectives may be mutually 
exclusive. If participants did not mean that French is free grammatically, they may have 
been using the word to express a feeling that they see French as free because of its 
association with French culture, which some women in the first generation consider as 
offering more freedoms (Killian, 2006). Based on a language attitudes survey conducted 
in Algeria, Benrabah (2007) concludes that French is allowed to “transgress” language 
taboos that Arabic cannot, such as topics of love in a dating context because of its 
association with French culture. When asked whether they agree with the statement that 
they are freer to express themselves in French, there was a mean agreement of 3.13. 
However, this mean conceals the fact that 11 of the 47 participants strongly disagreed and 
12 strongly agreed, while 16 were somewhat ambivalent by choosing three on a scale of 
one to five. This multi-modal distribution indicates that the predominantly female 
participants were divided on this issue, with at least some of them having a sense that 
French is a language in which they are more at liberty to express themselves. I suggest 
that for those who agreed with the statement this may be due to the association that 
French has with French culture, which, according to Killian’s (2006) first generation 
North African female participants, offers them more freedoms. This supports the 
possibility that by selecting the adjective free, participants mean to indicate that they feel 
a certain freedom when speaking French. 
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French is perceived as the least cool (23%), least traditional (12%), and least 
religious (4%) language, and is seen as only slightly more fun than SA with 16% 
compared to SA’s 10%. French is not highly associated with any of these solidarity traits, 
whether in terms of solidarity with peers or with family and tradition.  Although beautiful 
was one of the adjectives selected for French, when asked which language was the most 
beautiful, only 13% of participants chose French, indicating that, when compared to SA 
(82%), French is not nearly as overtly prestigious in this sense. It is seen as the most 
practical language (69%) and also as the most boring language (57%). French is the 
language most used in daily interactions and in mundane tasks like school, shopping, or 
bureaucracy, which may explain why it is perceived by the majority of participants as 
both practical and boring. This is corroborated by some of the comments that participants 
left such as “on l’utilise tous les jours donc elle est banale” (“you use it everyday 
therefore it is banal”).  
While French appears to be viewed as an instrumental language and is assigned 
some symbols of overt prestige and status, there is also a sense that participants view it 
distantly, given that many of the positive attributes they assign to French are perfunctory 
in nature. Two participants even went so far as to voluntarily add in the negative 
adjectives stupid and arrogant to describe French. It is important to note, however, that it 
is likely that the term ‘French’ for these participants refers to the prestige/standard variety 
of French, as opposed to the “argot” referred to earlier by a participant. The latter variety 
often represents solidarity in the banlieues and is a maker of their identity with others 
who share their minority and marginalized status in France.  
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6.1.2 Standard Arabic 
There were only two participants who chose Standard Arabic as their ‘own’ 
language despite its strong symbolism as the language of Islam. One of these participants 
left a comment, claiming that SA is their “langue maternelle.” This person does not seem 
to be referring to proficiency because they rated themselves very poorly for speaking and 
understanding Standard Arabic. Rather, like the participants who used the term to 
describe Darija, this participant appears to be using the term to describe its importance to 
them, perhaps as an ancestral language. This points to the persistent language ideology 
surrounding Standard Arabic. Given the overall positive attitudes toward SA, it seems 
likely that French was selected so much more often than SA not because most 
participants identify strongly with it, but because they were answering in terms of 
proficiency and frequency of use. 
The top three adjectives that were selected to describe Standard Arabic were 
religious (71%), beautiful (68%), and rich (57%). All but three of the participants in this 
study who completed the background information section identified as Muslim; therefore, 
when they describe SA as religious they are almost entirely referring to Islam. Even in 
the North African diaspora in France, the language ideology of Standard Arabic, which 
has been described in the Qur’an and the Hadith as the language of heaven and the 
language chosen by God (Suleiman, 2003), remains strong and present. It has retained its 
status as a language that is, according to participants, inherently beautiful in part because 
it is representative to them of Islam. Once a language has been selected as the most 
suitable one in which to express a religion, as is the case with Arabic, its association with 
that religion will help it to maintain its prestige and will encourage loyalty to it. 
Disassociation from that religion will become difficult and unlikely (Safran, 2008).  
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It is notable that, while only 29% found French to be beautiful, 68% of the 
population saw SA in this way, suggesting that the prestige of French is lessened in the 
diaspora, while SA remains prestigious in this way. Standard Arabic language ideology 
has long held up the language as inherently beautiful because of its association to Islam, 
but also because of its use in high art in the medium of calligraphy throughout the 
Muslim and Arab world. It is also used in many religious rituals, which are themselves 
considered to be beautiful and meaningful, and the language is part of what adds to these 
aesthetic experiences. Therefore, its association with ritual and art may in part be driving 
participants’ impression that it is a beautiful language.  
The adjective rich could either indicate an association with wealth or with the 
richness of the language itself. This is where comments from the participants can help to 
clarify the ambiguity of some of the adjectives. Comments indicate that, for Standard 
Arabic, this adjective was used to refer to its perceived inherent beauty and complexity. 
Participants who left comments referred to it as “belle, riche, et poetique” (“beautiful, 
rich and poetic”), “beau, complexe, riche, magnifique” (“beautiful, complex, rich, 
magnificent”), and “riche en vocabulaire etc.” (“rich in vocabulary etc.”). These 
comments indicate that rich, when used to describe SA, is referencing the language itself 
(based on a learned language ideology concerning SA), not wealth that is associated with 
it. 
Other adjectives used to describe SA include interesting (48%), necessary (43%), 
traditional (43%), prestigious (41%), and educated (38%). That so many participants 
describe SA as necessary may come as a surprise given how little it is used in daily life in 
France and the fact that it is a language that must be learned as opposed to naturally 
acquired at home. Rather than being necessary in the sense of practicality, however, I 
argue that it is necessary in a religious sense for this population. Religious services in 
 227 
Islam are conducted in Standard Arabic (Spolsky, 2010), and the language is needed in 
order to fulfill one of the five pillars of Islam, prayer (Rouchdy, 2002). Its image as a 
prestigious language goes hand in hand with it being seen as religious and beautiful. It is 
viewed as an educated language because, as a language that must be learned via formal 
instruction, anyone who can speak and write it must have gone to school in order to do 
so. It is not surprising that SA is considered traditional given that it is the language of 
Islam and Islam is the religion that most of these participants’ ancestors have practiced.  
The superlative adjective task reinforces this prestigious image of Standard 
Arabic. SA was selected as the most beautiful (82%), most religious (85%), and most 
moral (68%) language. Despite its status as the language of religion, SA was selected by 
only 24% of participants as the most traditional language, while Darija was chosen by 
65%. This indicates that tradition and religion are somewhat separate in the minds of 
these participants and are represented by different languages. While religion is a part of 
their tradition it does not wholly encompass or embody it. North African culture and 
language, although related to Islam, stand separate from it and are important to 
participants in their own right.  
SA tied with Darija as the least modern language. Some of the comments indicate 
that participants treated the question as referring to temporal recency, although most did 
not leave a comment. Participants may have viewed the question as asking about 
modernity, as Benrabah’s (2007) and Chakrani’s (2010) participants did, and, like them, 
did not associate either dialect of Arabic with modernity. While voted the least fun 
language (10%) and only slightly cooler than French, with 28% of participants selecting 
SA, it was also deemed the most boring language by only 14% of participants. Perhaps 
because SA is not used in daily life in France, and because of its history and association 
with religion, it retains a sense of mystery and excitement for these participants. Many 
 228 
French women of North African origin, both in the comments for this study and in Killian 
(2006), express a desire to learn SA because of its religious connotations. On the other 
hand, it is not perceived as a fun language. This may be because of their general low 
proficiency in SA, which indicates that they are not using it in social interactions with 
their peers. It also could be due to the perception that it has a rigid and inflexible 
grammar that is difficult to learn as compared with Darija.  
In the diaspora, Standard Arabic has retained much of the language ideology that 
was expressed via the language attitudes studies done in the Maghreb both thirty years 
ago and more recently (Bentahila, 1983; Benrabah, 2007; Chakrani, 2010). These studies 
found that SA is associated with Islam and sacredness, and is viewed as beautiful and 
rich. It remains, among the North African diaspora in France, the language that is 
primarily associated with religion, prestige and beauty. They also view it as an interesting 
language, a topic that was not explored in previous studies in the Maghreb. There may be 
a renewed sense of excitement about this language because of a desire on the part of the 
participants to reclaim the culture and religion of their parents, a trend that can be seen in 
other studies such as Yag ̆mur and Akinci (2003). This is consistent with what Billiez et 
al. (2012) describe as the “fetishization” of Standard Arabic. Today’s second generation 
of North African immigrants in France have been described as more religious than their 
parents, unlike the second generation in the 1980s (Begag, 2007). In terms of language 
attitudes, these participants appear to be embracing the language that is most closely 
associated with Islam, which is consistent with their high levels of religiosity. 
6.1.3 Darija 
While participants who chose French as their ‘own’ language did so largely 
because they understood the question to be asking about proficiency, those who chose 
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Darija (20%) seemed to do so out of a sense of its relationship to their identity. Based on 
their comments, people who chose Darija did so because it links them to their heritage 
and to the culture of their ancestors. One participant referred to it as her “langue 
maternelle” that represents the “cordon ombilical avec mes origines” (“umbilical cord to 
my origins”). This usage of “langue maternelle” appears to have to do with heritage 
instead of proficiency. Darija provoked something more personal in their responses and 
seems to have more weight as an identity marker than French. There were also a couple 
of participants who added in the comment section that although they chose French, they 
see Darija as being a part of their identity and that they would have selected it alongside 
French had they had the option.  
The top three adjectives used to describe Darija were practical (61%), traditional 
(52%), and necessary (50%). Darija is viewed as traditional because it is the language of 
their culture and ancestors, with participants describing it as the thing that connects them 
to their heritage. This is supported by the fact that 65% of participants selected it as the 
most traditional language. One participant commented that she would have liked to 
choose both Darija and French, because they are both family languages for her. Notably, 
her parents were born in France and she identifies herself as Christian, indicating that 
parents’ birthplace and religion may influence the language(s) selected as a carrier of 
tradition. Selecting the adjectives practical and necessary for Darija may at first appear 
counterintuitive given that this is a language that is not written or learned in school, nor is 
it used outside the Maghreb and its diaspora communities; however, it is the language 
that is used at home, and possibly the only language with which these participants can 
communicate with some of their family members, especially those from an older 
generation, making it both practical and necessary in their lives.  
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Other adjectives commonly selected for Darija include alive (33%), free (30%), 
flexible, fun and cool (all 26%). The superlative adjective selection task reinforces this 
image of the language. Darija was deemed the coolest language (49%), the most fun 
(73%), and the most modest (49%). Several participants left comments about these last 
three adjectives, describing how Darija does not have any rules and is therefore a 
language that can be played with. These results also imply the possibility that French, 
rather than being modest, is viewed as haughty. One explanation for this view of Darija is 
that, because it is not a language that is taught, and these participants were never made to 
explicitly learn or obey grammatical rules, they think that it is a language that they can 
play with and manipulate more so than other languages. This brings up questions about 
method of acquisition that might have theoretical or methodological implications; 
however, this hypothesis needs to be tested before drawing any conclusions. 
Darija is still considered fun even though it is a language used in daily life at 
home, while French, which is also a daily language, is not seen this way. French is used 
for school, work and more broadly in a society that puts great value on grammar and 
precision in language and is unaccepting of slang or non-standard accents, all of which 
may contribute to it not being seen as fun. It is noteworthy that Darija is viewed as cool 
and fun while still representing tradition and heritage. However, not everyone felt this 
way: 30% of participants did select it as the most boring language, most likely because of 
its quotidian use at home. 
Describing Darija as cool and fun is unique to the diaspora in France and was not 
found in the studies of North Africans in Bentahila (1983), Benrabah (2007) or Chakrani 
(2010). These previous studies found that although Darija was a language of solidarity for 
participants to a certain extent, it was also seen as ignorant and not cool, although this 
may be beginning to change. This is reminiscent of the language attitude studies done in 
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the Welsh diaspora, which found more positive views of Welsh and Welsh society in the 
diaspora than in Wales, what they call a “diasporic lens” (Garrett et al., 2009). However, 
a colleague informed me that in Morocco French is less and less considered to be cool, 
and is being replaced by Darija because it symbolizes Moroccan national solidarity, 
which has increasing importance in the minds of the youth. On the other hand, in Tunisia, 
which has had a closer and better relationship with France, French is still considered cool 
to speak. Regardless, it is notable for a language that is strongly associated with tradition 
to be equally seen as fun and cool.  
Darija was considered the least beautiful (5%), and least moral (12%) language. 
This is consistent with attitudes in the Maghreb where Darija is seen as lacking in 
prestige. It was also seen as the least practical (15%) language, almost tying with SA 
(16%). Although many participants in this study selected practical as one of the attributes 
of Darija (61%), it seems that it is considered far less practical than French, despite being 
used at home to communicate with family. Darija is not taught in France nor is it used in 
school, government, most public spaces, or in the work place.  
In contrast to Chakrani’s (2010) study in Morocco, Darija was not ranked as more 
religious than SA. It was deemed to be the most religious language by only 11% of 
participants, far behind SA (85%). While Darija is taking on some of the religious 
connotations of SA in the Maghreb, that does not appear to be occurring in the diaspora. 
Rather than representing religion, Darija is a far more potent symbol of tradition. 
However, the relationship with Darija and Islam will be looked at more closely when we 
discuss the correlations between attitudes toward Darija and attitudes toward religion.  
When asked whether they prefer to marry someone who speaks Darija, the mean 
level of agreement on a scale of one to five was 2.79, while the desire to have their 
children speak Darija produced a mean of 4.19. It is notable that 13 out of 48 participants 
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completely disagreed with the former statement, while 29 out of 48 participants 
completely agreed with the latter. It seems that they desire to pass on the language of 
their culture and heritage to their children but are, for the most part, anywhere from 
ambivalent to adamant that they do not want to marry a spouse who speaks Darija, even 
though having two Darija-speaking parents in the home would greatly increase the 
chances that a child will speak the language. It is important to note that all but five of 
these participants were women. Although it is not entirely clear what is the cause of these 
slightly inconsistent attitudes, I hypothesize that these women are somewhat reluctant to 
marry men who speak Darija because they may have been born in the Maghreb or have 
strong ties to that culture. As Killian (2006) and Gray (2005) point out, many first 
generation North African immigrants in France worry that marrying a man from the 
Maghreb will mean a restriction on the kinds of freedom that they enjoy in France. The 
second generation women in this study may be torn between wanting to pass on their 
heritage to their children via language and not welcoming certain aspects of that culture 
that marriage to a man from the Maghreb might bring into their lives. This is a sentiment 
that men do not seem to share. Selby (2009) found that second and third generation North 
African men in France have a preference for marrying women from the Maghreb because 
they symbolize cultural purity. The mean for preference to marry someone who speaks 
Darija might be higher were the sample group made up primarily of men rather than 
women.   
6.1.4 Summary of Research Question #1 
French is seen as practical and necessary, but not prestigious in the same way that 
has been reported in the Maghreb over the past few decades. It is still viewed by some as 
educated because it is the language of school and universities, and is seen as highly 
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necessary and practical. Although one cannot get by in France without speaking French, 
this does not mean that it is viewed affectionately or as particularly prestigious. Standard 
Arabic remains a language that is strongly tied to Islam and which has retained its image 
of being beautiful because of its ties to that religion, indicating that the strength of the 
language ideology of Arabic is not weakened in the second generation in the diaspora. It 
may even be eclipsing French as the language of prestige. Darija, while still not viewed 
as beautiful, moral or religious, is seen by the diaspora as cool and fun, a view not shared 
by their counterparts in North Africa. One factor that emerged unexpectedly was the way 
in which a language is acquired. Participants claimed that Darija is fun and cool because 
it has fewer rules and can be easily played with. One hypothesis, which needs to be 
separately tested, is that they view it as being without rules because they are not formally 
taught the language’s grammar or structure. Despite being viewed as fun and cool, it is 
also still representative of tradition for this population. Here it is necessary to remark that 
although they may view the prestige variety of French with a lack of affection, and view 
Darija as a solidarity language, the French spoken within the banlieues, the “argot” that 
one participant refers to, may also be an important solidarity language/variety for them, 
although attitudes toward this variety were not explored in this dissertation. 
Previous research indicates that language can act as an indicator of attitudes 
toward the related culture and society (Baker, 1992; Choi, 2003). If this is the case, the 
attitudes of this group indicate a lack of affection for French language and culture, 
although their feelings are not hostile. They appear, on the other hand, to view North 
African and Muslim societies more positively, by conferring onto the languages 
associated with each adjectives of praise, reverence, and solidarity. It is important to note, 
however, that due to the small sample size, any conclusions drawn from these results 
must be done so tentatively. 
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As discussed earlier, language ideologies precede and help to form language 
attitudes. Both French and Arabic have powerful language ideologies, which is, in part, 
what motivated studying the language attitudes of participants with varying levels of 
proficiency in these two languages. One question that arises is whether these extensive 
language ideologies are being reproduced among this population, and more specifically, 
whether the language ideologies of the Maghreb are reproduced in the diaspora in France. 
Based on the data presented above, it appears that the language ideology of Standard 
Arabic is being reproduced by this population. SA remains a language that is closely 
associated with Islam, sacredness and beauty. Darija continues to be viewed as the 
language of tradition and solidarity, similar to how it is viewed in the Maghreb, with the 
exception that it is now also seen as fun and cool. The language ideology concerning 
French, however, is not entirely reproduced. It has lost some of its image of being a 
language of beauty and education. Most importantly, these participants strongly rejected 
some of the basic tenets of French language ideology, namely its ‘vital’ role in the 
construction of French citizenship and French identity. 
One further point of discussion is how their language attitudes might differ in 
other diasporic contexts, such as in Canada or Belgium. Dragojevic et al. (2013) points 
out that “Language attitudes are not only a product of the present times, but also a 
reflection of complex histories of domination and sub-ordination that, in some cases, can 
be traced back hundreds of years” (p. 20). Given the colonial history between France and 
the Maghreb, including years of strict language policy, a violent fight for independence, 
and decades of discrimination and rejection in France, it seems highly likely that these 
language attitudes are shaped, in no small part, by France’s stance toward the North 
African community and their religion. It further indicates that the language attitudes of 
second-generation North African immigrants might differ if they lived in the United 
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States, Canada or Britain, countries with very different histories with the Maghreb and 
stances on immigration. In these contexts we might see more positive attitudes toward the 
language of the receiving country.  
 
6.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 2: RELIGION AND CULTURE 
RQ2. What are the religious and cultural attitudes of this population? 
6.2.1 Attitudes toward the Maghreb 
The attitudes of the predominately female second-generation North African 
diaspora in France toward the Maghreb were overall positive. They expressed extremely 
high levels of pride in being North African (mean of 4.67) and agreed overall with the 
statement, “one day I’d like to live in the Maghreb” (mean of 3.45). These participants, 
almost all of who were born in France, have maintained a sense of connectedness with 
their parents’ homeland. In the midst of the ongoing tension in France between the 
majority culture and the minority North African community, the second generation seems 
to be looking toward their Maghrebi heritage for a sense of pride and identity in reaction 
to their rejection from French society, as suggested by Scott (2007) and Kaya (2009). 
Despite this pride, participants demonstrated some reluctance to marry someone 
from the Maghreb with a mean of only 2.73 to the statement “I would like to marry 
someone who was born in the Maghreb,” although 57% of participants were either 
neutral or felt positively toward the statement, responding with a 3, 4, or 5. This is fairly 
consistent with the fact that, of the participants who are married/engaged, 42% reported 
that their spouse/fiancé was born in North Africa. However, it is important to point out 
that for this question there was a bi-modal distribution with 16 participants completely 
disagreeing with the statement and 11 completely agreeing with it. This is a topic that is 
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quite divisive for this population, with no consensus on the issue. All but four of the 
participants who answered this question about marriage preferences were women. The 
mean level of agreement for the four men was 3.5, while the mean for the women was 
lower at only 2.72 (closer to the overall average). All of the participants who completely 
disagreed with the statement “I would like to marry someone from the Maghreb” were 
women. This indicates the possibility of a gender difference for this population in terms 
of marriage preference. As I discussed in the previous section, there is a strong tendency 
for second and third generation North African men to wed women born in the Maghreb 
because they symbolize Maghrebi culture (Selby, 2009), whereas, first generation women 
of North African heritage in France express caution and are reluctant to marry men from 
North Africa because of a fear that they will be close-minded and will not allow them the 
kind of freedom that they desire (Gray, 2005; Killian, 2006). This is similar to Gal’s 
(1978a) female participants who she describes as “less committed than the men to the 
traditionally male-dominated system…” (p. 2-3). The data above suggests that although 
women may have high levels of pride in their Maghrebi culture, they may not wish to 
marry based on this pride, while this may not be the case for men. This topic should be 
researched further with an even gender distribution.  
6.2.2 Attitudes toward France  
   Attitudes toward France are overall more negative than attitudes toward the 
Maghreb. The mean level of agreement for the statement “I feel like I have more freedom 
in France than in the Maghreb” was 2.79, with 17 participants completely disagreeing 
with it. This is interesting in light of their similarly low level of agreement to wanting to 
marry someone from the Maghreb, perhaps due to a perception that male spouses from 
the Maghreb will be more conservative and controlling. It is possible that they, like many 
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people, hold slightly contradictory and complicated attitudes toward their culture. So, 
while these women tend to be reluctant to marry someone from the Maghreb they also do 
not want to acknowledge directly that that region may be more restrictive in some ways. 
Another possibility is that participants do not feel freer in France in terms of practicing 
their religion and cultural rituals, including veiling and prayer in public, because of the 
official and cultural secularism in France, even if they may experience more freedom in 
other, more secular, ways. It could also be that when they visit the Maghreb they are on 
vacation and are only experiencing certain aspects of life there and thus are not fully 
conscious of the freedoms that France affords them.  
Participants expressed a strong sense of not feeling at home in France. Over 50% 
answered with a 1 or 2, on a scale where 1 equaled ‘completely disagree’ and 5 equaled 
‘completely agree’, to the statement “I feel at home in France,” with an overall mean of 
2.66. This is unsurprising given the background and history between France and the 
Maghreb during the colonial period, and the ensuing hostility within France toward North 
African immigrants and their children. France has been largely unreceptive to Islam and 
its Arab Muslim population, with 60% of French people claiming in a 2012 poll that 
Islam has become “too visible and influential” in France (Kern, 2012). Participants also 
strongly disagreed that France is more religious than the Maghreb (mean of 1.92). France 
is officially a secular state, which has caused problems for Muslim women desiring to 
wear headscarves in public places. It is also largely culturally secular, with only 4.5% of 
French Catholics claiming to attend Mass regularly (IFOP, 2009). Given that almost all 
of the participants who took my survey stated that they are religious and that their 
religion is important to them, it follows that viewing France as a less religious country 
than the Maghreb conveys a negative attitude toward France. This is supported by the 
fact that many of these participants do not feel at home there. The responses to these two 
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statements support the possibility that the reason participants do not overall feel that they 
have more freedoms in France is because they do not feel free to practice their religion 
there. It also indicates that religious freedoms may be valued higher than the secular 
freedoms that they gain by living in France.  
6.2.3 Pan-Arab Identity 
When it comes to identifying with people from other Arab countries, participants 
had fairly positive attitudes. The mean level of agreement on a five-point scale was 3.61, 
and only 7 of the 49 participants responded with a 1 or 2, on a scale where 1 equaled 
‘completely disagree’ and 5 equaled ‘completely agree.’ Participants have a general sense 
of solidarity with people from other Arab countries, a sentiment that is contextualized by 
the powerful history of the now defunct project of Arab nationalism, and the association, 
going back centuries, of the Arab people with the religion of Islam. Although Arab 
nationalism has lost its political goals there is a persisting sense of pan-Arab identity that 
exists as an ethnoreligious and ethnolinguistic group (Rouchdy, 2002). Dawisha (2003) 
calls this sense of shared identity “Arabism.” The results from this question indicate that 
there is a sense of Arabism alive among second-generation North Africans in France. 
Future studies could explore this further by giving participants more questions on this 
topic, including action-oriented ones, in order to see if these positive attitudes toward 
Arab identity would carry over into behavior.  
6.2.4 Attitudes toward religion 
Participants expressed very positive attitudes toward religion. Given that of the 48 
participants who completed this section, one is not religious and two are Christian, the 
results from the questions on religion can be overall interpreted as attitudes toward Islam. 
When appropriate I will look more closely at these three participants who were not 
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Muslim. It is important to note that there is a difference between practicing Islam and 
identifying as Muslim. Identifying with a religion may just be a matter of identifying with 
ones culture and heritage rather than actually practicing it, as Kaya (2009) points out. 
This is why it was important to ask not only how they identify themselves, but also to ask 
questions about the role that religion plays in their own lives, in terms of participating in 
religious activities, and in the lives of their children, in terms of wanting it to be a part of 
their children’s education. In this way, we can begin to differentiate between religion as a 
symbol of cultural identity and religion as a practice of a faith. 
Religion is seen as highly important both to the participants (mean of 4.67) and to 
their parents (mean of 4.38). Forty-one out of 48 participants responded with a 5 to the 
statement “religion is important to me.” It appears that these participants were for the 
most part raised in very religious homes, and that the importance of religion has been 
passed on to them. Only three responded with a 1, completely disagreeing with the 
statement “religion is important to me.” Of these three, one is an atheist/secularist, one is 
Christian and one is Muslim. Participants also expressed positive attitudes toward 
religion in terms of participation in religious activities.  
The mean level of agreement with the statement “I regularly participate in 
religious activities” was 3.52. Although slightly lower than the mean level of agreement 
for the other questions about religion, this is still fairly high. There are many religious 
activities in which Muslims can participate. The five pillars of Islam include 1) prayer, 2) 
charitable giving, 3) declaring that Allah is the one true god, 4) fasting during Ramadan, 
and 5) making the pilgrimage to Mecca. Of these five, Ramadan is the pillar most 
frequently observed by North African Muslims in France (Ben Brower, personal 
communication). In addition, there are also religious services on Friday that are attended 
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at Mosques, of which there were approximately 2000 in 2011 (Guénois, 2011), indicating 
that Mosque attendance is a factor in the religious activities of Muslims in France. 
Participants expressed very positive attitudes toward the role of religion in the 
education of children (mean of 4.48). The response to this question implies not only that 
participants want religion to be a part of their children’s education, but perhaps also 
suggests dissatisfaction with the secular French school system. This supports the 
hypothesis that participants do not feel very at home in France in part because of religion. 
If religion is important to the North African diaspora, and they think it should be part of 
the schooling of their children, but the dominant culture and government does not value it 
and forbids it in public life, then it follows that these participants would feel ill at ease in 
France to some extent.  
This data supports the researchers who have argued in the past several years that 
there is an increase in religiosity among the second generation in France today, as 
opposed to the second generation of the 1980s (Gray, 2005; Begag, 2007; Scott, 2007). 
Tribalat (1995) found a low level of attendance to religious ceremonies among the second 
generation in the early 1990s. If his data is correct, this does suggest an increase in 
religiosity over the past twenty years. Today, these youths more visibly demonstrate their 
religion via clothing, adherence to Ramadan, and even in their enthusiasm for Standard 
Arabic. One of the reasons for this renewed interest in Islam is, according to researchers 
like Kaya (2009), out of a reaction to their marginalized status in France. They therefore 
create an “Islamic parallel societ[y]” (Kaya, 2009, p. 85) as a substitute for French 




While expressing negative views toward France, it is notable that in the self-
identification task, over 50% of participants selected French (they were permitted to 
choose as many titles as they liked). Forty percent chose French of North African origin. 
It is possible that participants strongly identify as French; however, given their overall 
positive attitudes toward the Maghreb and their relatively negative ones toward France, it 
is also possible that they viewed this question as asking not how they identify culturally 
but how they identify in terms of their legal status. After all, France puts a heavy 
emphasis on the concept of citizenship, what it means to be a “vrai français” (“real 
French person”), and on assimilation to French culture (Weil, 2010). While 56% 
responded with French, all but two of these also made reference to their North African 
heritage. Of the 27 participants who identified themselves as French, 15 also identified as 
French-Algerian, French-Tunisian or French-Moroccan, 13 as French of North African 
origin, 12 as Algerian, 7 as Moroccan and 6 as Tunisian. Forty-four percent of 
participants chose not to select French at all. This indicates that almost all of these 
participants identify partly or entirely as North African as expressed in any number of 
ways (French-Algerian, Moroccan, etc.). This suggests that these participants identify 
themselves as, at least to some extent, separate from mainstream French identity. This 
may have its roots in their sense of ethnic ‘separateness’ from majority French society in 
part due to France’s exclusion of and discrimination against the North African immigrant 
community.  
Only two participants selected French and no other adjectives. It is worth looking 
more closely at these two participants in order to see if there is anything particular about 
their profiles. The first participant is 28 and was born in Tours. When asked where her 
parents were born she responded with other but did not elaborate in a comment, although 
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she reports that she does not often return to the Maghreb. She was one of the two 
participants who identified as Christian, not Muslim, and she describes religion as being 
very important to her and her parents. When it comes to proficiency in Darija, she rated 
herself very poorly. However, she responded with a 5, strongly agree, when presented 
with the statement “I am proud to be of North African heritage.” She gave a response of 3 
to many of her answers for statements about attitudes toward France and the Maghreb. 
She does not think it is very important to marry someone who speaks Darija nor does she 
think that people of North African origin must speak Darija. She chose French as her 
‘own’ language, just like over 70% of participants, and found French to be the most 
religious and traditional language. This may be because French is more connected to the 
Catholic tradition in France. She also found French to be the most fun language. Because 
of her low proficiency levels in Darija she most likely does her socializing with peers 
who speak French, not Darija. She has overall very positive attitudes toward French, 
while selecting Darija as the most boring language. Her profile indicates that religion and 
language proficiency may be related to her self-identifying solely as French despite being 
of North African heritage and expressing pride in that heritage. Christianity is more 
accepted in France than is Islam, which may be why she expressed feeling at home there 
and more able to comfortably designate herself exclusively as French.     
The second participant who chose only French to describe herself was a woman 
who was born in Lyon and did not disclose her age. Her parents were born in Tunisia, 
and she identifies herself and her parents as Muslim. Religion is very important to her 
and her parents, although slightly higher for herself. She participates regularly in 
religious activities and strongly agrees that religion should be part of education for 
children. She strongly agrees that she has more freedom in France than in the Maghreb 
but very much does not feel at home in France. She also expressed feeling very proud of 
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her heritage. She, just like the other participant, rated herself a two out of five for 
speaking and understanding Darija, indicating that proficiency may be a factor in self-
identification. She chose French as her own language, although so did the majority of 
participants. She also had generally positive attitudes toward SA but less so toward 
Darija. She strongly disagrees with statements about feeling more North African while 
speaking Darija, and marrying someone who speaks Darija. This participant, similar to 
the other, has very positive attitudes toward French, although unlike the other participant 
she has relatively negative attitudes toward the Maghreb. The fact that both participants 
had low levels of proficiency in Darija and positive attitudes toward French suggests that 
proficiency may be a factor in forming language attitudes and a sense of national identity. 
6.2.6 Summary of Research Question #2 
Overall, participants tend to have positive views of the Maghreb and their North 
African culture and heritage, although as discussed above, the question concerning 
marrying someone from the Maghreb showed a bi-modal distribution indicating polarized 
attitudes. This question may also have been affected by the fact that almost all of the 
responses were from women. Attitudes overall toward France are somewhat negative. 
Participants do not feel very at home there nor do they feel like it is a very religious 
country, a significant factor for a population that expressed the importance of religion in 
their lives and in the lives of their family. This sense of feeling ill at ease in France and 
having more positive attitudes toward North African culture and Islam may be due to 
France’s anti-Islamic rhetoric and chilly reception of the North African diaspora. In terms 
of how they identify themselves, more than 50% of participants identified as French. 
Almost all participants, however, selected other adjectives that describe some aspect of 
North African identity either instead of, or in conjunction with, French. 
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6.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 3: ARABIC AND ISLAM 
RQ3. Are positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic and Darija associated with 
positive attitudes toward Islam? 
The overall findings for the correlations that I ran in order to respond to this 
research question indicate that there is a correlation between positive attitudes toward 
Standard Arabic and positive attitudes toward religion, namely Islam. The strongest 
correlations were between the adjectives used to describe SA and participation in 
religious activities. Women who expressed positive attitudes toward SA reported 
regularly participating in religious activities.42 Their attitudes toward SA are not just 
correlated with a feeling that religion is important to them, although there was a 
significant correlation there as well, but also with how they actually behave concerning 
religion in their own lives. This suggests that SA continues to act as a symbol of Islam 
even in the second generation in France, and that language attitudes are related to 
religiosity, at least for women. It seems that the renewed enthusiasm for Islam in France 
is reflecting what Billiez et al. (2012) call the “fetishization” of Arabic among the North 
African diaspora. This correlation further supports the claims in the literature on the 
sociology of religion and language on the relationship between language and religion 
across cultures (Spolsky, 2010), and more specifically for the relationship between 
Arabic and Islam (e.g. Suleiman, 2003).  
                                                
42 As discussed in the previous chapter, the five male participants were excluded from the correlations. Any 
conclusions drawn for RQ3-7 have to do exclusively with second-generation North African women in 
France.  
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This data supports the argument that religion needs to be more closely scrutinized 
both in language attitude studies and in sociolinguistics, especially for a population that 
has a religious affiliation. As Garrett (2001) points out, language attitudes affect language 
variation, and the two should be more integrated. Thus, the data indicating that religion 
plays a role in language attitudes should spur investigations into the role that it plays in 
variation, as was recently done by Baker-Smemoe and Bowie (2015). One way to do this 
is to give a brief survey that, in addition to investigating typical topics, such as age, 
gender, education, proficiency etc., also includes a handful of scalar questions about 
religion. This dissertation specifically points to the need to do this when studying Muslim 
North African Arabic speakers in France.  
The correlations also reveal that there may be a connection between attitudes 
toward Darija and Islam, despite the fact that participants did not often select religious or 
moral to describe the dialectal variety. There were no significant correlations between the 
adjective selection task for Darija and questions about religion; however, there were 
correlations between attitudes toward religion and attitudes toward Darija as expressed 
through the statement agreement task from section three of the survey. Women who hold 
positive attitudes toward religion also have positive attitudes toward Darija, but only in 
the specific sense of wanting Darija to be a part of their children’s lives. The correlations 
were highly significant between wanting their children to speak Darija and the following 
two statements: “religion is important to me” and “religion should be a part of my 
children’s lives.” The correlation between wanting children to speak Darija and the 
statement “I regularly participate in religious activities” just reached significance. Parents 
typically desire what they consider to be best for their children, and so asking about their 
desires for them in terms of religion and language is somewhat of a covert way of 
accessing their language attitudes, even if these attitudes do not manifest themselves in 
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regular participation in religious activities themselves. The results from the correlations 
for this research question suggest that, for the North African female Muslim diaspora in 
France, Darija and Islam work in conjunction to form their identity, such that if they 
deem one to be important they will more likely also deem the other to be so. This data 
indicates that Darija could become symbolic of Islam, although when asked specifically 
about whether Darija supports their religious values better than French, the response was 
slightly negative (a mean of 2.85).  
6.3.1 Summary of Research Question #3 
In response to the research question “Are positive attitudes toward Standard 
Arabic and Darija associated with positive attitudes toward Islam?” I found that positive 
attitudes toward Standard Arabic and religion, namely Islam, are correlated, such that the 
more positive one’s attitudes are toward SA the more positive one’s attitudes will be 
toward religion. Attitudes toward Darija, while not correlated with religion in terms of 
the adjectives that were selected, was correlated with religious attitudes in terms of the 
desire for it to be a part of their children’s education. However, because of the small 
sample size, these conclusions are tentative, and are in need of follow up work on a 
broader population in order to make any generalizable conclusions.  
 
6.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  4-6: LANGUAGE ATTITUDES AND NATIONAL IDENTITY  
6.4.1 Research Question #4 
RQ4. How are attitudes toward Darija and French associated with attitudes 
toward the Maghreb? 
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The data from the previous chapter indicates that there was a correlation between 
attitudes toward Darija and attitudes toward the Maghreb. Selection of positive adjectives 
for Darija was strongly correlated with the desire to marry someone born in North Africa, 
indicating perhaps that one reason to marry someone from the Maghreb could be due to 
their language skills. If a person views Darija in a positive light then they may also value 
marrying a person who speaks that language. There was also a weak negative correlation 
between selection of negative adjectives for Darija and being proud of North African 
descent, where the more negative things participants had to say about Darija the less 
proud they were of their Maghrebi background, suggesting that part of pride in their 
heritage revolves around the language of that heritage.  
There were also significant correlations between desiring one’s children to speak 
Darija, and a) wanting to live in North Africa and b) preferring to marry someone who 
was born in North Africa. The preference to marry someone who speaks Darija was also 
highly correlated with the desire to marry someone form the Maghreb. It is consistent that 
participants who want their children to speak a language would also want to live in, and 
marry from, the country where that language is spoken. However, there is a disparity 
between overall desire to marry someone who speaks Darija (mean of 2.79) and wanting 
one’s children to speak Darija (mean of 4.19). Although feelings about the latter are 
much stronger than the former, there does appear to be a link between the two. Preference 
to marry a Darija speaker was also mildly correlated with being proud of North African 
descent. Attitudes toward Darija appear to be related to feelings about cultural and 
national identity especially when it concerns marriage preferences and the lives of their 
children. The language represents, for them, the country and culture of their heritage. 
When asked specific questions about Darija and national/cultural identity, 
participants continued to express attitudes indicating a link between the two. The mean 
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level of agreement to feeling more North African when speaking Darija was 3.10, just 
slightly above the neutral point on the scale; however, 11 people completely disagreed 
while 12 completely agreed with the statement, suggesting that people are somewhat torn 
about this question. Only 8 people entered a score of 3 for this statement, the mid-point 
on the scale. Although participants are divided about whether the language they are 
speaking expresses their identity when asked a direct question about it, their responses to 
questions elsewhere in the survey produced correlations that indicate that Darija is 
connected to their North African cultural identity. There are slightly stronger feelings 
when it comes to whether French people of North African origin should know Darija. 
The mean level of agreement that they should know Darija was 3.36, with 25 out of 47 
respondents replying with a 4 or 5, indicating some sense of duty for them to maintain the 
language of their heritage in the diaspora because of their background.  
Language has long been seen as a crucial component of nation building and of 
national identity (Joseph, 2004). It is often used as the cultural product that a nation uses 
to bind people together (Suleiman, 2003). The data on Darija and the Maghreb is 
consistent with this understanding of the nation, while also indicating that dialectal 
Arabic can symbolize national identity, despite SA being the official national language. It 
further suggests that language can continue to represent nation and culture in a migration 
context. Laguerre (2010) describes a kind of nationalism without borders, what he calls 
the digital diaspora because members of this diaspora connect online. He argues that 
language is an important symbol of this nationalism outside of the nation. Language, in 
addition to religion, helps to solidify this sense of national cohesion, because both are 
“the cultural materials used to shape a national identity” (Safran, 2008, p. 187-88). This 
seems to be the case for the North African community in France. 
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When it comes to attitudes toward French and attitudes toward the Maghreb, only 
one correlation came back as significant. Selection of positive adjectives to describe 
French are negatively correlated with wanting to marry someone born in North Africa, 
such that, the more positive adjectives they chose the less they wanted to marry someone 
from the Maghreb. This implies that positive attitudes toward French are related to 
negative attitudes toward the Maghreb; however, this was the only significant correlation. 
One possibility why the results produced only one correlation is that while Darija plays 
an active role as a symbol for North African identity, French may be less involved. 
However, in order to draw this conclusion much more research would need to be 
conducted. It would be necessary to ask more specific questions about attitudes toward 
French in the statement agreement task and to run correlations between those and the 
answers to attitudes about the Maghreb. This would offer a more nuanced understanding 
of whether attitudes toward French are in fact related to feelings of North African 
identity. 
6.4.1.1 Summary of Research Question #4 
In response to Research Question #4, there appears to be a relationship between 
attitudes toward Darija and attitudes toward North Africa. This emerged strongly for 
attitudes toward marrying a spouse from North Africa, marrying a spouse who speaks 
Darija, wanting to move back to North Africa, and having children who speak Darija. 
There was also a relationship between viewing Darija positively overall and desiring to 
marrying someone from the Maghreb, although it is important to note that participants 
were very divided over their marriage preferences.  Language, specifically Darija, plays a 
principal role in the lives of these participants in terms of their expressed attitudes toward 
where they live, whom they marry and how they raise their children. Like Baker’s (1992) 
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participants, degree of cultural attachment is correlated with attitudes toward the 
language of that culture. This research question also inquired after the relationship 
between French and North African identity. Only one correlation emerged as significant, 
linking positive attitudes toward French with negative attitudes toward the Maghreb; 
however, this data is insufficient to draw conclusions about the relationship between 
attitudes toward French and attitudes toward North African culture for this diaspora 
group in France.  
6.4.2 Research Question #5 
RQ5. Are positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic and Darija associated with 
positive attitudes toward individuals from other Arab countries? 
The answer to this research question about language and pan-Arab identity cannot 
be fully ascertained at this time because no significant correlations emerged. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that a correlation does not exist. One reason that could 
have led to the lack of significant correlations is the small number of participants. With 
only approximately 40 participants sufficiently completing the survey, significant 
correlations may have been difficult to reach. A future study with a larger population 
might produce significant results for this topic. Although no clear conclusions can be 
made about the association between attitudes toward dialects of Arabic and a sense of 
pan-Arab identity within the North African diaspora in France, some qualitative 
comments can be made about the association. When participants were asked to complete 
the phrase “An Arab speaks…,” 36% of them responded with Arabic or Arabic plus 
another language. This seems to indicate that Arab ethnicity and identity are connected 
with language in the minds of some participants. The history of Arab nationalism was 
based on the shared language of Arabic throughout much of the Arab world and acted as 
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a symbol to bind them together (Dawisha, 2003). This sense of ethnolinguistic identity 
has persisted for more than one third of these participants, despite the failure of the Arab 
nationalist project of the mid-20th century.   
6.4.3 Research Question #6 
RQ6. How are attitudes toward French and Darija associated with attitudes 
toward France? 
This research question inquires after the relationship between language attitudes 
and attitudes toward national and cultural identity, although this time it concerns French 
and French national identity. There were several correlations that emerged as significant 
between attitudes toward French and attitudes toward France. Participants who chose 
more positive adjectives to describe French were more likely to agree that they feel at 
home in France and that France offers them more freedoms than the Maghreb. Similarly, 
participants who chose fewer negative adjectives were also more likely to agree with 
those statements. This suggests a relationship between positive attitudes toward the 
French language and positive attitudes toward the country. It supports the hypothesis that 
French acts as a proxy for French culture and that those that view the former in a positive 
light will also view the latter in this manner. It also supports the hypothesis that women 
who appreciate the freedoms that France offers them will view French more positively. 
When it comes to the relationship between Darija and attitudes toward France no 
correlations emerged. It is not clear why attitudes toward Darija and attitudes toward 
France would not have a relationship. One would have expected that, given the 
association between Darija and the Maghreb, attitudes toward Darija would coincide not 
only with increased positivity toward North African culture as we saw for RQ4, but also 
with decreased positivity toward French culture. It is possible that, similar to what was 
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discussed in reference to attitudes toward French and the Maghreb, Darija does not play 
an active role in the formation of attitudes toward France. It could also be due to the 
limited sample size. This is an area that should be studied in more depth in order to 
understand this relationship better. 
Participants also responded to two statement agreement questions that specifically 
targeted the relationship between language and France. Participants had a strong 
revulsion against the statement that ‘good’ French citizens only speak French. Their 
mean agreement was 1.15 with 44 of the 48 participants completely disagreeing with the 
statement. These participants do not see their identity as French citizens to be 
compromised in any way by the fact that they are bi or multi-lingual. In this way they 
reject the French nationalistic ideology that strongly relates the French language to 
French national identity, a rejection that perhaps manifests itself in their fairly distant 
attitudes toward French. French language ideology is held in varying degrees by different 
sections of French society. It was implemented during the colonial era when France 
foisted French upon its North African colonies to the exclusion of Arabic, and has been 
an integral tool used by the French state to assimilate immigrants. These participants see 
French citizenship to be compatible with multiple languages. This is consistent with their 
positive attitudes toward Darija, as well as their generally high levels of proficiency in 
the language. Similarly, they also reject the idea that Darija is not important to speak just 
because they live in France. They do not see their country of residence as having an 
effect on the importance of Darija in their lives. The language of their heritage supersedes 
the fact that they live in France. Because of the close association between Darija and the 
Maghreb, this implies that they may not feel the need to leave behind North African 
culture just because they live in France either. This, too, is consistent with their generally 
positive attitudes toward North African identity.  
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6.4.3.1 Summary of Research Question #6 
There appears to be a positive correlation between attitudes toward French and 
attitudes toward France, which is expected given the tendency for attitudes toward a 
culture to be transferred onto the language most closely associated with that culture. 
Although this correlation exists, participants overwhelming do not think that French is 
the only language that should be spoken by French citizens. They strongly believe that 
one can be French and speak multiple languages, and that in no way should the North 
African diaspora abandon Darija because they live in France. No correlations emerged 
between attitudes toward Darija and attitudes toward France. 
 
6.5 RESEARCH QUESTION 7: PROFICIENCY AND ATTITUDES  
 
RQ7. Are high levels of proficiency in a language predictive of positive attitudes 
toward that language and the culture associated with it? 
 
The relationship between language attitudes and language proficiency43 appears to 
depend on the language in question. The only significant correlation that emerged was 
between proficiency in and positive attitudes toward Darija. Two more correlations that 
surfaced were between proficiency in Darija and feeling more North African when 
speaking Darija. The better participants are at speaking and understanding Darija, the 
more they report feeling North African while speaking Darija. This may shed some light 
on the earlier discussion about why participants felt so divided on the topic of identity 
while speaking this language. The reason for this division may be that the more proficient 
                                                
43 It is important to note again that their proficiency was based on limited self-assessment. 
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a participant is in the language, the more she is able to tap into the identity related to that 
language when speaking it, in this case North African identity. Participants who rated 
themselves poorly for Darija may therefore be less likely to feel North African while 
speaking the language. 
Although there is some relationship between proficiency and attitudes for Darija, 
there was none for French and Standard Arabic. SA is a language with a long lasting and 
powerful language ideology that is tightly woven together with the history and practice of 
Islam. It is possible that language attitudes toward SA are relatively fixed, such that they 
are impervious to the effects of language proficiency. Perhaps attitudes may wax and 
wane some depending on the cultural and linguistic context, but overall, whether one 
speaks and understands SA is beside the point. It is a language that is idolized by much of 
the Arab/Muslim community whether in Muslim majority countries or in the diaspora, as 
was displayed in the results section for RQ1. This elevated status may make it resistant to 
some extent to proficiency effects. Davies and Bentahila’s (1989) participants reported 
Arabic as their ‘own’ language, while reporting low proficiency. Similarly, Billiez (1985) 
reported one participant who described Arabic as his language even though he does not 
speak it. This indicates that positive attitudes do not, in fact, always indicate proficiency. 
That said, I would have expected that positive attitudes would affect motivation to learn 
the language thus linking it to proficiency.  
The reason that there were no correlations between proficiency and attitudes when 
it comes to French seems most likely to be due to the fact that nearly all of the 
participants speak French at high levels of proficiency (mean of 4.61 for speaking, 4.87 
for understanding). They have gone through at least some part of the school system 
where knowing French is mandatory, and they live in a society where French is required 
in order to get by and to thrive. These participants speak French at high levels of 
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proficiency whether they want to or not. This may confound any potential relationship 
between proficiency and attitudes for French, such that their attitudes toward the 
language do not interact with their proficiency.  
Darija, on the other hand, has neither the same kind nor strength of ideology 
behind it that SA and French have. It is also not a language that participants are required 
to master in the same way as French. Although they need it to communicate with some 
family members at home, participants can probably get by with speaking Darija at 
varying levels of proficiency. They certainly are not required to maintain a certain 
standardized variety or to read and write in it. There is, therefore, more variance in 
proficiency for Darija allowing for correlations between proficiency and attitudes to 
emerge.  
I also looked at the relationships between language proficiency and attitudes 
toward the Maghreb and France. There were half a dozen significant correlations between 
language attitudes and attitudes toward the Maghreb. Three of these correlations 
concerned proficiency in Darija and wanting to live in the Maghreb one day or wanting to 
marrying someone from the Maghreb. It is not surprising that deciding whether or not to 
marry someone who speaks Darija or whether to move to a country where Darija is the 
language spoken on the street would be related to how well one speaks Darija. This is 
also expected given that proficiency in Darija is somewhat correlated with attitudes 
toward Darija, and attitudes toward Darija are correlated with attitudes toward the 
Maghreb. This is supported by data that indicates that for second generation Hispanic-
Americans, the more they were dominant in English, the more they had adopted the 
values and beliefs that are characteristic of the general U.S. public (Pew Hispanic Center, 
2002), linking proficiency with attitudes toward culture.    
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There was a significant correlation between understanding SA and wanting to 
marry someone from the Maghreb. This would seem to imply that SA proficiency is 
linked to attitudes toward SA as a symbol of Muslim or North African identity; and yet 
there were no significant correlations between proficiency in SA and attitudes toward SA. 
This is an area that needs to be explored further. One way to go about this would be to 
provide more opportunities for participants to express their attitudes toward SA via the 
statement agreement tasks, so that there are more ways to explore the correlations 
between language attitudes and proficiency when it comes to SA. In addition to its status 
as the national language of all three North African countries, it is possible that 
proficiency in SA is correlated with religiosity, a relationship not explored in this study, 
and that people with high levels of proficiency in SA seek out people from the Maghreb 
who might similarly value religion.  
Speaking and understanding French were strongly correlated with pride in North 
African heritage. Most of the participants rated themselves extremely high in their 
proficiency in French (over 4.5 average for understanding and speaking). These 
participants speak French very well, but, as was discussed above, this has little to do with 
their preferences and much to do with the fact that they were raised and live in France. A 
high level of proficiency is nearly unavoidable. They also agreed strongly with the 
statement “I am proud to be of North African origin” with a mean of 4.67. I argue that the 
correlation between proficiency in French and pride in heritage may be coincidental. If 
participants had had a choice when it came to learning French and attaining high levels of 
proficiency, then this correlation would be meaningful, but as it is, I am skeptical of how 
much meaning to assign to this result.  
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6.5.1 Summary of Research Question #7 
It appears that proficiency can be correlated with positive attitudes toward 
language and the culture associated with it; however, it depends on the language in 
question, and possibly on its history, ideology, and how it is learned and used by the 
population. In this case, there is a connection between proficiency in Darija and attitudes 
toward Darija as well as attitudes toward the Maghreb. However, there were no 
correlations between proficiency in French and SA and attitudes toward French and SA. 
This may have to do with the high levels of proficiency in French throughout this 
population, and to the strong language ideology of SA, which may make it as least 
partially impervious to interaction with language attitudes. It may also be due to the small 
sample size. Proficiency in SA was correlated somewhat with positive attitudes toward 
the Maghreb, indicating that SA has some involvement in the formation of national and 
cultural attitudes. 
 
6.6 ADDITIONAL FINDINGS 
6.6.1 The Role of Religion in Alienation 
Two additional correlations emerged that were not expected but that, while not 
dealing with language directly, are worth discussing because they support some of the 
findings discussed above. There was a strong negative correlation between feeling that 
religion should be a part of the education of one’s children and feeling at home in France. 
The more that people wanted religion to be a part of education the less they felt at home 
in France. France maintains an official policy of secularism and has been particularly 
resistant to Islam, most notably with the decades long affaire des foulards, but also in the 
rhetoric of groups like the far right Front National who have been very vocal about their 
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anti-Muslim stance. Public opinion polls show that 74% of people polled think that Islam 
is incompatible with French values (Le Bars, 2013). These predominantly Muslim 
participants, who have expressed a high level of devotion to their religion and a desire for 
it to be a part of raising their children, do not feel at home in a country that rejects these 
values. Similarly, there was a mild negative correlation between participating in religious 
activities and feeling at home in France, such that the more they reported participating the 
less they reported feeling at home there. This supports the argument that the secular 
nature of French society presents a barrier for this population to feeling at ease and at 
home in France.  
6.6.2 Imbalanced Gender Distribution 
One of the unexpected outcomes of this study came not from the data itself, but 
from the uneven gender distribution, with only five men participating in the survey. This 
made a gender comparison impossible in terms of comparing data; however, perhaps the 
very fact that women were more willing to participate in the study is informative in and 
of itself. There are several reasons why this may have happened. First, most of the 
participants learned about the survey on Facebook groups. It is possible that these groups 
are predominantly made up of women, indicating that women of North African descent in 
France are more willing to self-identify as part of the cultural/ethnic/religious diaspora in 
France (depending on the group’s focus). Another possibility is that men and women 
frequent these groups equally, but that the men were hesitant to engage in a survey about 
language, identity and religion. Men may be more suspicious of these types of studies, 
especially when distributed by a researcher who is not an in-group member, whereas, 
women were more eager to have their voices heard and to support research on their 
community. Maybe men would be more willing to participate if the survey were 
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distributed by an institution in France that they felt would be less likely to take advantage 
in some way, or skew the results to paint a negative picture of the North African 
community (e.g. Institut du Monde Arabe). These are all things to be taken into 
consideration when designing and conducting a study on the North African diaspora in 
France. 
Whatever the reason, it is important to consider how the uneven distribution may 
have affected the results. One way, which was discussed above, is in terms of their 
marriage preferences. Despite otherwise positive attitudes overall toward the Maghreb, 
when it comes to preferring to marry someone from the Maghreb there is a multi-modal 
distribution, with 16 participants completely disagreeing, 11 completely agreeing, and 15 
selecting the mid-point on the scale. Marriage preference appears to be a divisive topic, 
especially for a predominantly female group. It is possible that, if there had been more 
male participants, attitudes may have been generally more positive.  
It is also worth noting how the gender distribution did not affect the results in a 
way in which it was expected to. An early prediction was that women of North African 
origin in France would have more positive attitudes toward France and French because of 
its association with a culture that permits more material freedoms to women. However, 
this predominantly female sample, although small in size, had very positive attitudes 
toward religion, and expressed negative attitudes toward France and toward French 
language ideology. Based on the data, it seems that whatever liberties French culture 
affords these women, they are overshadowed by France’s hostility toward their 
community, especially when it comes to religious freedoms. Although no conclusion can 
be drawn on the subject, it is possible that there would not be the kind of gender effect for 




In this chapter, I have summarized the results that were presented in Chapter Five 
and have discussed them according to how they pertained to each of the seven research 
questions whose exploration have been the goal of this dissertation. These include the 
overall attitudes toward language, national identity and religion, and the relationship 
between these three. In the following chapter, I will make my closing remarks, and 





This dissertation investigated the language attitudes of the second-generation 
North African diaspora in France. The main goals of this research were to understand the 
general attitudes of this group toward French, Standard Arabic and Darija, as well as 
toward religion, France and the Maghreb. It specifically explored how language attitudes 
correlate with religious, cultural and national attitudes, and whether proficiency plays a 
role in the formation of these attitudes. In order to reach these goals and answer the 
research questions that were posed, I launched an anonymous online language attitude 
survey targeted at 18 to 30-year-old French men and women who were born in France, 
and whose parents are Arabic speakers who were born in Morocco, Tunisia or Algeria. In 
addition to collecting original data, I contextualized the study by giving an overview of 
the history between France and North Africa, including the colonial era, the fight for 
independence, migration from the Maghreb, and the current status of the immigrant 
community in France. The purpose of this study was to investigate, via language 
attitudes, how this community views itself in relation to the majority French society and 
the country and culture of their heritage. 
The results of this dissertation have shed light on how members of the North 
African diaspora in France identify themselves in a culturally and linguistically 
antagonistic environment, although their implications are limited because of the small 
sample size. This population still strongly values both Darija and Standard Arabic, the 
former because it is the carrier of their heritage and culture, while still acting as a 
language of solidarity, and the latter because it symbolizes their religion. French is 
viewed as a practical and necessary part of life. It has lost much of its prestige and status 
as a language of beauty, possibly because of negative associations with majority French 
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society. The prestige variety is not a symbol of solidarity for this diaspora community, 
although the spoken “argot” variety may be. This population’s attitudes toward these 
languages seem to reflect the attitudes that they expressed toward Islam, France and the 
Maghreb. Their desire to engage with Darija in their lives, and in the lives of their 
children, is connected to their religiosity and their sense of North African identity. They 
have strong positive attitudes toward North African culture, although for some items their 
attitudes were sharply divided. They highly value religion and want it to be part of their 
children’s education, so much so that it appears to be one of the reasons why they do not 
feel at home in France. This underscores the role that France’s treatment of North African 
immigrants plays in how this community views itself in relation to the state, as well as 
how they view French and Arabic. The fact that two of the most essential aspects of their 
identity—language and religion—are unwelcome in France, may be causing them to turn 
away from French culture and society and seek out their identity in the country, culture, 
and languages of their heritage.  
 
7.1 CONTRIBUTIONS 
This dissertation makes contributions to various fields methodologically, 
theoretically and substantively, although they must be approached tentatively because of 
the small sample size. Methodologically, it has innovated on the language attitude survey 
tool by launching a survey online, which, to my knowledge, has not previously been done 
in this field. This allows for two things: the first is absolute anonymity. Although all 
surveys and experiments are by nature invasive, and while there is no way to completely 
avoid the observer’s paradox or interviewer bias, an anonymous online survey can 
minimize these effects in ways that previous researchers in the field have been unable to 
do. This anonymity should allow participants to answer more freely, in the privacy of 
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their home or other comfortable environment, without the pressure of being in a 
laboratory or interacting with an unknown researcher.  
Launching the survey online also permits people to become participants who 
might otherwise not be reached by a traditional study done in a university setting. Many 
researchers rely on finding their participants via the university because it ensures that 
their participants will be literate in the languages they seek to study (e.g. Chakrani, 2010) 
and also because the university provides institutional backing which reassures 
participants (although see Garrett et al., 2009, for an example of targeting participants at 
cultural events). This tends to limit the study to include only university-educated 
participants, leaving out large sections of the population. An online distribution allows 
the researcher to avoid this problem by reaching people from varying educational and 
socioeconomic backgrounds (although it does require access to a computer or smart 
phone, which have become increasingly prevalent, and typing ability). It further allows 
people who might be unwilling or unable to travel to participate in a study with very little 
inconvenience.  
Theoretically, this dissertation has made contributions in a number of ways. The 
first concerns the variables examined in sociolinguistic studies of language variation. 
Typically the field has shied away from including religion as a factor when considering 
what influences linguistic variation, although Yaeger-Dror (2014) has recently urged the 
field to change in this way and a recent sociophonetic study found that degree of 
religiosity was a significant variable in a Mormon community in Utah (Smemoe & 
Bowie, 2015). The current study, by demonstrating the relationship between religion and 
religiosity, and language attitudes for this population, supports claims made by 
researchers such as Omoniyi and Fishman (2006) that religion plays a key role in 
language use and should be studied by sociolinguists. Garrett (2001) recommends more 
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integration between language attitude studies and sociolinguistic studies in general 
because the former is an “essential component” of the latter (p. 626), therefore, if religion 
is a factor in language attitudes, it may also be a sociolinguistic variable in language 
variation. My data specifically points to the need to consider religious identity when 
conducting studies on the North African diaspora in France, considering that the second 
generation is more religious today than the second generation of the 1980s (Begag, 
2007). Future sociolinguistic studies on the second or third-generation North African 
diaspora in France, or other similarly religious groups, should consider giving brief 
surveys about religious attitudes to their participants before moving on with their 
experiment. 
Second, this dissertation has more generally contributed to the field of language 
attitudes by providing more data on language attitudes among diverse populations. The 
more cultures, languages, and social contexts that are studied, the more we will come to 
understand how language attitudes function on the whole. It also contributes to the 
smaller sub-field that examines how migration affects language attitudes. This study 
indicates that, although language shift almost always occurs in migration contexts, 
awareness of and attitudes toward the language(s) in question are not necessarily quick to 
disappear, and may sometimes be enhanced, supporting the research done for the Welsh 
diaspora that found that there is a “diasporic lens” through which diaspora communities 
view their language and heritage (Garrett et al., 2009). 
Third, it indicates that proficiency is not correlated equally with all language 
attitudes in a given linguistic context. Proficiency was only correlated with Darija in this 
study, but not with Standard Arabic or French. The reasons for this are not clear, although 
I have suggested some possible explanations. Fourth, the data from this survey suggests 
that studying language attitudes in a diaspora setting can allow for enhanced 
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understanding of attitudes toward national and cultural identity, and therefore provide 
insight into assimilation and integration for migrant communities. Finally, this research 
has indicated that the method of acquiring a language, specifically whether or not it was 
formally taught, may impact language attitudes, although no conclusions regarding this 
were drawn. 
Substantively, this dissertation has increased our understanding of the attitudes of 
the North African diaspora, not only toward language, but also toward religion and 
national identity. It has specifically looked at how language is viewed by a group that has 
been understudied in the language attitude literature, despite living in a country where 
language and culture are closely intertwined. By studying their attitudes toward language, 
culture and religion, this dissertation has enriched our understanding of a highly 
stigmatized and marginalized community that is rapidly growing both in France, and as 
members of the Muslim diaspora, in Europe in general. The conflict-filled history 
between France and the Maghreb, and the unrest of the past decade makes this a crucial 
population to study. An increased understanding of how linguistic, religious and cultural 
identity are intertwined for this group can help guide future research in areas outside of 
linguistics, such as diaspora studies, sociology, psychology, history and European 
studies. More specifically, this dissertation has suggested one major way in which 
language attitudes toward Darija may differ in the diaspora from the attitudes of those 
living in the Maghreb. Darija has come to be viewed as cool and fun, while still being the 
bearer of tradition. This is a change from the attitudes of their counterparts in North 
Africa where, although Darija is a solidarity language, it is not viewed as explicitly cool, 
being viewed instead in a more negative light (Chakrani, 2010).  
The findings in this dissertation particularly expand our knowledge of the post-
colonial relationship between former colonizers and their former subjects by suggesting 
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that languages can act as important symbols of cultural and religious identity. In this case, 
there was mass migration from the former colonies in the Maghreb to the country of their 
former ruler, such that the North African immigrants in France continue to be in a power 
relationship with the French government, although now it is on the European continent as 
opposed to their native lands. In this post-colonial diaspora context, language continues 
to be a potent tool for assimilation, on the part of the French state, and, for some 
members of the diaspora, a symbol of rejection of French culture and identity and a 
turning toward the culture and religion of their heritage. By examining the role that 
language plays in the post-colonial identity of this population, this study has broadened 
our understanding of post-colonial migration, and emphasized the importance of 
language in these contexts. These findings could encourage researchers in post-colonial 
studies to take language into account as an enduring locus of struggle between former 
ruler and subject. This study could also aid efforts on the ground level when it comes to 




While contributing to a better understanding of language attitudes, sociolinguistic 
variables and the North African diaspora in France in general, this study also has certain 
limitations. The primary limitation of this dissertation is the small sample size, which 
makes the data less generalizable, the correlations less powerful and restricts the 
conclusions that can be drawn.44 The length of the questionnaire may have discouraged 
some participants from beginning it, and convinced others to quit before completing it, 
                                                
44 According to the Office of Survey Research at the University of Texas at Austin, the ideal target sample 
size would have been 300 participants. 
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something that piloting would have helped to prevent. This is a limitation that could be 
avoided in future research by keeping length a primary concern in survey construction. 
Other ways to improve sample size would be a) to consult with experts in social media 
content to work on how to make a flyer more attractive to consumers of media, b) to start 
connecting with people on social media who are members of the target network earlier in 
the process so that the Facebook messaging function does not get blocked, c) to form 
personal relations with members of these social networks in real life who may be able to 
help spread the word, and finally, d) consult or collaborate with a French survey company 
to aid in distribution. Despite the manifest drawbacks of this small sample size, the 
results gathered can help direct future research both in language attitudes and in 
sociolinguistic variation studies.  
Another major limitation of this study concerns the gender distribution of the 
participants. As discussed in the results chapter, only five men responded to the survey. 
This eliminated the possibility of looking at gender as a factor in language attitudes 
specifically, and made any conclusions drawn from this study less generalizable because 
they pertain almost entirely to women. This unequal gender distribution may be due, in 
addition to the small sample size, to women self-selecting to participate in studies of this 
nature. It is possible that men are more wary of voicing their opinions and attitudes about 
sensitive topics such as language, religion and national identity. 
There were also limitations that have to do with the nature of surveys and of 
measuring attitudes. To begin with, there is no way to know for certain whether 
participants are responding truthfully to the questions that they are being asked. This is an 
inherent drawback of surveys, but one that is unavoidable. Presumably, most people are 
not willing to spend the time and effort to fill out a survey only to respond falsely; 
however, it is something that must be acknowledged as a possibility. Another inherent 
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limitation concerning surveys has to do with section placement. The final section in a 
survey will always be the most vulnerable because it is least likely to be completed. It is 
necessary, therefore, to organize the sections purposefully with full awareness of the 
possible consequences.  
As is the case with most quantitative studies, I have only been able to determine 
correlations, not causations. I have demonstrated relationships between attitudes toward 
certain languages and religion, national identity and proficiency, but I can only speculate 
about causation. This is an important distinction to call to mind when considering any 
conclusions that have been drawn.  
 
7.3 FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS  
This dissertation has opened up several directions for future research, some of 
which were noted in the discussion chapter. In this section, I highlight those areas of 
research that are the most needed. First, a follow up study needs to be done that has an 
even distribution of male and female participants, as well as a larger sample size, in order 
to be able to draw more generalizable conclusions about the language attitudes of the 
North African diaspora in France. In addition, a study with an even number of men and 
women would allow for a gender comparison. Based on previous studies that were 
discussed in the literature review, it is possible that women in this population would 
express different language attitudes than men in part because of the differences between 
life in France and life in the Maghreb for women (Sadiqi, 2003). This is supported by the 
way that language has been seen in previous studies to act as a symbol or proxy for 
freedom and changes in status and position (Gal, 1978a). This could have implications 
for language use, which could in turn have implications for sociolinguistic studies. While 
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gender is often studied in sociolinguistics, for this population it might be the case that 
linguistic behavior is influenced by an interaction between gender, religion and cultural 
identity.  
A second area that should be explored is how the method of acquiring a language 
affects language attitudes, and relatedly language variation. I suggested that the way in 
which Darija is acquired may have affected participants’ views that it is without rules and 
therefore fun and cool, as opposed to the strict grammatical and prescriptive tradition of 
learning French and Standard Arabic. This needs to be studied explicitly in order to 
understand how acquisition plays a role in attitudes and in linguistic behavior.  
Another research project could explore attitudes toward two dialects of French 
described by one participant as the French spoken by the “white French people” and the 
“argot” that she speaks with other people of Arab descent. Specifically, a study of this 
sort could examine how language attitudes toward these two varieties correlates with 
attitudes toward the majority French society and with the Arab diaspora in France. It 
could further study how attitudes toward the argot that the participant refers to correlate 
with the rate of Arabic code-switching. 
An additional research recommendation is to do a similar study on language 
attitudes for the North African diaspora in France that focuses solely on French and 
Darija, to the exclusion of Standard Arabic. The purpose of this would be to see whether 
Darija takes on the religious and prestige attributes conferred to Standard Arabic when 
the latter is no longer an option, as was the case in Belazi’s (1992) study in Tunisia. It is 
possible that Darija, when contrasted with French, will become the language that is 
viewed not only as traditional but also as religious, even if participants in this study did 
not strongly agree that Darija is better able than French to support their religious values.  
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A final future research direction is to compare the language, cultural and religious 
attitudes of second-generation North Africans with the attitudes of their parents’ 
generation. It is thought that the second generation today is more religious than their 
parents, and that they are turning more toward the culture of their heritage (Begag, 2007), 
and by extension, language (Billiez et al., 2012); however, there has not yet been a study 
of this nature which spans both generations for this population (although see Yag ̆mur and 
Akinci, 2003, for a similar study for the Turkish diaspora in France). A study like this 
would permit a more nuanced understanding of the effects of migration on language and 
cultural attitudes by exploring whether the attitudes of the second generation are, in fact, 
more potent. If so, where is this increase in positive attitudes toward religion, culture and 
language coming from? A study of this nature could explore whether it is coming from 
within their diaspora community, from other Muslim communities both in France and 
abroad, or whether it is a reaction against French culture and society.  
 
7.4 SUMMARY 
This dissertation contributes methodologically, theoretically and substantively to 
the field of language attitudes, contributions that extend into sociolinguistics, sociology, 
psychology, diaspora studies and European studies. It has helped to broaden our 
understanding of the highly marginalized North African diaspora in France via an 
exploration of language attitudes and their relationship with religious, cultural and 
national identity. There is evidence to suggest that the North African diaspora strongly 
identifies themselves with Islam and that they do not feel at home in France, a place that 
is not welcoming to their religion. These attitudes are reflected in their attitudes toward 
Arabic and French. If attitudes are a “map of the social world” (Garrett et al., 2003, p. 3), 
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and language is a fundamentally social tool, then understanding language attitudes can 
provide great insight into the social world and positioning of this population. 
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Dans cette partie vous répondrez au sujet de votre savoir des langues. 
 
1. Comparé à vos amis, camarades de classe et collègues,  
décrivez votre aptitude à parler les langues suivantes en cochant la case qui convient.   
 









     




     




2. Comparé à vos amis, camarades de classe et collègues,  
décrivez votre aptitude à comprendre les langues suivantes en cochant la case qui 
convient.   
 









     




     









Dans cette partie vous répondrez aux questions au sujet des langues. 
 
1. Quelle langue est-ce que vous considérez comme votre « propre » langue ?  
a. Le français 
b. Le tamazight 
c. L’arabe littéral 
d. L’arabe dialectal (Darija) 
 




3. Parmi les adjectifs ci-dessous, cochez la case à côté de ceux qui décrivent le mieux le 
français selon vous. Vous pouvez choisir autant d’adjectifs que vous désirez. Si vous 
voulez laisser une remarque au sujet de vos réponses, n’hésitez pas. 
 
Pratique, mort, moral, riche, flexible, beau, moderne, inutile, vivant, nécessaire, 
obsolète, religieux, prestigieux, à l’esprit fermé, traditionnel, modeste,  intéressant, 
ennuyeux, cool, laid, impoli, fier, absurde, pauvre, éduqué, sévère, intelligent, libre, 













4. Parmi les adjectifs ci-dessous, cochez la case à côté de ceux qui décrivent le mieux 
l’arabe dialectal (darija) selon vous. Vous pouvez choisir autant d’adjectifs que vous 
désirez. Si vous voulez laisser une remarque au sujet de vos réponses, n’hésitez pas. 
 
Pratique, mort, moral, riche, flexible, beau, moderne, inutile, vivant, nécessaire, 
obsolète, religieux, prestigieux, à l’esprit fermé, traditionnel, modeste,  intéressant, 
ennuyeux, cool, laid, impoli, fier, absurde, pauvre, éduqué, sévère, intelligent, libre, 











5. Parmi les adjectifs ci-dessous, cochez la case à côté de ceux qui décrivent le mieux 
l’arabe littéral  selon vous. Vous pouvez choisir autant d’adjectifs que vous désirez. Si 
vous voulez laisser une remarque au sujet de vos réponses, n’hésitez pas. 
 
Pratique, mort, moral, riche, flexible, beau, moderne, inutile, vivant, nécessaire, 
obsolète, religieux, prestigieux, à l’esprit fermé, traditionnel, modeste,  intéressant, 
ennuyeux, cool, laid, impoli, fier, absurde, pauvre, éduqué, sévère, intelligent, libre, 















Instructions: Répondez aux questions suivantes en choisissant le français, l’arabe 
dialectal (darija) ou l’arabe littéral. Si vous voulez laisser une remarque au sujet de votre 
réponse, n’hésitez pas.  
 
6. Quelle langue est-ce que vous trouvez la plus belle ?   
a. Le français 
b. L’arabe dialectal (darija) 
c. L’arabe littéral 
 





7. Quelle langue est-ce que vous trouvez la plus morale ? 
a. Le français 
b. L’arabe dialectal (darija) 
c. L’arabe littéral 
 





8. Quelle langue est-ce que vous trouvez la plus moderne ?  
a. Le français 
b. L’arabe dialectal (darija) 
c. L’arabe littéral 
 





9. Quelle langue est-ce que vous trouvez la plus cool ? 
a. Le français 
b. L’arabe dialectal (darija) 









10. Quelle langue est-ce que vous trouvez la plus pratique ? 
a. Le français 
b. L’arabe dialectal (darija) 
c. L’arabe littéral 
 





11. Quelle langue est-ce que vous trouvez la plus religieuse ?  
a. Le français 
b. L’arabe dialectal (darija) 
c. L’arabe littéral 
 





12. Quelle langue est-ce que vous trouvez la plus traditionnelle ?  
a. Le français 
b. L’arabe dialectal (darija) 
c. L’arabe littéral 
 





13. Quelle langue est-ce que vous trouvez la plus ennuyeuse ? 
a. Le français 
b. L’arabe dialectal (darija) 









14. Quelle langue est-ce que vous trouvez la plus modeste ?  
a. Le français 
b. L’arabe dialectal (darija) 
c. L’arabe littéral 
 





15. Quelle langue est-ce que vous trouvez la plus amusante ?  
a. Le français 
b. L’arabe dialectal (darija) 
c. L’arabe littéral 
 






Section 3  
 
Voici quelques remarques sur le français, l’arabe dialectal, et la vie culturelle. Pour 
chaque phrase dites si vous êtes d’accord ou non en cochant la case qui correspond le 
mieux à votre point du vue.  
 
1 = pas du tout d’accord  
5 = tout à fait d’accord 
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Je suis fier/fière d’être d’origine 
maghrébine.  
     
Je m’identifie avec des peuples d’autres 
pays arabes.  
     
Un jour, j’aimerais habiter au Maghreb.      
La religion est importante pour moi.      
La France me donne le sentiment d’être 
chez moi. 
     
J’aimerais me marier avec quelqu’un qui 
est né(e) au Maghreb.  
     
J’ai l’impression que j’ai plus de libertés en 
France qu’au Maghreb.  
     
La religion est importante pour mes parents.      
La France est un pays plus religieux que le 
Maghreb.  
     
Je me sens plus maghrébin(e) quand je 
parle en arabe dialectal (darija).  
     
L’arabe dialectal peut soutenir mieux mes 
valeurs religieuses que le français.  
     
Tous/toutes les français(es) d’origine 
maghrébine devraient connaître l’arabe 
dialectal.  
     
Je préfère me marier avec quelqu’un(e) qui 
parle l’arabe dialectal.  
     
Je participe régulièrement aux activités 
religieuses.     
     
Je voudrais que mes enfants parlent l’arabe 
dialectal.  
     
Un(e) bon(ne) citoyen(ne) français(e) parle 
uniquement français.  
     
La religion devrait faire partie de 
l’éducation des enfants. 
     
Je suis plus libre de m’exprimer en français.       
Il n’est pas important de parler en arabe 
dialectal parce que j’habite en France.  
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Section 4  
 
Dans cette partie vous répondrez aux questions personnelles de vous-même. 
 
1. Quel est votre âge? _______________   
 
2. Quel est votre sexe ? 
a. Homme 
b. Femme  
 
3. Où est-ce que vous êtes né(e)? ________________________ 
 
4. Dans quelle ville est-ce que vous habitez ? _______________  
 
5. Dans quel département est-ce que vous habitez? _______________ 
 




7. Si non, avec qui est-que vous habitez?_____________________ 
 
8. Quel est le plus haut niveau de vos études?  
a. Collège 
b. Lycée 













g. Homme au foyer 
h. Fonctionnaire 
i. Chômeur 
j. Autre : ______________ 
 







g. Femme au foyer 
h. Fonctionnaire 
i. Chômeuse 
j. Autre :______________ 
 
 
11. Où sont nés vos parents?  
a. En France 
b. En Algérie 
c. Au Maroc 
d. En Tunisie 
e. Autre :______________________  
 








h. Femme/Homme au foyer 
i. Fonctionnaire 
j. Chômeur/Chômeuse 
k. Autre :______________ 
 
13. Quelle(s) langue(s) est-ce que vous parlez?  
a. Le français 
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b. L’arabe dialectal (darija) 
c. L’arabe littéral 
d. Le tamazight 
e. Autre:_____________________ 
 
14. Combien de fois est-ce que vous visitez le Maghreb?  
a. Jamais  
b. Moins d’une fois par an 
c. Une fois par an 
d. Plus d’une fois par an 
 
15. Quelle(s) langue(s) est-ce que vous parlez quand vous êtes dans votre pays d’origine 
au Maghreb ?   
a. Le français 
b. L’arabe dialectal (darija) 
c. L’arabe littéral 




16. Combien de fois est-ce que votre famille au Maghreb visite vous et votre famille en 
France ?  
a. Jamais  
b. Moins d’une fois par an 
c. Une fois par an 
d. Plus d’une fois par an 
 




18. Avec quelle religion est-ce que vous vous identifiez? 
a. Le christianisme 
b. L’islam 
c. Le judaïsme  
d. Autre:_________ 
 







20. Avec quelle religion est-ce qu’ils s’identifient ? 
a. Le christianisme 
b. L’islam 








22. Où est-ce que votre époux(se) ou fiancé(e) est né(e)? 
a. En France 
b. En Afrique du Nord 
c. En Angle Terre 
d. En Espagne 





























Instructions : Voici quelques phrases qui ne sont pas finies. Complétez-les comme vous 
voulez. Il n’y a pas de réponse « correcte ».  
 
1. Mon devoir dans la vie est _______________________________________ 
2. Un bon mari est quelqu’un qui ____________________________________ 
3. Un(e) Arabe parle ______________________________________________ 
4. Une bonne fille est quelqu’une qui ________________________________ 
5. Un(e) bon(ne) musulman(e) parle__________________________________ 
6. Les femmes au Maghreb sont ____________________________________ 
7. La liberté, c’est ________________________________________________ 
8. Une bonne épouse est quelqu’une qui___________________________________ 
9. Chaque homme doit_________________________________________________ 
10. Mes parents souhaitent que je _______________________________________ 
11. Un bon fils est quelqu’un qui ____________________________________ 
12. La religion est ________________________________________________ 
13. Les femmes en France sont_______________________________________ 
14. Les hommes au Maghreb sont _____________________________________ 
15. Chaque femme doit _____________________________________________ 
















Instructions: Voici quelques remarques sur l’usage des langues. Cochez la case qui 
décrit le mieux la fréquence avec laquelle vous parlez chaque langue avec chaque 
personne, ou dans chaque situation. 
 
(FR-AR  veut dire un mélange de français et d’arabe dialectal) 
 
 









       
 Français       
 Arabe 
dialectal 
      
 FR-AR       
 
 













     
 Français       
 Arabe 
dialectal 
      
 FR-AR       
 
 








       
 Français       
 Arabe 
dialectal 
      
 FR-AR       
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 Français       
 Arabe 
dialectal 
      











       
 Français       
 Arabe 
dialectal 
      













       
 Français       
 Arabe 
dialectal 
      
 FR-AR       






       
 Français       
 Arabe 
dialectal 
      
 FR-AR       
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8. A la 
mosquée 
       
 Français       
 Arabe 
dialectal 
      
 FR-AR       
 
 








       
 Français       
 Arabe 
dialectal 
      
 FR-AR       
 








       
 Français       
 Arabe 
dialectal 
      
 FR-AR       
 
 








       
 Français       
 Arabe 
dialectal 
      












       
 Français       
 Arabe 
dialectal 
      
 FR-AR       
 
 






       
 Français       
 Arabe 
dialectal 
      
 FR-AR       
 
 
Voici une liste de thèmes. Indiquez quelle langue vous utilisez pour parler au sujet 
de chaque thème.  
 
 FRANÇAIS ARABE DIALECTAL FR-AR SANS OBJET 
1. La musique     
2. La religion     
3. L’argent     
4. Le travail     
5. Le travail 
scolaire 
    
6. L’amour     
 
 




Est-ce que vous seriez disposé(e) à distribuer le lien pour ce questionnaire à vos 
amis/collègues qui sont aussi d’origine maghrébine ? Si oui, vous aideriez beaucoup 
avec la recherche sur les attitudes vis-à-vis du langage en France.   
 288 




In this section you will respond to questions about your knowledge of language.  
 
1. Compared to your friends, classmates and colleagues, describe how well you speak the 
following language by checking the appropriate box.  
 









     




     
Tamazight      
 
 
2. Compared to your friends, classmates and colleagues, describe how well you 
understand the following language by checking the appropriate box.  
 









     




     













In this section you will respond to question about language.  
  
1. What language do you consider to be your “own” language?  
a. French 
b. Tamazight 
c. Standard Arabic 
d. Dialectal Arabic (Darija) 
 




3. Among the adjectives below, check the box next to those that best describe French 
according to you. You can choose as many adjectives as you like. If you would like to 
leave a comment about your response, please do not hesitate.  
 
Practical, dead, moral, rich, flexible, beautiful, modern, not useful, alive, necessary, 
obsolete, religious, prestigious, close-minded, traditional, modest, interesting, boring, 
cool, ugly, impolite, proud, absurd, poor, educated, severe, intelligent, free, fun, none of 











4. Among the adjectives below, check the box next to those that best describe Dialectal 
Arabic (Darija) according to you. You can choose as many adjectives as you like. If you 
would like to leave a comment about your response, please do not hesitate.  
 
Practical, dead, moral, rich, flexible, beautiful, modern, not useful, alive, necessary, 
obsolete, religious, prestigious, close-minded, traditional, modest, interesting, boring, 
cool, ugly, impolite, proud, absurd, poor, educated, severe, intelligent, free, fun, none of 











5. Among the adjectives below, check the box next to those that best describe Standard 
Arabic according to you. You can choose as many adjectives as you like. If you would 
like to leave a comment about your response, please do not hesitate.  
 
Practical, dead, moral, rich, flexible, beautiful, modern, not useful, alive, necessary, 
obsolete, religious, prestigious, close-minded, traditional, modest, interesting, boring, 
cool, ugly, impolite, proud, absurd, poor, educated, severe, intelligent, free, fun, none of 











Instructions: Respond to the following question by choosing French, Dialectal Arabic 
(Darija) or Standard Arabic. If you would like to leave a comment, please do not hesitate.  
 
 
6. What language do you find to be the most beautiful?   
a. French 
b. Dialectal Arabic (Darija) 
c. Standard Arabic 
 







7. What language do you find to be the most moral? 
a. French 
b. Dialectal Arabic (Darija) 
c. Standard Arabic 
 





8. What language do you find to be the most modern?  
a. French 
b. Dialectal Arabic (Darija) 
c. Standard Arabic 
 





9. What language do you find to be the coolest? 
a. French 
b. Dialectal Arabic (Darija) 
c. Standard Arabic 
 





10. What language do you find to be the most practical?  
a. French 
b. Dialectal Arabic (Darija) 
c. Standard Arabic 
 







11. What language do you find to be the most religious?   
a. French 
b. Dialectal Arabic (Darija) 
c. Standard Arabic 
 





12. What language do you find to be the most traditional?   
a. French 
b. Dialectal Arabic (Darija) 
c. Standard Arabic 
 





13 What language do you find to be the most boring?  
a. French 
b. Dialectal Arabic (Darija) 
c. Standard Arabic 
 





14. What language do you find to be the most modest?  
a. French 
b. Dialectal Arabic (Darija) 
c. Standard Arabic 
 







15. What language do you find to be the most fun?  
a. French 
b. Dialectal Arabic (Darija) 
c. Standard Arabic 
 





Section 3  
 
Here are some comments about French, Dialectal Arabic and cultural life. For each 
sentence, say whether or not you agree by checking the box that best describes your 
opinion.  
 
1 = completely disagree 
5 = completely agree 




2 3 4 5 
COMPLETELY 
AGREE 
I am proud to be of North African 
origin.  
     
I identify with people from other Arab 
countries.  
     
One day, I would like to live in the 
Maghreb.  
     
Religion is important to me.       
France feels like home to me.      
I would like to marry someone who 
was born in the Maghreb.  
     
It seems like I have more freedoms in 
France than in North Africa.  
     
Religion is important to my parents.       
France is a more religious country than 
North Africa.  
     
I feel more North African when I speak 
Dialectal Arabic (Darija).  
     
Dialectal Arabic (Darija) can maintain 
my religious values better than French.  
     
All French people of North African 
origin should know Dialectal Arabic 
(Darija).  
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I would prefer to marry someone who 
speaks Dialectal Arabic (Darija).  
     
I regularly participate in religious 
activities.  
     
I would like my children to speak 
Dialectal Arabic (Darija).  
     
A good French citizen only speaks 
French.  
     
Religion should be a part of children’s 
education.  
     
I feel freer to express myself in French.       
It isn’t important to speak Dialect 
Arabic because I live in France.  
     
 





Section 4  
 
In this section you will respond to personal questions about yourself.  
 
1. How old are you? _______________   
 




3. Where were you born? ________________________ 
 
4. What city were you born in? _______________  
 
5. What department do you live in? _______________ 
 










8. What is the highest level of your education?  
g. Middle School 
a. High School 
b. Some College 
c. College Degree 
d. Masters Degree 
e. Doctorate Degree 
 
9. What kind of job does your father (or guardian) have?  
k. Education 
l. Computer Science 
m. Medicine 
a. Engineer 
b. Manual Labor 




g. Other: ______________ 
 
10. What kind of job does your mother (or guardian) have?  
a. Education 
b. Computer Science 
c. Medicine 
d. Engineer 
e. Manual Labor 




j. Other: ______________ 
 







12. What type of job do you have? 
a. Student 





f. Manual Labor 






13. What languages do you speak?  
a. French 
b. Dialectal Arabic (Darija) 




14. How many times per year do you visit the Maghreb?  
a. Never 
b. Less than once per year 
c. Once per year 
d. More than once per year 
 
15. What language(s) do you speak when you’re in your ancestral country in North 
Africa?  
a. French 
b. Dialectal Arabic (Darija) 




16. How often does your family in the Maghreb visit you and your family in France? 
a. Never 
b. Less than once per year 
c. Once per year 
d. More than once per year 
 








c. Judaism  
d. Other: _________ 
 




20. What religion do they identify with? 
a. Christianity 
b. Islam 
c. Judaism  
d. Other: _________ 
 




22. Where was your spouse or fiancé born?  
a. France 




f. Other: ____________ 
 
23. I identify as (check all that apply): 















16. French of North African origin 





Instructions: Below are some incomplete sentences. Complete them in any way that you 
wish. There are no “correct” answers.  
 
1. My duty in life is __________________________________________________ 
2. Is good husband is someone who  _____________________________________ 
3. An Arab speaks ____________________________________________________ 
4. A good daughter is someone who _____________________________________ 
5. A good Muslims speaks ____________________________________________ 
6. Women in the Maghreb are _________________________________________ 
7. Freedom is ______________________________________________________ 
8. A good wife is someone who _______________________________________ 
9. Every man must ___________________________________________________ 
10. My parents wish that I ______________________________________________ 
11. A good son is someone who _____________________________________ 
12. Religion is __________________________________________________ 
13. Women in France are___________________________________________ 
14. Men in the Maghreb are  _________________________________________ 
15. Every woman must ____________________________________________ 






Instructions: Below are some remarks on the use of language. Check the box that best 
describes the frequency with which you speak language with each person or in each 
situation.  
 
(FR-AR means a mix of French and Dialectal Arabic (Darija))  
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 French       
 Dialectal 
Arabic 
      
 FR-AR       
 
 








       
 French       
 Dialectal 
Arabic 
      











       
 French       
 Dialectal 
Arabic 
      
 FR-AR       
  NEVER SOMETIMES OFTEN VERY 
OFTEN 
ALWAYS N/A 
3.  With 
your 
friends 
       
 French       
 Dialectal 
Arabic 
      




  NEVER SOMETIMES OFTEN VERY 
OFTEN 
ALWAYS N/A 
5. At the 
bar/club 
       
 French       
 Dialectal 
Arabic 
      
 FR-AR       
 
 





       
 French       
 Dialectal 
Arabic 
      
 FR-AR       
 





       
 French       
 Dialectal 
Arabic 
      
 FR-AR       
 
 
  NEVER SOMETIMES OFTEN VERY 
OFTEN 
ALWAYS N/A 
8. At the 
Mosque  
       
 French       
 Dialectal 
Arabic 
      














       
 French       
 Dialectal 
Arabic 
      
 FR-AR       
 
  NEVER SOMETIMES OFTEN VERY 
OFTEN 
ALWAYS N/A 
10. To give 
directions 
       
 French       
 Dialectal 
Arabic 
      
 FR-AR       
 






       
 French       
 Dialectal 
Arabic 
      
 FR-AR       
 
 






       
 French       
 Dialectal 
Arabic 
      












       
 French       
 Dialectal 
Arabic 
      
 FR-AR       
 
 
Below is a list of themes. Indicate which language you use to talk about each theme.  
 
 FRENCH DIALECTAL ARABIC FR-AR N/A 
Music     
Religion     
Money     
Work     
School work     








Would you be willing to distribute the link to this questionnaire to your 
friends/colleagues who are also of North African origin? If so, you will help with the 
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